Holly Woods Ass'n of Residence Owners v. Hiller

• Decision Date: 21 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 4790.,4790.
• Citation: 708 S.E.2d 787,392 S.C. 172
• Parties: HOLLY WOODS ASSOCIATION OF RESIDENCE OWNERS, Respondent,v.Joe W. HILLER, Robert E. Hiller, David Hiller, and HHH, Ltd. of Greenville, and Holly Woods Association of Residence Owners, Inc., Defendants,of whom Joe W. Hiller and HHH, Ltd. of Greenville, are the Appellants.
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals

392 S.C. 172

708 S.E.2d 787

HOLLY WOODS ASSOCIATION OF RESIDENCE OWNERS, Respondent,

v.Joe W. HILLER, Robert E. Hiller, David Hiller, and HHH, Ltd. of Greenville, and Holly Woods Association of Residence Owners, Inc., Defendants,of whom Joe W. Hiller and HHH, Ltd. of Greenville, are the Appellants.

No. 4790.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard March 10, 2010.Decided Feb. 3, 2011.Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled April 21, 2011.

Tucker S. Player, of Columbia, for Appellants.John T. Crawford, Jr., and Keven Kenison, both of Greenville, for Respondent.LOCKEMY, J.

The plaintiffs in this action were property owners in the Holly Woods Development in Greenville or members of the Holly Woods Association of Residence Owners (the Association). The Association brought suit against the property developers in 2005. After a trial, the jury awarded the Association $971,000 in actual damages for its negligence claim and $1 for the breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service claim. On appeal from this tort action, Joe W. Hiller, Robert E. Hiller, and David Hiller of HHH, Ltd. of Greenville, and Joe Hiller, individually, (Appellants) argue the trial court erred in: (1) allowing the Association to present a damages estimate from its expert witness; (2) denying Appellants' motions for directed verdict and judgment non obstante verdict; (3) submitting verdict forms to the jury without separating the respective defendants; (4) failing to grant a new trial absolute; (5) finding in favor of the Association on its equitable causes of action; (6) failing to grant a mistrial; and (7) allowing the Association to amend its complaint on the day of trial. We affirm.

FACTS

On May 2, 2005, the Association brought suit against Joe Hiller and HHH, Ltd. of Greenville. The Association alleged six causes of action, including: (1) specific performance to compel defendants to turn over control of the homeowners' association to the resident owners; (2) quiet title as to the common areas in favor of the Association; (3) breach of fiduciary duty with respect to Appellants turning over control of the homeowners' association and the Holly Woods Horizontal Property Regime in good repair or with adequate reserves to make repairs; (4) negligence in the construction of the project and the infrastructure associated thereto; (5) breach of contract; and (6) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act. On December 7, 2005, the Association amended its complaint and added two defendants, Robert E. Hiller and David Hiller, and added three causes of action: (1) breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service; (2) breach of implied warranty of good title and fair dealing; and (3) veil piercing as to the individual defendants for any damages recovered. Thereafter, defendant HHH, Ltd. of Greenville answered the amended complaint and argued the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, standing, estoppel, waiver, and the statute of repose. The court held two hearings prior to trial. The first hearing was related to discovery issues, and the second hearing involved Appellants' affirmative defenses.

By court order, in July 2006, defendant Joe Hiller continued with his case pro se after his counsel's motion to be relieved was approved. The Association then filed a motion to compel discovery from Appellants, and after a hearing, Judge Cooper ordered Appellants to turn over certain documents to the Association on December 18, 2006. Subsequently, the Association filed a motion for sanctions for Appellants' failure to comply with Judge Cooper's order. Judge Few heard the Association's sanction argument and the Appellants' motion for summary judgment based on standing, the statute of limitations, and the statute of repose on January 7, 2007. After the hearing, Judge Few granted the Association's motion for sanctions against defendants pursuant to Rule 37(b), SCRCP. Additionally, he denied Appellants' summary judgment motions. Specifically, Judge Few (1) denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment based on the applicable statute of limitations because the Association claimed no damages were incurred more than three years before the commencement of this action; (2) denied Joe Hiller's motion to dismiss for lack of standing and motion to compel; (3) denied Joe Hiller's motion for sanctions; and (4) denied the Association's motion to amend its complaint to add an additional developer.

