Holloway v. Newman
| Docket Number | Civil Action 6:23cv196 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
| Parties | WILLIAM HOLLOWAY #167657 v. OFFICER DAWSON NEWMAN |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff William Holloway, a pretrial detainee in the Gregg County Jail proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights in the course of his arrest for assault/family violence. The case was referred to the undersigned for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 3, 2023, Officer Dawson Newman of the Longview Police Department responded to a report of a sofa on fire at Plaintiff's location and ultimately arrested him “on a warrant for a P.I.” (Dkt. #1 at 4.) Upon arrival at the Gregg County Jail, Newman informed Plaintiff that he was being charged with “AFV/member of a household,” which the Court understands to mean assault/family violence on a household member. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked Newman why he was being charged with that crime, but Newman refused to provide additional details or identify the victim of the alleged crime. (Id. at 4, 6.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks dismissal of his criminal charges, $750,000 in damages, plus court and legal fees. (Id. at 4.)
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private remedy against any person alleged to have deprived the plaintiff “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States while acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]o state a section 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, and he is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his claims are subject to preliminary screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e). Those statutes direct sua sponte dismissal of a complaint-or any portion thereof-if the Court finds it frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit has held that a complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact when “the facts alleged are fantastic or delusional scenarios or the legal theory upon which a complaint relies is indisputably meritless.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, during the initial screening under Section 1915A, a court may determine that a prisoner's complaint is frivolous if it rests upon delusional scenarios or baseless facts-and dismiss the complaint. See Henry v. Kerr County, Texas, No. SA-16-CV-284-DAE (PMA), 2016 WL 2344231, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) () (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)).
Moreover, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted where it does not allege sufficient facts which, taken as true, state a claim which is plausible on its face and thus does not raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Montoya v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys. Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim has factual plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 610 F.3d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 2010). This plausibility standard is not akin to a probability standard; rather, the plausibility standard requires more than the mere possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Although all well-pleaded facts are taken as true, the district court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions. See Whatley v. Coffin, 496 Fed.Appx. 414 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (citing Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Crucially, while the federal pleading rules do not require “detailed factual allegations,” the rule does “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice, nor does a complaint which provides only naked assertions that are devoid of further factual enhancement. Id.
Plaintiff's claim that he is entitled to dismissal of his criminal charges based on Defendant Newman's actions implicates the validity of any future conviction in his criminal case and is, therefore, not currently cognizable in a Section 1983 action. A Section 1983 claim that challenges the validity of a standing criminal conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until the plaintiff has succeeded in having the conviction or sentence overturned or invalidated through habeas corpus or other proper means. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78-82 (2005); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). If a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of criminal proceedings “before he has been convicted . . . it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” Id. at 394.
In this case, however, a stay is unnecessary because Plaintiff's claim fails for a second reason, which he cannot overcome regardless of the outcome of his criminal case: he does not allege any facts that would establish that Defendant Newman violated any of Plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, he fails to allege any “violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” as required to state a viable claim under Section 1983. Whitley, 726 F.3d at 638.
Plaintiff does not allege that he was arrested without cause or that the charge itself somehow violated his rights. Instead, he simply complains that Defendant Newman refused to give him specific details about the facts underlying the charge. But he does not identify any constitutional provision requiring an arresting officer to provide such information. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides all defendants a right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI. But that does not mean that arresting officers themselves must explain the details underlying an arrest.
The actual examination of the facts of a case to determine whether probable cause exists for detention must be made by a judge or magistrate at an initial appearance within some reasonable time after the arrest, typically within 48 hours. Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., Miss., 678 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2012). And “an accused does not have a Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation until the government has committed itself to prosecution.” Hiley v. Skinner, No. CV 21-4179, 2022 WL 604187, at *4 (W.D. La. Feb. 8, 2022) (quoting Coulson v. Washoe Cty., 69 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1995)), report and recommendation adopted, No CV 21-4179, 2022 WL 602190 (W.D. La. Feb. 28, 2022); see also Bittakis v. City of El Paso, ...
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