Hollis v. Hollis (Upton)

• Decision Date: 16 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-CA-00482-SCT,93-CA-00482-SCT
• Citation: 650 So.2d 1371
• Parties: Harold E. HOLLIS v. Blanche N. HOLLIS (UPTON).
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1371

650 So.2d 1371

Harold E. HOLLIS v. Blanche N. HOLLIS (UPTON).

No. 93-CA-00482-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 16, 1995.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1995.

John Robert White, Jackson, E. Michael Marks, Jackson, for appellant.

Katherine S. Kerby, Gholson Hicks Nichols & Ward, Columbus, for appellee.

Before HAWKINS, C.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ.

HAWKINS, Chief Justice.

The majority of the contentions in this case arise from an antenuptial agreement entered into by the parties on July 16, 1986. Four years later, in July of 1990, Harold E. Hollis (hereinafter Harold) and Blanche Hollis (hereinafter Blanche) joined in a Consent to Divorce decree on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. A final Judgment of Divorce which enforced portions of the antenuptial agreement was then entered on December 17, 1990, by Judge Woodrow W. Brand in the Chancery Court of Lowndes County. On January 15, 1991, Harold appealed the final judgment to this Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision on January 15, 1992. Hollis v. Hollis, 594 So.2d 1149 (Miss.1992). A Petition for Rehearing was then filed in February of 1992 and was denied on March 25, 1992. Hollis, 594 So.2d 1149.

In September of 1992, Blanche remarried. Soon thereafter, on October 19, 1992, Harold filed a Motion for Modification of Final Judgment of Divorce and For Alternative Relief. On November 16, 1992, Blanche filed an Answer to this motion and a hearing was held in front of Judge Brand on April 12, 1993. Ten days later, Judge Brand entered a Decree which denied Harold's Motion for Modification of Final Judgment of Divorce and For Alternative Relief.

Aggrieved by the court's decision, Harold filed a Notice of Appeal on April 29, 1993.

FACTS

On July 16, 1986, the soon-to-be-married Harold Hollis and Blanche Bobitt entered into an antenuptial agreement. This agreement reads in part:

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the marriage about to be entered into 1. Husband and wife intend to marry each other soon, and it is agreed that after such marriage all the properties of any name or nature, real or personal, belonging to husband before marriage shall be and remain forever, his personal estate, excepting the following conditions of intent.

by and between said parties and the further consideration of mutual agreements herein contained the parties hereto agree as follows:

(a.) Husband [Harold] agrees to bestow his retirement benefits with a reasonable and comfortable monthly income to his wife [Blanche] so long as she may live.

(b.) The promise of intent to provide the home for the wife so long as she may live.

2. All properties of any name or nature, real or personal, wherever the same may be found which belong to wife before marriage, shall be and remain forever her personal estate.

3. It is agreed that after the marriage, all monies earned, interest, rents, and profits of any nature will be shared equally. It is agreed that all property, real or personal, acquired after the marriage, shall be shared and owned equally.

Four years later, the couple decided to go their separate ways. On July 23, 1990, Harold and Blanche signed a Consent to Divorce which reads:

Come now Blanche N. Hollis and Harold E. Hollis and each give their consent to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences as provided for by Mississippi Code Annotated Sec. 93-5-2, as amended in March, 1990. The parties each agree that they wish a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and consent specifically to the stipulation that all issues raised by the pleadings including but not limited to all property rights, alimony rights, contract rights, and all financial issues not agreed upon in this consent and agreement shall be determined by the court and that the determination given shall be a binding and lawful judgment subject to right of appeal.

A Final Judgment of divorce was entered on December 17, 1990, by Judge Brand in the Chancery Court of Lowndes County. Parts IV. and V. of the judgment deal with post-divorce payments to be made by Harold to Blanche and the division of property:

IV.

The Court does specifically enforce the terms of the agreement entered into by the parties in paragraph 1(a) and Harold E. Hollis is directed to pay unto Blanche N. Hollis the amount of $650.00 per month due on the 1st of each succeeding month beginning November 1, 1989.

V.

