Hollis v. Johnston-Tombigbee Furniture Manufacturing Company, Civil Action No. 1:93cv346-D-D (N.D. Miss. 12/ /1994), Civil Action No. 1:93cv346-D-D.
| Decision Date | 01 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:93cv346-D-D. |
| Parties | JOE HOLLIS, PLAINTIFF, v. JOHNSTON-TOMBIGBEE FURNITURE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Before the undersigned is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. Finding that there exist genuine issues of material fact only as to one of the plaintiff's claims, the defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiff Joe Hollis was employed by the defendant Johnston-Tombigbee Furniture Manufacturing Company (hereinafter "JTB") for two years as a lumber grader. In July of 1992, JTB terminated Hollis, and stated the reason for his termination was that the company required a certified lumber grader in his position. Mr. Hollis was not certified, but he was sixty-seven (67) years old at the time he was fired. Hollis filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC"), and an investigation followed. JTB subsequently offered to re-hire the plaintiff, did so, and placed him in a salaried position within the paint department of the company. The plaintiff returned to work on February 8, 1993. In the presence of representatives of both the company and the EEOC on July 13, 1993, Hollis signed a release withdrawing his EEOC charge. On August 27, 1993, the plaintiff was told by plant managers that the company was cutting back and eliminating some salaried positions. The plaintiff's position was to be included in this cutback. After inquiring about another employment within the company, the plaintiff was told that he could possibly be placed in an hourly-wage job, but that it would mean a substantial decrease in pay.1 Were the plaintiff interested in such a position, he was to return on the following Monday. The plaintiff did not return to work on Monday nor any day after that. The plaintiff contends that he was fired on that eventful day, while the defendant asserts that he voluntarily quit by not returning to work the next week.2
Instead of returning to JTB, the plaintiff filed a new claim with the EEOC charging both race and age discrimination. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed this action, alleging claims of race and age discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and breach of a negotiated settlement agreement. After suit was filed in this court, the plaintiff received a "right-to-sue letter" from the EEOC which stated that the EEOC believed that although 180 days had not passed since the filing of the plaintiff's EEOC claim, the EEOC believed that it could not process his claims within 180 days. The defendant has now moved this court to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, or in the alternative to grant the defendant a judgment as a matter of law. This court will address the defendant's motion only as a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. F.R.C.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After a proper motion for summary judgment is made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hanks v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir. 1992). If the non-movant sets forth specific facts in support of allegations essential to his claim, a genuine issue is presented. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. v. Krajl, 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992).
Initially, the defendants attack the plaintiff's claims on two similar grounds, both of which gravitate around the "right-to-sue" letter received by the plaintiff from the EEOC. In short, the defendant's positions are that:
1) the plaintiff filed his suit in this court before receiving the right-to-sue letter, and therefore this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims; and
2) the EEOC was without authority to issue the plaintiff a right-to-sue letter, because less than 180 days had passed since the plaintiff had filed his complaint with the EEOC.
The court will address these arguments separately before reaching the potential merits of the plaintiff's claims.
The defendant's argument in this regard is based upon the assumption that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite to the filing of a claim under Title VII. However, this is not the case. A right to sue letter is not a jurisdictional requisite to the commencement of an action, but it is a requisite to the completion of an action under Title VII. The plaintiff's possession of a right-to-sue letter is a statutory condition precedent which can be fulfilled after the filing of a lawsuit. Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal without prejudice if he has yet to obtain a right-to-sue letter, but the defect is cured if he receives one before the court addresses the matter. Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1215; James v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 818 F.Supp. 987, 990 (N.D. Tex. 1993). In the case at bar, Mr. Hollis did in fact receive a right to sue letter before this court addressed the matter. In fact, Mr. Hollis obtained his letter on November 23, 1993, on a date before the defendant had even responded in any fashion to the plaintiff's complaint. This action will not be dismissed for the plaintiff's failure to receive his right-to-sue letter before his filed the instant action.
The defendant also asserts that pursuant to the 180-day requirement contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the EEOC is without authority to issue a right-to-sue letter before the expiration of this specified time period of 180 days. The EEOC issued the letter in this case pursuant to a regulation that permits early notice if it is probable that the EEOC will be unable to administratively process the plaintiff's claim within the 180 day time limit. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). It is the defendant's position that the EEOC does not have the power to issue such a regulation because of the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) creates a mandatory choice for the EEOC to either dismiss the claim or wait 180 days before issuing a right-to-sue letter. This court is cognizant of this argument and its history. See, e.g., Valerie J. Pacer, The Early Right-To-Sue Letter: Has the EEOC Exceeded Its Authority?, 72 Wash. U.L.Q. 757 (1994). Some District Courts around the country are in agreement with the defendant on this issue. E.g., Henschke v. New York Hospital, 821 F.Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F.Supp. 34, 36 (D.Colo. 1983); Loney v. Carr-Lowrey Glass Co., 458 F.Supp. 1080, 1081 (D. Md. 1978). However, at least two Circuit Courts disagree, and hold that the EEOC has the discretion to issue early right-to-sue letters pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). This has been the rule in the Ninth Circuit for some time. E.g., Brown v. Puguet Sound Elec. App. & Train. Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984); Bryant v. California Brewer's Ass'n., 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1978). Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit recently adopted the same viewpoint. Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (11th Cir. 1994). While the Fifth Circuit has never addressed this issue, a sister court within this circuit has, and has determined that the EEOC regulation is valid. Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F.Supp. 174, 189 (E.D. Tex. 1980). This court agrees. There is no legitimate purpose that wold be served by dismissing this claim without prejudice and forcing the plaintiff to undergo further delay. A plaintiff should not be required to sit and "twiddle his thumbs" when the EEOC is fully aware that they will not be able to process his claim timely. The challenged EEOC regulation comports with the legislative scheme which underlies 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), and the EEOC has been mandated to promulgate regulations to implement that statute. The plaintiff has received his right-to-sue letter and is properly before this court on the claims asserted in his filed claim with the EEOC.
One of the plaintiff's claims is that the defendant breached a negotiated settlement agreement which was reached in conjunction with the withdrawal of the plaintiff's prior EEOC claim. The claim is presented by the plaintiff as one arising under state law. Consistent with this approach, the plaintiff did not file a claim with the EEOC to enforce the agreement. The defendant, however, takes the position that if in fact there was a settlement agreement reached, it was done under the provisions of federal discrimination law. Because of this, the defendant proposes, an action to enforce such an agreement must be brought under Title VII like any other claim — and the plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action in federal court. Apparen...
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