On January 8, 2007, the Association filed a motion to amend its complaint to correct a scrivener's error and remove the “Inc.” from its name. Judge Miller granted the Association's motion to amend the complaint to reflect the Association's correct name. The peculiar effect of Judge Miller's ruling was that the original plaintiff became a named defendant. After trial, the jury returned a $971,000 verdict in favor of the Association for actual damages as to the negligence claim. The jury awarded $1 in actual damages on the breach of contract claim, breach of fiduciary duty claim, and breach of implied warranty of workmanlike service claim, but it did not award punitive damages. All defendants filed notices of appeal, including Joe Hiller in his individual capacity. These appeals were consolidated into this final appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried by a jury, the jurisdiction of this court extends merely to correction of errors of law. Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 460, 494 S.E.2d 835, 841 (Ct.App.1997). We will not disturb the jury's factual findings unless a review of the record discloses there is no evidence that reasonably supports the jury's findings. Id. at 461, 494 S.E.2d at 841.

When a suit involves both legal and equitable issues, each cause of action retains its own identity as legal or equitable for purposes of the applicable standard of review on appeal. West v. Newberry Elec. Co-op., 357 S.C. 537, 542, 593 S.E.2d 500, 502 (Ct.App.2004). “In an action at equity, this court can find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[A]n action to quiet title to property is an action in equity.” Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 10, 681 S.E.2d 6, 11 (Ct.App.2009). Specific performance is also an equitable action. Fesmire v. Digh, 385 S.C. 296, 303–04, 683 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct.App.2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Appellants present numerous issues on appeal. We begin our analysis of this case by examining a timeline to determine if the Association was procedurally barred from bringing its lawsuit either under the statute of repose or the statute of limitations.

I. Statute of Repose

Appellants maintain the trial court should have granted a directed verdict because the damages the Association complained of occurred more than thirteen years after construction was completed on the property. We disagree.

The version of the statute of repose in effect at the time the Association initiated its lawsuit required it bring its action within thirteen years of substantial improvement to real property.¹ S.C.Code Ann. 15–3–640 (Supp.2003). Specifically, section 15–3–640 provided:

No actions to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than thirteen years after substantial completion of the improvement. For purposes of this section, an action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property includes:

(1) an action to recover damages for breach of a contract to construct or repair an improvement to real property;

(2) an action to recover damages for the negligent construction or repair of an improvement to real property;

(3) an action to recover damages for personal injury, death, or damage to property;

(4) an action to recover damages for economic or monetary loss;

(5) an action in contract or in tort or otherwise;

(6) an action for contribution or indemnification for damages sustained on account of an action described in this subdivision;

(7) an action against a surety or guarantor of a defendant described in this section;

(8) an action brought against any current or prior owner of the real property or improvement, or against any other person having a current or prior interest in the real property or improvement;

(9) an action against owners or manufacturers of components, or against any person furnishing materials, or against any person who develops real property, or who performs or furnishes the design, plans, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, or a repair to an improvement to real property.

This section describes an outside limitation of thirteen years after the substantial completion of the improvement, within which normal statutes of limitations continue to run. (emphasis added)

The purpose of the statute of repose is to provide a substantive right to developers to be free from liability after a certain time period. See Langley v. Pierce, 313 S.C. 401, 403, 438 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1993) (“A statute of repose constitutes a substantive definition of rights rather than a procedural limitation provided by a statute of limitation.”). Further, “[s]tatutes of repose are based upon considerations of the economic best interests of the public as a whole and are substantive grants of immunity based upon a legislative balance of the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by determining a time limit beyond which liability no longer exists.” Id. at 404, 438 S.E.2d at 244.

The development at issue was built in several stages. According to plats and testimony submitted in the record, buildings one through eight were built between 1978 and 1983. The rest of the buildings in the development were built in 1996 or later. Here, the Association's complaints concern the common areas of Holly Woods. Specifically, the Association based...