Holloway v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Division

• Decision Date: 14 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 7,M,7
• Citation: 250 N.W.2d 736,399 Mich. 617
• Parties: Brenda HOLLOWAY, by her next friend, Sharon H. Holloway, and Sharon Holloway, as administratrix of the Estate of Ernest T. Holloway, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION, a Foreign Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Eaton County and Eaton County Road Commission, Defendant. ay Term.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 736

250 N.W.2d 736

399 Mich. 617

Brenda HOLLOWAY, by her next friend, Sharon H. Holloway, and

Sharon Holloway, as administratrix of the Estate

of Ernest T. Holloway, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION, a Foreign

Corporation, Defendant-Appellee,

and

Eaton County and Eaton County Road Commission, Defendant.

No. 7, May Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 14, 1977.

Richard J. Abood, William E. Rheaume, Abood, Abood & Abood, P.C., Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan by Grant J. Gruel and Kenneth L. Block, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellee.

FITZGERALD, Justice.

An allegedly defective automobile wheel assembly provides yet another occasion to examine Michigan products liability law. The specific question is whether the trial court correctly awarded defendant General Motors a directed verdict because no proofs were introduced which would indicate or permit the reasonable inference that the right front ball joint assembly was defectively designed, constructed with defective material, or improperly assembled. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's decision, and we likewise believe that a directed verdict was properly awarded for defendants.

On May 28, 1971, Ernest T. Holloway was traveling between 50 and 55 miles an hour on Nixon Road in Eaton County, when he lost control of his 1967 Chevrolet automobile and struck a telephone pole. Holloway was killed and his minor daughter, Brenda, sustained multiple injuries. The accident was allegedly caused by a defective ball joint assembly in the right front wheel, which broke while traveling over chuckholes in the road.

Plaintiff, surviving wife Sharon, filed suit for damages against General Motors, Eaton County, and the Eaton County Road Commission. At the close of trial, a verdict of no cause of action was entered in favor of Eaton County and the Commission. Defendant General Motors was awarded a directed verdict because no proofs were introduced to permit the inference of a breach of warranty due to a failure of the vehicle's suspension system when it had performed more than four years covering some 47,000 miles without evidence of a part failure.

Plaintiff appealed, and Judge O'Hara, writing for the majority below, viewed the Court of Appeals position as having to choose between two mutually exclusive rules of law as set forth in Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965), and Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., 376 Mich. 98, 135 N.W.2d 388 (1965). Piercefield required that a plaintiff must 'prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains.' ¹ The rule in Bronson, gleaned from the passage quoted in the margin, ² is that even in the absence of competent direct evidence, it is error to conclude as a matter of law that a prima facie case cannot be established where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, permits reasonable minds to differ as to the legitimate inferences that might be drawn from the proofs submitted. The Court elected to follow Piercefield which requires 'more than accident and injury to constitute a jury-submissible question of breach of implied warranty of fitness for the purpose intended.' ³ Unable to find any testimony which would indicate defective design or material, and in the absence of any evidence suggesting improper assembly, the Court affirmed the trial judge's award of the directed verdict for defendant.

The dissenting opinion, however, viewed the two cases as being consistent. Piercefield is interpreted as detailing What a plaintiff is required to prove in a products liability claim, '(namely), 'a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between that defect and the injury or damage". Bronson is seen as expanding upon this rule by 'explaining How a plaintiff could prove the claim, by the introduction of direct proof and through the inferences which the jury might draw from that proof'. The dissent concluded that sufficient credible evidence existed which would permit a jury to infer the existence of a defect.