The parties stipulated at the time of trial and the court does hereby approve and adopt as part of this decree those stipulations that Blanche N. Hollis is awarded exclusive ownership, possession and control of a 1987 Buick automobile and she is to assume any outstanding indebtedness thereon; Blanche N. Hollis shall execute, if not already done so, an assignment to Harold E. Hollis to a 1988 Southwind motor home; Harold E. Hollis assumes and will pay all outstanding debt on the 1988 Southwind motor home; Blanche N. Hollis shall assign any interest she may have in the Hideaway Harbor Resort contract to Harold E. Hollis and Harold E. Hollis assumes and pays any debt associated with the Hideaway Harbor Resort; Blanche N. Hollis has no claim to the former marital residence wherein Harold E. Hollis now resides; Harold E. Hollis has no claim to the mobile home in which Blanche N. Hollis now resides; all items of personal property have been previously divided.

Harold filed a Notice of Appeal to this original case on January 15, 1991. In his brief on appeal he cited as issues to be considered 1. The trial court erred by considering the document entitled "antenuptial Agreement" as a basis for its decision because the document was never accepted into evidence and was not properly before the court for its consideration.

2. The trial court, if it did not err in considering the document entitled "antenuptial Agreement" in reaching its decision because it was not accepted into evidence, erred in finding that said agreement was enforceable, and should have found that said agreement was unenforceable because it was not the entire document and/or because it is too vague, uncertain, inconsistent and contradictory.

3. The trial court, if it did not err in considering the document entitled "antenuptial Agreement" as a basis for its decision because it was never accepted into evidence and in finding that said agreement was enforceable, erred in its interpretation of said agreement by not considering the whole of the document and by enforcing only one fragmentary portion thereof, thereby creating an unjust result.

After reviewing the original appeal, this court affirmed the ruling of the lower court per curiam on January 15, 1992. Hollis v. Hollis, 594 So.2d 1149. Harold responded by filing a Petition for Rehearing in February of 1992. In that petition he listed as issues:

I.

Whether the Chancery Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, erred in specifically enforcing only one term of the purported agreement, and not the agreement as a whole.

II.

Whether the Chancery Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi, erred in basing its judgment on a document which was never accepted into evidence where there was conflicting testimony as to the completeness of said document.

This petition was denied on March 25, 1992. Hollis, 594 So.2d 1149.

On September 4, 1992, Blanche remarried. By October 19, 1992, Harold filed a Motion for Modification of Final Judgement of Divorce and for Alternative Relief. In this Motion he asked that the judge modify the antenuptial agreement to excuse him "from further 'bestowing his retirement benefits ... to his wife so long as she may live' since it is clearly now and was not then the intent of the parties that the said Movant should ever continue to support another man's wife." He further requested that Paragraph 3 of the agreement be enforced so that:

'... all property, real or personal, acquired after the marriage shall be shared and owned equally,' and in such event, the Movant prays for a full and complete accounting of the present estate, assets, both real and personal, and net financial worth of the Respondent [Blanche] after which time the Court should divide and apportion equally all of the property of the Movant [Harold] and Respondent equally between each other.

In conclusion he asked the court to excuse him from making further payments to Blanche or, in the alternative, to order an accounting of Blanche's estate and assets and to grant him ownership of all property, real or personal, acquired by Blanche since their marriage or "more specifically, since any such time as the Respondent might have acquired such estate or assets, including income and earnings, since the marriage of the parties." Finally, he requested the court to have Blanche refund to him $22,750.00 "or any additional sum paid to the Respondent up until a hearing of this Motion that has been advanced to the Respondent by the Movant since the date of the divorce since the inequities between the parties are now so great and since the Movant is practically destitute."

On November 16, 1992, Blanche filed an Answer in which she stated that Harold's Motion should be dismissed as it failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted and further that The allegations of the Motion for Modification of the Final Judgment of Divorce and for Alternative Relief are barred as a result of the application of res judicata and/or are moot as a result of a Final Decree of Divorce entered into in Cause # 24,787, appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court with Docket # 91-CA-0068, as the issues raised by the present pleading were adjudicated in said appeal and same asserted in the Petition for Rehearing filed in said cause.

She also went on to state that:

... since rendition of the Final Judgment on December 17, 1990, there has been [no] material change in facts and circumstances that would warrant the court to modify the terms and conditions of the Final Judgment dated December 17,...