Holloway v. New York City Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 28 October 1999 |
| Citation | 699 N.Y.S.2d 261 |
| Parties | Sandra HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. New York County |
| Court | New York City Court |
Wallace D. Gossett, Brooklyn (Jamileh-Sofia di Guida of counsel), for defendant.
Sandra Holloway, plaintiff pro se.
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims, pursuant to C.P.L.R. §§ 3211(a)(7) and 3014, for failure to state a cause of action. The pro se plaintiff's claims, prepared with the aid of a court clerk, are set forth on an endorsed complaint. Defendant's motion requires the Court to address an important question regarding the sufficiency of pleadings on endorsed complaints: "If [a] 'cause of action' ... need not be stated in an indorsement pleading to the extent that it would have to be stated in a formal pleading, just how much will satisfy as an indorsement pleading?" Siegel, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Judiciary (Book 29A)--New York City Civil Court Act § 903, at 178.
On March 9, 1999, plaintiff filed a summons with endorsed complaint in New York County in the Civil Court of the City of New York. The summons indicates the damages sought ($50,000) and the date from which interest is sought (December 23, 1997), which by inference is the date of the events giving rise to the action. Further, the endorsed complaint specifically provides that:
"the nature and substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is as follows: 1st Cause of Action: $25,000 Damage Caused to Person; 2nd Cause of Action: $25,000 Loss of Time from Work."
Because plaintiff appeared pro se, the endorsement on the summons was made by the clerk, pursuant to CCA § 902(a)(1). The source of the information for the endorsement was a form, entitled "Application for a Pro Se Summons," completed and signed by plaintiff. 1 The form contains two sections: a section which identifies the "parties" and a section which identifies the "claim." The claim section requires that the pro se plaintiff indicate the "reason for [his or her] claim" by choosing from the following list of suggested claims, including a generic "other," designed to help the prospective plaintiff to accurately articulate, in writing, his or her cause of action:
This form, used in all of the courts of the Civil Court of the City of New York, has been used to help pro se plaintiffs at least since 1992.
On her form/application, plaintiff checked the claims indicating "Damage caused to ... person" and "Loss of time ... from work," which the clerk then used to generate the summons with endorsed complaint in this action. No further allegations regarding the nature and substance of plaintiff's claims are set forth on the summons with endorsed complaint.
After filing its answer, defendant promptly moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. In its motion, defendant's counsel describes the action as one "for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff on December 23, 1997," and expressly assumes that the plaintiff's action is based on a claim of "negligence." Relying upon C.P.L.R. §§ 3014 and 3211(a)(7), however, defendant argues that the complaint fails to "adequately state[ ] plaintiff's theory against" defendant. Specifically, defendant claims that plaintiff's allegations fail to "inform the defendant what it is alleged to have done to cause [plaintiff's alleged] damage" (i.e., the "who, what, when, where and how" of the accident). Defendant also argues that plaintiff's claimed damages ($50,000) exceeded the jurisdictional amount of Civil Court.
In response to defendant's motion, plaintiff cross-moved to amend her complaint to reduce her claimed damages to $25,000. In her affidavit, plaintiff set forth the following additional allegations regarding her claim: "I fell down 3 steps on the subway stairs due to the fact that I had to carry my son Kwan over water that was settled at the bottom of the step resulting in a torn menicul [sic] of Lt knee."
In reply and opposition, defendant consents to the downward amendment of the claimed damages. Although defendant originally moved to dismiss only for failure to "state a cause of action," defendant now argues, in its reply and opposition papers, that the action should be dismissed because plaintiff "has no cause of action." In support of the motion, however, defendant relies only upon the affirmation of counsel and does not submit an affidavit from a person with personal knowledge, or any other extrinsic evidence, except a weather report indicating that it was raining rather heavily on the day in question. In her affirmation, counsel argues that plaintiff failed to explain what "caused" her to fall, and failed to "produce some proof tending to show that the defendant created the dangerous condition causing injury to the plaintiff or had either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition." Counsel further argued that plaintiff herself failed to use reasonable care under the circumstances.