While we share the concern expressed by Judge O'Hara, that the absence of clearly defined rules to be applied in product liability cases may lead to 'ad hoc disposition, case by case', the alternative need not be a choice between what are viewed as two conflicting lines of authority. This Court recently stated in Caldwell v. Fox, 394 Mich. 401, 410, 231 N.W.2d 46, 50 (1975), and Kupkowski v. Avis Ford, Inc., 395 Mich. 155, 235 N.W.2d 324 (1975), that in order to prevail in either a breach of warranty or negligence action a plaintiff must 'prove a defect attributable to the manufacturer and causal connection between that defect and the injury or damage of which he complains'. Both direct and circumstantial evidence may be introduced to prove such a defect. ⁴ To the extent that the Court of Appeals opinion is interpreted as limiting evidence considered in products liability cases to Direct proofs, we wish to make clear that the existence of a defective condition may be inferred from circumstantial evidence alone. Caldwell v. Fox, supra; Schedlbauer v. Chris-Craft Corp., 381 Mich. 217, 160 N.W.2d 889 (1968); Bronson v. J. L. Hudson Co., supra. In the instant case there was no demonstrable malfunction which would have provided unequivocal and direct evidence that a defect existed in the right front ball joint assembly when the vehicle left control of the manufacturer, defendant General Motors. Therefore, we must review the circumstantial evidence which plaintiff believes will permit a reasonable inference that such a defect existed.

Plaintiff's brief states that more than ample proof has been presented at trial to show that a failure of the right front ball joint occurred on the roadway which caused the vehicle to slide to the right, leave the road, and collide with a telephone pole. In support of this position, plaintiff offered testimony from an expert witness that this type of failure is not expected 'from driving a car at 55 or 50 miles an hour over a rough road'. The witness is an independent consulting physicist who stated that in his opinion the failure occurred on the roadway because of the hazardous condition of the road which resulted in the decedent's inability to control the vehicle. Upon further cross examination, he testified that his expertise was not that of a qualified metallurgist and therefore he could not testify as to stress and design analysis, material strength, or any other aspect of metallurgy that would explain the breakage in the ball joint. The testimony of this witness, however, assumes that which is sought to be proved, and does not address the question of whether a defect was present in the ball joint assembly which would cause such a failure to occur.

Plaintiff further directs our attention to the Absence of testimony indicating that (1) the vehicle was improperly maintained and (2) failures of this type are expected to occur in vehicles after they have been operated for a four-year period. Apparently we are asked to conclude from this that the ball joint failure could be attributed to defective material or design, or improper assembly. In Kupkowski v. Avis Ford, Inc., supra, we rejected plaintiff's attempt to prove a braking system defective by the absence of evidence indicating repair or replacement of the brake parts. In that case, lack of repair or maintenance records invited the inference that none had been performed and, by further inference, this caused the alleged defect that existed in the vehicle's braking system to remain undiscovered and, therefore, unrepaired. The latter inference was ruled as impermissible conjecture not properly based upon a known positive fact. See, also, Kaminski v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 347 Mich. 417, 79 N.W.2d 899 (1956).

The difficulty in asserting lack of evidence as a basis for reasonably inferring the existence of a defective automobile part is readily apparent. Because no testimony was introduced that the vehicle was Improperly maintained, the jury is asked to conclude that the decedent's loss of control could be attributable to a defective ball joint assembly. Reviewing the theories advanced in Kupkowski and the instant case, we are urged to conclude that either an alleged defect would have been discoverable or all other causes of the failure were eliminated, depending upon whether testimony of proper or improper maintenance is absent from the record. In either case the inferences drawn are improper and are in direct contradiction of the established rule that the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove, not the defendant to disprove, the existence of a defect and its causal connection with the injury or damage suffered. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., supra; Kupkowski v. Avis Ford, Inc., supra.

It is agreed that if a question of fact exists upon which reasonable persons may differ, the trial judge should not direct a verdict for defendant. Once granted, however, to determine on review whether such verdict is proper, we must accord plaintiff the benefit of viewing the testimony and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Caldwell v. Fox, supra. We have considered other evidence in the record which might be helpful to plaintiff in establishing a prima facie case, yet remain convinced that the trial court properly directed a verdict for defendant.

A nearby resident testified that she heard a 'loud bang' from inside her home and, after walking to her doorway, saw the Holloway vehicle, airborne, striking a telephone pole. An investigating officer testified that he observed marks with a 'scuffing effect' on the highway. He further observed that the 'A' frame for the right front axle was broken. Testimony from two others was received to the...