Hollis v. United States
Decision Date | 23 January 2019 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-351-WKW [WO] |
Parties | SHEDRICK D. HOLLIS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Before the court is petitioner Shedrick D. Hollis's ("Hollis") pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by a person in federal custody. Doc. No. 1.1
In March 2013, a jury found Hollis guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 1 and 2); one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count 3); and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) & 924(e) (Count 4). Doc. No. 15-26. After a sentencing hearing on August 6, 2013, the district court sentenced Hollis to 420 months in prison, consisting of concurrent terms of 360 months on Counts 1, 2, and 4 and a consecutive term of 60 months on Count 3. Doc. No. 15-27; Doc. No. 1-7 at 1-2.
Hollis appealed, arguing that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drug and firearm evidence found in the apartment where he was arrested; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony from the defense's forensic expert regarding the sufficiency of a latent fingerprint for comparison. See Doc. No. 15-29. On March 12, 2105, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion affirming Hollis's convictions and sentence. United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2015); Doc. No. 15-30. Hollis filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which that court denied on October 5, 2015. Doc. No. 15-31.
On May 5, 2016, Hollis filed this § 2255 motion asserting the following claims:
Doc. No. 1 at 4-10; Doc. No. 1-1 through 1-3; Doc. No. 2 at 2-20.2
For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Hollis's § 2255 motion should be denied without an evidentiary hearing and this action be dismissed with prejudice. Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts.3
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A prisoner may have relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Walker, 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated against the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 689. Second, the petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. See Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
Scrutiny of counsel's performance is "highly deferential," and the court indulges a "strong presumption" that counsel's performance was reasonable. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will "avoid second-guessing counsel's performance: It does not follow that any counsel who takes an approach [the court] would not have chosen is guilty of rendering ineffective assistance." Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). "Given the strong presumption in favor of competence, the petitioner's burden of persuasion—though the presumption is not insurmountable—is a heavy one." Id.
As noted, under the prejudice component of Strickland, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The prejudice prong does not focus only on the outcome; rather, to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient representation rendered the result of the trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (). "Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him." Id. at 372.
Unless a petitioner satisfies the showings required on both prongs of the Strickland inquiry, relief should be denied. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Once a court decides that one of the requisite showings has not been made, it need not decide whether the other one has been. Id. at 697; Duren v. Hopper, 161 F.3d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1998).
A criminal defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel continues through direct appeal. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may be shown if the movant can Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1994).
a. Failure to investigate defense's own expert. Hollis claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the defense's forensic expert to determine if he was qualified as an expert in latent fingerprint analysis. Doc. No. 1 at 4; Doc. No. 2 at 2-5.
In a search of the apartment where Hollis was arrested, officers discovered about a pound of...
To continue reading
Request your trial