Pleadings in Civil Court are primarily governed by Article Nine of the Civil Court Act. Generally, in civil court "all pleadings shall be formal pleadings, as in supreme court practice." CCA § 902(a). The major exception to that general rule, however, is an exception which virtually eviscerates the rule--namely where "the plaintiff's cause of action is for money only," CCA § 902(a)(1), the most common cause of action asserted in Civil Court.
In money-only actions, "the cause of action may be set forth by indorsement upon the summons" and the "indorsement shall consist of a statement of the nature and substance of the cause of action." Id. Further, should "the plaintiff ... appear without attorney, such indorsement shall be made by the clerk." Id. Notably, should a party, having been served with an indorsement pleading, desire a formal complaint where none is required, he or she may move for an order, "direct[ing] the service and filing of a formal pleading," or the court may issue such an order sua sponte "in any case ... at any time before judgment." CCA § 902(2)(e).
Absent such an order, CCA § 903 provides that the CCA and/or CPLR "requirements ... applicable to a formal pleading shall not be applicable to an indorsement pleading." The simple purpose of Section 903 is "to prevent any of the technicalities of pleading--and even some matters that are not mere technicalities--from being applied to an indorsement pleading." Siegel, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Judiciary (Book 29A)--New York City Civil Court Act § 903, at 176.
Thus, when a party utilizes a summons with endorsed complaint, he or she may properly dispense with, inter alia, the separate numbering requirements of C.P.L.R. § 3014, and the particularity requirements of C.P.L.R. §§ 3015 and 3016. Nor would he or she be required to set forth the "material elements" of the asserted causes of action, or otherwise give "notice of the transactions, occurrences ... intended to be proved," as required by C.P.L.R. § 3013 for formal pleadings. See generally id., at 176-178. See also Gaeta v. Home Box Office et al., 169 Misc.2d 500, 507, 645 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Civil Court, N.Y.Co.1996); cf. Oelkrug v. Gilwaldron Realty Co., Inc., 45 Misc.2d 160, 161, 256 N.Y.S.2d 348 (App.Term, 2nd Dept.1964) ().
Instead, the only substantive pleading requirement of an indorsed complaint is that it shall set forth the "nature and substance of the cause of action" (CCA § 902[a]; Freliba, Ltd. v. Essential Dental Systems, Inc., N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1994, p. 25, col. 6 [App.Term, 1st Dept.] ), which may be satisfied by setting forth a "summary statement of the cause of action," (Southern Boulevard Sound, Inc. v Felix Storch, Inc., 167 Misc.2d 731, 732, 643 N.Y.S.2d 882 [App.Term, 1st Dept.1996]; Kimma v. Chazen, Inc., 8 Misc.2d 589, 169 N.Y.S.2d 942 [App.Term, 1st Dept.1957] [under predecessor statute] ), as long as it generally apprises the defendant of the claim. Carcione v. Rizzo, 154 Misc.2d 13, 14, 593 N.Y.S.2d 152 (App.Term, 2nd Dept.1992). See generally Picone v. Jacobs, N.Y.L.J., December 5, 1969, p. 17, cols 4-5 (Civil Court, New York Co.) (" 'If ... the few words (or even single word) used indicates in the most general way what the cause ... is ..., the indorsement pleading should be sustained' "; " 'What section 903 seeks to do is to require for an indorsement the barest minimum--the terse sentence or even phrase that will merely enable the court to say that it gives the party a "general idea" of what is being pleaded' ") (quoting Professor Siegel's 1964 Practice Commentary).
The foregoing sufficiency standard for an endorsed complaint is analogous to the sufficiency standard for notices which must be attached to the summons (where the plaintiff does not serve the complaint with the summons) in supreme and county court actions, pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 305(b). 2 See Siegel, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Judiciary (Book 29A)--New York City Civil Court Act § 903, at 179.
Applying the foregoing standards, courts have sustained endorsed complaints which merely allege "defamation," Gaeta v. Home Box Office et al., supra, 169 Misc.2d at 507, 645 N.Y.S.2d 707, "breach of contract, negligence and unjust enrichment," Skowron v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 150 Misc.2d 1051, 578 N.Y.S.2d 806 (App.Term, 2nd Dept.1991); or which merely alleged that "the object of this action is to recover $10,000 damages for negligence," Picone v. Jacobs, N.Y.L.J., December 5,...
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