Holly Sugar Corp. v. Perez
| Decision Date | 02 April 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 4152,4152 |
| Parties | HOLLY SUGAR CORPORATION et al., Appellants (Defendants below), v. Amanda M. PEREZ et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs below). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
W. A. Swainson of Swainson & Swainson, Cheyenne, for all appellants.
Scott & Joffe, Worland, for appellant Holly Sugar Corp.
Mayne Miller, Casper, Gene Huntley, Baker, Mont., for appellees.
Before PARKER, C. J., and McEWAN and McINTYRE, JJ.
A truck carrying migratory workers from Weslaco, Texas to Glendive, Montana, for work in beet fields, turned over 27 miles north of Gillette, Wyoming. Several occupants of the truck were injured. Suits were brought by Amanda M. Perez, Santos Martinez, and Domingo Perez against Holly Sugar Corporation, against Clemente Ramos, owner of the truck, and against Oscar Ramos, driver of the truck. The three suits were consolidated for trial. The jury awarded damages to each of the three plaintiffs and the three defendants have appealed.
Holly's appeal raises the question of whether there was substantial evidence that Clemente Ramos and Oscar Ramos were agents of Holly at the time of the accident. The jury, of course, had to find such agency before it could consider the negligence of the Ramoses attributable to Holly.
According to Holly's version of the facts, the migratory workers were a group for whom Clemente Ramos acted as 'crew chief.' He owned the truck involved. The workers were to work in beet fields for various farmers. Clemente Ramos recruited the workers. The arrangement with Clemente Ramos was made by Nicolas Medina, an employee of Colorado Employment Service. For several years Medina had gone to Weslaco to assist in the recruitment of laborers for various sugar beet companies, including Holly. Altogether about 1,000 workers were recruited for the various sugar beet companies each year.
Medina advanced to each crew chief about one cent per mile for each worker in his crew. This amounted to about $21.50 per worker in the Ramos crew. In addition, Medina might advance to the head of a family money for subsistence during travel. There is no denial of the fact that Holly supplied (through Medina) the money for advances to Clemente Ramos and his crew. After arrival at their destination, the workers worked for individual beet growers and were paid by them. Field men for Holly, however, would tell the workers where and for whom they were to work. Counsel for Holly admits Oscar Ramos testified he was using the truck to work for Holly Sugar Corporation.
Counsel for the plaintiffs point to testimony of Clemente Ramos which bears upon the question of agency. First, his answers to interrogatories were read into evidence as follows:
'State whether you recruited the passengers who were aboard the truck involved in the accident.
'Answer: Yes, myself and Holly Sugar Corporation.
'Question: State where you recruited them.
'Answer: They were recruited at the Texas employment office in Weslaco, Texas.
'Question: State for what reason you recruited them.
'Answer: I recruited them for Holly Sugar Corporation to work in the sugar beet field in Glendive, Montana.
'Question: State whether Holly Sugar knew that you were recruiting them.
'Answer: Yes. It was with Holly Sugar Corporation that I did this.
'Question: State what arrangements, if any, had been made between you and Holly Sugar Corporation prior to the accident in question with regard to the transportation of the passengers aboard the truck.
Clemente Ramos also testified by deposition. In his deposition he said he was paid $21.50 for taking each person in his crew from Texas to Montana; that he knew the route because a man from Holly Sugar had shown him the route on a previous occasion; that he and the others who made the trip had been hired by the man from Holly Sugar; that the man from Holly Sugar decided who would ride on the truck; that the man from Holly Sugar advanced money to the people who were hired; that Holly Sugar Corporation advanced him the money to buy gas for the truck; that Holly Sugar's field men told them were to work; and that Holly Sugar paid him to recruit workers.
Medina testified that he was advanced money by Holly Sugar Corporation to finance the recruitment; that he had advanced funds for the trip on behalf of Holly Sugar Corporation; that he inspected the truck before it left; that he suggested the route to be followed; and on cross-examination Medina said Holly Sugar Corporation exercised control over the workers he selected.
