Hollis v. Tanner
| Decision Date | 10 February 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 71880,71880 |
| Parties | HOLLIS v. TANNER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Gary J. Leshaw, Decatur, Thomas D. Sutton, Atlanta, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Wayne P. Yancey, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Susan L. Rutherford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ronald J. Armstrong, Tucker, for appellees.
This is an appeal from a superior court order upholding the denial of the appellant's application for unemployment benefits.
The appellant has for some 15 years been an employee of the Head Start program operated by Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc. (EOA). Head Start is a federally funded program designed to provide children from low-income families who have not reached the age of compulsory school attendance "such comprehensive health, nutritional, educational, social, and other services as will aid the children to attain their full potential." 42 USC § 9833.
Because Head Start is active only during the school year, its employees are customarily laid off during the summer months; and they customarily have, in the past, applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits during such months. Following her normal pattern, the appellant made application for unemployment benefits on May 25, 1984, for the week beginning May 20, 1984. Her claim was denied on June 13, 1984, for the stated reason that she "performed services for a public or non-profit educational institution" and was consequently ineligible for benefits under OCGA § 34-8-152(a).
Simply stated, OCGA § 34-8-152(a) bars payment of unemployment compensation benefits to employees of any "public or nonprofit educational institution" for periods of unemployment occurring between academic years or terms, where there is a reasonable assurance that such employees will return to their jobs the following term. Prior to 1984, the Employment Security Agency of the Georgia Department of Labor, which administers the unemployment insurance program in Georgia, had not considered Head Start programs to be encompassed by the term "educational institution" and thus had not considered employees of such programs who were laid off during the summer months to be ineligible for unemployment benefits during those months. That policy changed for a brief period following the enactment of an amendment to § 34-8-152(a) in 1984, making the "between terms" exclusion applicable to individuals performing services "in a public or nonprofit educational institution while in the employ of an educational service agency." Ga.L.1984, p. 861, § 6 (OCGA § 34-8-152(a)(4)).
Although the term "educational service agency" was specifically defined by the amendment to mean "a governmental agency or governmental entity which is established and operated exclusively for the purpose of providing such services to one or more public or nonprofit educational institutions," the Georgia Department of Labor initially interpreted the term as encompassing Head Start programs; and it was on the basis of that admittedly mistaken interpretation that the appellant's claim for benefits was denied in June of 1984. In July of that same year, however, the department reinstated its former interpretation of the law to the effect that Head Start employees did not provide services to public or nonprofit educational institutions and thus were not ineligible to receive unemployment benefits during the summer months.
Upon discovering the department's change in policy, the appellant, on July 17, 1984, attempted for the first time to appeal the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. The hearing officer to whom the case was assigned rejected her appeal as untimely because it had not been filed within the 10-day period provided for by OCGA § 34-8-171. That decision was ultimately upheld both by the Commissioner of Labor and by the Superior Court of Fulton County, whereupon we granted the appellant's application for a discretionary appeal to this court.
It is undisputed that the appellant was provided with written notice of her appeal rights at the time she was notified of the rejection of her claim. At issue in this appeal is whether that notice was legally sufficient. The appellant contends that the written notice was not sufficient because she is illiterate and because the claims representative with whom she dealt knew it. The hearing officer rejected this contention based on a determination that "the claimant at least partially completed the statements on [the application form] which would indicate ... that she has some reading and writing abilities." Additionally, the appellant contends that the time limitation for filing an appeal should not be strictly enforced in the present case, since the department's rejection of her claim was based on a legal interpretation which it now concedes to have been erroneous. Held:
1....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Green v. Green, S93A0780
...rights. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank etc. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, [657,] 94 L.Ed. 865 (1949)." Hollis v. Tanner, 177 Ga.App. 759, 761, 341 S.E.2d 290 (1986). Accord Allen v. Board of Tax Assessors of Paulding Co., 247 Ga. 568, 277 S.E.2d 660 (1981), where this Court applied......
- Collins v. State, 71862
-
Youngblood v. State
...requires that notice be given in a way calculated to allow interested parties to protect their rights. See Hollis v. Tanner, 177 Ga.App. 759, 761, 341 S.E.2d 290 (1986). Notice in this instance was sufficient to permit the tax-protestors to intervene successfully and to present their argume......
-
Fed v. Butler, A14A0196.
...a specific statute applicable to a particular agency may provide for additional procedures. See generally Hollis v. Tanner, 177 Ga.App. 759, 761(1), 341 S.E.2d 290 (1986). 3. “The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.” OCGA § ...