Holloway v. State

• Decision Date: 02 August 2017
• Docket Number: A17A0950.
• Citation: 804 S.E.2d 125
• Parties: HOLLOWAY v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

342 Ga.App. 462

804 S.E.2d 125

HOLLOWAY

v.The STATE.

A17A0950.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 2, 2017

Jonathan Perry Waters, for Appellant.

Karl David Cooke Jr., Jason Michael Wilbanks, for Appellee.

Bethel, Judge.

Travis Lydell Holloway appeals from his conviction on one count of burglary and one count of hijacking a motor vehicle.¹ He asserts that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for hijacking. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

1. Holloway first contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. However, Holloway's claim for ineffective assistance is barred by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Glover v. State² and its progeny. In Glover , the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that because "a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel must be asserted at the earliest practicable moment," such claims must "be raised before appeal if the opportunity to do so is available; that the ability to raise the issue on motion for new trial represents such an opportunity; and that the failure to seize that opportunity is a procedural bar to raising the issue at a later time." 266 Ga. at 184 (2), 465 S.E.2d 659 (citations and emphasis omitted).

In this case, Holloway concedes that his enumeration of error in his brief before this Court is the first instance in which he has raised the issue of his trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Holloway never filed a motion for a new trial and instead filed multiple motions for out of time appeal, one of which was made with the assistance of appointed appellate counsel.³ Thus, not only did Holloway not move for a new trial at any point in these proceedings, he also pursued his appeal to this Court, at least in part, with the assistance of a new appellate counsel who would have been free to raise ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for a new trial with the court below.⁴ Cf. Bridges v. State , 279 Ga. 351, 357 (11), 613 S.E.2d 621 (2005) (remand to trial court with direction is appropriate where defendant was represented by trial counsel until after notice of appeal was filed). As Holloway and his new appellate counsel did not seize the opportunity to address the issue of the trial counsel's ineffectiveness with the court below, Glover bars this Court's consideration of Holloway's ineffectiveness claim on appeal.

2. Holloway also contends that the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for hijacking a motor vehicle.⁵ Following a conviction in a criminal case, our sufficiency of the evidence review is limited to a determination of whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant committed the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Gray v. State , 213 Ga.App. 507, 509 (1), 445 S.E.2d 328 (1994).

Holloway was charged with hijacking a motor vehicle pursuant to OCGA § 16–5–44.1 (b), the "essential elements" of which are: "(1) possessing a firearm or weapon; (2) while obtaining ... a motor vehicle from the person or presence of another; (3) by force and violence or intimidation." Bradford v. State , 223 Ga.App. 424, 425 (1), 477 S.E.2d 859 (1996). A person is also guilty of this offense if he or she attempts or conspires to do these acts. OCGA § 16–5–44.1 (b).

Here, the evidence presented shows that Holloway and several others were walking through a parking lot when they found a man and a woman in a vehicle. Holloway and another assailant approached the vehicle, and Holloway pulled the woman from the passenger seat and threw her to the ground. Holloway then moved around the vehicle and brandished a gun at the man who was seated in the driver's seat. Holloway then removed him from the vehicle and began beating him with the gun. One of the other men who had come with Holloway was "watching out" while this incident occurred. After the driver was subdued, Holloway and the other men who had been walking with him got in the vehicle and drove it away. Holloway was not driving the vehicle.

The woman who was pulled from the passenger seat of the vehicle recognized Holloway, testifying at trial that she knew Holloway because he is her cousin. She testified that she saw Holloway the day after the incident and that he told her where to find the stolen vehicle. Holloway also later admitted to law enforcement that he was present at the scene where the incident occurred and that he rode in the vehicle after it had been stolen.

This evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that Holloway committed each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the testimony established Holloway's possession of a gun that he used to hit the victim. Holloway has not suggested in his appeal that the gun described by the witnesses fails to meet the statutory definitions of the terms "firearm" or "weapon" in OCGA § 16–5–44 (a) (1) and (3), and witness testimony describing Holloway's possession and use of the gun in the course of the incident satisfies the requirement that Holloway was in possession of the weapon or firearm at the time of the offense.⁶

Likewise, the evidence indicates that Holloway and the other men "obtained" the vehicle "from the person and presence" of the victim as the result of this encounter. "[A]pplying the ordinary meaning of ‘obtain,’ the offense of hijacking a motor vehicle is concluded when possession of the motor vehicle is acquired." Gordon v. State , 316 Ga.App. 42, 46 (1) (a), 728 S.E.2d 720 (2012) (citations and emphasis omitted). The evidence here indicates that not only did Holloway and the others obtain control and possession of the vehicle after the victim had been subdued but that they also moved the vehicle to another location. Additionally, the evidence shows that the vehicle was obtained after removing the victim from the vehicle and beating him. Thus, the vehicle was clearly obtained from the victim. See Whaley v. State , 337 Ga.App. 50, 53–54 (1), 785 S.E.2d 685 (2016) (presence requirement satisfied when the defendant took the victim's keys from the victim upon threat of violent injury and then retrieved the car from the parking lot); see also Heard v. State , 287 Ga. 554, 555 (1), 697 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (noting that "the concept of immediate presence is broadly construed if the object taken was under the victim's control or responsibility and the victim is not too distant") (citation omitted).

As to the third element of the...