It is true Clemente Ramos, on cross-examination, repudiated statements he had mad in his deposition and answers to interrogatories concerning his connections with Holly. He testified, Counsel for the company point to this testimony and also suggest Clemente Ramos was uneducated and an illiterate person who did not understand even simple questions. The implication seems to be that his testimony should be disregarded.
Of course it was for the jury and not for us to decide what portions of the Clemente Ramos testimony should be believed and what portions, if any, should be disregarded. Also, it is for a jury and not an appellate court to decide what weight should be given to the testimony of the respective witnesses. In other words, counsel's argument to the effect that testimony of the Ramoses should be disregarded cannot be accepted on appeal.
Another part of the evidence tending to prove liability against Holly is a showing that Holly purchased liability insurance to protect it in case of an accident such as the one which happened. Taking the evidence as a whole, we must hold it sufficient for the jury to infer Clemente Ramos and Oscar Ramos were agents for Holly and not independent contractors, as claimed by Holly's attorneys.
In making this claim, Holly's attorneys rely largely on Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189, 190, where Justice Blume said the controlling or principal test is generally stated to be whether the employer has the right to control the details of the work to be done by the servant or agent, or whether the latter represents the former only as to the result to be accomplished.
We have no occasion to change anything that was said in the Stockwell case. However, we would point out that it was for the jury to determine from the evidence before it how much 'right to control' Holly had. For example, the jury may have believed Holly had a right to exercise even more control than it did; that it could have said the truck was not safely loaded; that it could have supervised with respect to the number of workers who could be hauled in a truck such as the one involved; and that it could have specified the frequency of rest stops and intervals for changing drivers. Indeed, the failure of Holly to supervise and exercise more control where it had a 'right to control' may have been considered by the jury to be evidence of negligence on the part of Holly.
Assignment of error is urged on behalf of Holly that prejudicial error occurred when the trial court permitted the jury to be informed that insurance was carried by Holly with respect to the Ramos vehicle. Counsel for the company concede there is authority for the proposition that the existence of insurance may be shown as bearing on the question of principalagent or employer-employee relationship if there is other evidence tending to show the existence of such a relationship. Total reliance seems to be placed on the contention that other evidence of agency was not present in this case.
The attorneys for plaintiffs contend the rule is that the existence of insurance may be shown as bearing on the question of agency regardless of whether other evidence of agency has been offered. They say the legal proposition does not need to be reached in this case, however, because there was indeed substantial evidence of agency aside from the fact of insurance.
Without pretending to try the case anew or to decide whether the Ramoses were in fact agents for Holly, we will say the record discloses ample evidence, disregarding that pertaining to insurance, to satisfy any possible requirement for other evidence to support the existence of an agency relationship. In fact, either with or without the evidence pertaining to insurance, we believe the jury could have found the Ramoses were Holly agents or employees.
In a single paragraph in the Holly brief, counsel suggests the only evidence to establish that Clemente Ramos and his driver, Oscar Ramos, were acting as agents of Holly rather than as independent contractors was the declarations of the Ramoses plus the evidence on the existence of insurance. Counsel suggests our court has held declarations of an agent are insufficient alone to show agency.
We fail to find support for counsel's suggestion in the cases cited. If the declarations are not hearsay, we know of no reason why an alleged agent may not testify to facts and transactions within his knowledge; and the jury should weigh his testimony the same as any other evidence. We did say in Sun Land & Cattle Co. v. Brown, Wyo., 394 P.2d 387, 388, that a jury was not bound by the testimony of the employee nor employer. In the case at hand, there clearly was testimony bearing on the question of agency aside from declarations made by the Remoses. Such declarations did not stand alone. Even the fact of insurance would negative any idea that declarations of the alleged agents stood alone.
On behalf of all appellants, including Holly Sugar Corporation, the following additional assignments of error are claimed:
1. The trial court erred in denying appellants a continuance of the time of trial.
2. The trial court erred by giving Instruction...
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