Holloman v. State
| Decision Date | 22 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21A0848 |
| Citation | 360 Ga.App. 812,861 S.E.2d 644 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | HOLLOMAN v. The STATE. |
Leslie Spornberger Jones, for Appellant.
James Bradley Smith, District Attorney, Jeffrey Michael Perry, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Following a domestic dispute with his daughter, Davy Macio Holloman was found guilty of battery. The trial court denied Holloman's motion for new trial, and he now appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient and that he was denied his right to a fair trial because the State exercised its peremptory challenges to strike all persons of color from the jury. We affirm.
1. Holloman first argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, the proper standard for review is whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [The appellate court] does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Harper v. State , 298 Ga. 158, 780 S.E.2d 308 (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The evidence presented at trial showed that on April 23, 2016, around 9:00 p.m., a 911 dispatcher received a call from Lolita Freeman, the mother of the 16-year-old victim. Freeman told the dispatcher that Holloman, the victim's father, had been drinking and that he "came in [her apartment] and jumped on [the victim]," and the two of them were fighting. Freeman asked the dispatcher to send the police to get Holloman, who did not live at the apartment, "out of [her] house" and stated that she should have never opened the door for him.
When officers arrived at the apartment, they encountered the victim, the victim's boyfriend, Freeman, and Holloman. Audio from the officers’ body microphones was admitted at trial. In the audio, Freeman explained to the officers that an intoxicated Holloman came to her home and was upset that the victim had a boyfriend. She stated that when she let Holloman into her apartment, "he just went crazy" and hit the boyfriend, and then the victim and Holloman "just went in." The boyfriend told the officers that Holloman did not hit him but pushed his face, and that when he moved back, Holloman fell. He stated that Holloman then tackled the victim and the two of them began fighting. The boyfriend stated further that he had to pull Holloman off of the victim. The victim told the officers that Holloman punched her in the face although she was unsure whether he did so intentionally. She explained that she became angry and pushed Holloman. Holloman then "came back at [her]" and grabbed her arms causing her to fall onto the floor and scrape her knee. A photo of the victim's scraped and bloody knee was admitted into evidence.
Holloman was charged with simple battery against the victim's boyfriend and family violence battery for "intentionally caus[ing] visible bodily harm to the person of [the victim] ... by striking her and causing her to fall."
At trial, the officers testified that Freeman, the victim, and the victim's boyfriend described to them that Holloman either hit the victim, "jumped on" her, or attacked her. The victim explained that Holloman "was basically mad because [her] boyfriend was there and [Holloman] didn't like him." She denied that Holloman hit her, testifying that he "fell over because he was so drunk," causing her to fall and scrape her knee. The victim did not recall telling the officers that Holloman "struck [her] in the face." Similarly, Freeman testified that Holloman did not like the fact that the victim had a boyfriend. She explained she could not remember many details from the incident, but that the victim scraped her knee while "beat[ing] up her dad." Like the victim, Freeman stated that she did not recall telling the officers that Holloman struck the victim with his hand. The victim's boyfriend testified that he did not remember many details of the incident but did recall that Holloman did not hit him. He also did not recall telling police that Holloman hit the victim.
Following the presentation of evidence, the jury found Holloman guilty of family violence battery against the victim, but not guilty of simple battery against the victim's boyfriend.
Although at trial the victim recanted her statement to police that Holloman hit her, explaining that he only fell into her, the jury heard her statements at the scene. The jury also heard the victim's boyfriend tell police that Holloman tackled the victim, and the victim's mother tell the 911 dispatcher that Holloman "jumped on [the victim]." "We do not re-weigh testimony, determine witness credibility, or address assertions of conflicting evidence; our role is to determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Stone v. State , 358 Ga. App. 98, 99, 853 S.E.2d 682 (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted). "This is true even in cases in which the victim recants her previous accusation against the defendant." Andrews v. State , 275 Ga. App. 426, 429 (1), 620 S.E.2d 629 (2005).
The evidence here was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty on the charge of family violence battery for intentionally causing visible bodily harm to the victim by striking her, causing her to fall. See OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a) and (b) ( ); see also OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (f) (1) and (2) (); Andrews , supra () (citations and punctuation omitted).
2. Holloman asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury when the State exercised its peremptory challenges to strike all persons of color from the jury, "leaving him to be tried by an all-white jury."
Batson [v. Kentucky , 476 U. S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.E[d.2]d 69 (1986) ] established a three-step process for evaluating claims of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes: (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent's discriminatory intent.
Suggs v. State , 310 Ga. 762, 765 (3), 854 S.E.2d 674 (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). "We review the denial of a Batson motion under a clearly erroneous standard." Ford v. State , 298 Ga. 560, 565 (6), 783 S.E.2d 906 (2016). And "[a] trial court's finding as to whether the opponent of a strike has proven discriminatory intent is entitled to great deference." Blackshear v. State , 285 Ga. 619, 620 (3), 680 S.E.2d 850 (2009).
The court empaneled 18 prospective jurors so that Holloman could be tried by a jury of six. See OCGA § 15-12-125 (). Following voir dire, Holloman's counsel moved to strike the panel on the ground that there was only one person "of color who is on the panel, and the population in Barrow County would be 30 percent – roughly 30.5 percent African American to 59.7 percent White American, and 3.8 percent Hispanic." The trial court denied defense counsel's motion.
The State then used its peremptory strikes to remove an African-American and a Hispanic panelist, and the parties do not dispute that this resulted in an all-Caucasian jury. Defense counsel objected to the State's use of its peremptory strikes to strike "all of the people of color," and the trial court asked the State to respond. The African-American panelist stated during voir dire that he had been arrested for drag racing in...
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