Holly v. United States

• Decision Date: 09 June 1972
• Docket Number: 24144,24145 and 71-1024.,No. 24142,24142
• Citation: 150 US App. DC 287,464 F.2d 796
• Parties: John HOLLY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Michael C. McCLOUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee. Calvin JONES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

150 US App. DC 287, 464 F.2d 796 (1972)

John HOLLY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Michael C. McCLOUGH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Calvin JONES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.

Nos. 24142, 24144, 24145 and 71-1024.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 18, 1972.

Decided June 9, 1972.

Mr. Peter R. Kolker, Washington, D. C., with whom Miss Marilyn Cohen, Washington, D. C., and Mr. Sanford Z. Berman, Riverdale, Md., were on the brief, for appellants in Nos. 24142, 24144, and 24145. Mr. Sol Rosen, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellant in No. 24142. Miss Susan M. Chalker, Washington, D. C., entered an appearance for appellant in Nos. 24144 and 24145.

Mr. Carl W. Berueffy, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant in No. 71-1024.

Mr. Daniel E. Toomey, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and Gregory C. Brady, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief for appellees in Nos. 24142, 24144, and 24145.

Mr. C. Madison Brewer, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and Warren E. King, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee in No. 71-1024.

Mr. Joel E. Hoffman, with whom Mr. Ralph J. Temple, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for American Civil Liberties Union Fund as amicus curiae in Nos. 24142, 24144, and 24145.

Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The constitutionality of 22 D.C. Code § 1515(a) (1967) is challenged on these appeals by persons convicted thereunder.¹ That statute provides in pertinent part as follows:

Whoever is found in . . . an establishment where . . . any narcotic drug is sold, administered, or dispensed without a license shall, if he knew it was such an establishment and if he is unable to give a good account of his presence in the establishment, be imprisoned. . . .

We now hold, on the basis of our prior decision in Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 414 F.2d 1097 (Ricks I) and Ricks v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 414 F.2d 1111 (1968) (Ricks II), that § 1515(a), which makes criminal liability turn upon a defendant's ability to give a "good account" of himself, is unconstitutionally vague.

It is unnecessary here to retrace the thorough analysis of Judge Robinson in Ricks I, which found the concept of "good account" to be "much too loose to satisfy constitutional requirements." 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 208, 414 F.2d at 1104. See generally 134 U.S.App.D.C. at 204-209, 211-214, 218-223, 414 F.2d 1100-1105, 1107-1110, 1114-1119. Although formulated in the context of a separate but related statute, the analysis applies equally here.² In the light of this conclusion, it is also unnecessary to reach appellants' additional claims that the statute is overbroad, and that it infringes First Amendment rights of association and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

In United States v. McClough, note 2 supra, the DCCA thought to make § 1515(a) constitutionally invulnerable by construing "good account" as providing an affirmative defense rather than as constituting an element of the offense. However, we are unable to perceive how this transformation, which merely shifts the burden of proof from the Government to the criminal defendant, in any way makes the statutory offense more precise. Whatever constitutional significance such a construction may have with respect to a defendant's claim of privilege against self-incrimination, the constitutional requirement that statutes be written with sufficient precision that men do not have to "guess at their meaning" is unrelated to the technicalities of burden of proof. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). While a construction that would have narrowed "good account" to require proof merely that the defendant was not trespassing or had no intent to participate in the illegal narcotics activity might conceivably have rendered the statute sufficiently precise, the DCCA has expressly rejected these alternatives. Wells v. United States, 281 A.2d 226 (1971).³

The Government has made no real effort to justify the manifest infirmities of the phrase "good account," but rather urges this court, despite our conceded jurisdiction to resolve these appeals on their merits, to defer to the decisions of the DCCA upholding the statute. If the DCCA had not yet had the opportunity to rule on the issues here, or if the question involved only the construction of a statute unrelated to constitutional considerations, sound policy might support this request. Here, however, the position of that court on the constitutional question is clear. Appellants Holly and Jones have been convicted under the statute, and appellant McClough faces trial under it. Thus we are not persuaded to reject their appeals in the teeth of our own views as to the merits of their constitutional claim— views which were shaped and made known as long ago as 1968 in Ricks.

The judgments appealed from are reversed, and the cases are remanded for disposition consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.

TAMM, Circuit Judge (concurring):

I join in the court's opinion today solely because these cases fall squarely within our decisions in Ricks v. District of Columbia, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 414 F. 2d 1097 (1968); Ricks v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 414 F.2d 1111 (1968). Were it not for the constitutional issue involved I would have preferred to have this court stay its hand in these cases in deference to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It is because of these constitutional issues alone that I join in the court's decision.

The need for reorganization of the courts in the District of Columbia was a foregone conclusion by the time that the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (July 29, 1970), took effect on February 1, 1971. In March 1970 the House District Committee observed,

the fact is that the diversity of Federal and local interest in the District of Columbia has led to the jurisdictional disarray which presently exists—the local court handles some federal misdemeanors, the Federal court has jurisdiction of local felonies and concurrent jurisdiction over local misdemeanors; the local court makes determinations as to certain administrative procedures appeals, the Federal court hears others without apparent distinction as to local-Federal interest; the Federal court tries cases that would elsewhere be within the state system. And then there is the overall problem of concurrent jurisdiction, producing delays in the disposition of criminal matters, described as "pingpong", in derogation of the public and federal interest.

H.R.Rep.No.907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970). As a result of feelings of inefficiency, confusion, and lack of effectiveness of the local courts Congress enacted the Court Reform Act. Under the terms of one section of that Act, 11 D. C.Code § 102 (Supp. V 1972), "The D. C. Court of Appeals is declared by Congress to be the `highest court of the District of Columbia' whose final judgments and decrees are reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970) in the same manner as such review is accorded the highest court of a State." Kern, The District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970: A Dose of the Conventional Wisdom and a Dash of Innovation, 20 Am.U.L.Rev. 237, 241 (1970-71).

In M. A. P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.App.1971) the court stated:

As this court on February 1, 1971 became the highest court of the District of Columbia, no longer subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals, we are not bound by the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals rendered after that date. With respect to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals rendered prior to February 1, 1971, we recognize that they, like the decisions of this court, constitute the case law of the District of Columbia. As a matter of internal policy, we have adopted the rule that no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court or refuse to follow a decision of the United States Court of Appeals rendered prior to February 1, 1971, and that such result can only be accomplished by this court en banc.

Id., at 312. (Emphasis added.) As Judge Wright succinctly stated in United States v. Thompson, 147 U.S.App.D. C. 1, 10, 452 F.2d 1333, 1342 (1971), "the overriding purpose which emerges from the Court Reform Act is to put the District's judicial system on a par with those of the states."

It is equally obvious that the transitional period, in which shifts of jurisdiction occur, will be a difficult one. As one law review author expressed:

The transitional period will require that

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