Holm v. Holm
| Decision Date | 27 March 1947 |
| Docket Number | 30076. |
| Citation | 178 P.2d 725,27 Wn.2d 456 |
| Parties | HOLM v. HOLM. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Suit for divorce by Fred A. Holm against Edna B. Holm, wherein defendant filed a cross-complaint seeking similar relief. Defendant was granted a divorce on her cross-complaint, and from that portion of interlocutory order relating to amount and terms of property award to defendant and from supplemental order, plaintiff appeals.
Interlocutory and supplemental orders modified in accordance with opinion and in all other respects affirmed.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F Wright, judge.
Bigelow & Manier and George F. Yantis, all of Olympia, for appellant.
J. T Trullinger and O'Leary & Meyer, all of Olympia, for respondent.
Plaintiff brought suit for divorce from the defendant. By cross-complaint defendant sought similar relief. Upon a trial Before the court, an interlocutory order was entered granting a divorce to the defendant, making a property division between the parties, and requiring plaintiff to provide funds for the support of their minor children. Plaintiff appealed from only that portion of the order relating to the amount and terms of the property award to the defendant.
Appellant, Fred A. Holm, and respondent, Edna B. Holm, intermarried January 9, 1926. Two children were born of the union: one a boy, who at the time of the trial of this action was approximately sixteen years of age and was attending high school in Olympia; the other, a girl, who at that time was about fourteen years old and was attending a seminary for girls, in Tacoma.
The married life of the parties has been an unhappy one of the greater part of its existence. Prior to the birth of the children, respondent had instituted an action for divorce from appellant, but a reconcitiation was thereafter effected and the suit was dismissed. Since then, however, dissensions of one kind or another have continually arisen, causing the parties to drift further and further apart. Concluding that it was no longer possible for them to live together with any degree of happiness, they finally decided that one or the other should institute an action for divorce.
Accordingly, on November 20, 1945, appellant filed a complaint, praying that he be awarded a divorce from respondent; that provision be made for the custody and support of the children; and that a reasonable amount be awarded to the respondent. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed an answer, including a cross-complaint in which she asked that she be granted a divorce, together with the custody and control of the two children; that the court make an equitable division of the property; that the appellant be required to contribute monthly a reasonable amount for the care and support of the minor children; and that she be allowed her costs and a reasonable sum for her attorneys' feets.
Issues having been fully joined, the cause came on for trial, at which time it was stipulated between counsel that the hearing proceed upon respondent's cross-complaint. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court rendered an oral decision declaring that an interlocutory order be entered granting respondent a divorce from appellant the dividing the property equally between the parties. Some months later, the court made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and entered an interlocutory order in accordance with the oral decision and, further, setting forth in detail the amount and terms of the award to be made to respondent as her share of the property and for the support of the children, together with her costs of suit and a fee for her attorneys. This appeal followed, bringing up for review only the matter of the property award made by the trial court in favor of the respondent.
Since no appeal was taken from that portion of the interlocutory order which granted the divorce to the respondent, rather than to the appellant, it will not be necessary to refer to the evidence concerning that issue, other than to say that it was sufficient to warrant the order made by the trial court in that respect. We therefore confine ourselves to a consideration of the questions relating to the property award to the respondent.
On those question, there is no dispute as to the facts involved. Appellant is a capable and eminently successful business man, of long and varied commercial experience, and through thrift and acumen has amassed considerable wealth. The evidence concerning his vocational progress and present pecuniary standing was supplied by his own testimony upon cross-examination, supported by a full financial statement, consisting of twenty-four typewritten pages. The statement was furnished by the appellant, on the prior demand by the respondent, and was compiled by a certified public accountant for use in court.
Appellant entered upon his business career in 1923, which was about three years prior to his marriage. His operations, all conducted under the trade name of 'The Olympia Feed Company-Fred Holm', included a general feed business in the city of Olympia, the financing of transactions involving the purchase of automobiles by individuals, the negotiation of small loans to borrowers, the acquisition of real estate contracts, and other similar activities. At some time not definitely shown in the record, a branch of the general business was established in the city of Shelton. Subsequent to the marriage appellant continued operation of the business, including its various activities, in the same manner and under the same name as Before , and in consequence thereof it has steadily grown to its present proportions.
It appears from the undisputed evidence and from a specific finding made by the trial court that, at the time of the marriage, appellant's assets had a value of $72,836.01. The court further found that, after the marriage, these separate assets of the appellant were commingled with the community property thereafter acquired by the parties, and that at the time of the trial the total assets, considered as community property, amounted to $342,233.67. This latter amount included the home, valued at $13,890.16; household goods and furniture, valued at $3,000; and the business investment which, together with certain miscellaneous items, was valued at $325,343.51. For the purposes of this case, we need refer to only three items included in the business investment, namely, accounts receivable, $38,848; notes receivable, $20,842.77; and real estate contracts, $32,617.97; total $92,308.74.
The trial court held that the entire property, amounting in value to $342,233.67 should be equally divided between the parties, that is, each to have $171,116.83 in amount. To that end, the court awarded to the respondent the following:
The home property
$13,890.16
Household goods and furniture
3,000.00
Credit for one-half the value of an automobile
900.00
Cash
15,000.00
Proceeds, as collected by appellant on the accounts,
notes, and contracts above mentioned, to the extent of
67,209.84
An additional amount payable by appellant in
semi-annual installments of $3,500, or more,
71,116.83
-----------
Total
$171,116.83
It will thus be seen that, of this property award, $153,326.27 was cash or its equivalent. To secure the respondent on the item of $67,209.84, the court directed the appellant to deposit in a designated bank, to the credit of the respondent, eighty per cent of all moneys received by him on outstanding accounts, notes, and contracts, until respondent had received the full amount owing her on that item. To secure the respondent on the item of $71,116.83, the court obligated the appellant, in the event he should dispose of either the Shelton store or the Olympia store, to pay the net proceeds of such sale to the respondent, to the extent necessary to satisfy that item. To further secure the respondent on both of these items, the court directed the appellant to furnish respondent with a balance sheet and profit and loss statement at least twice each year, and, in addition, imposed a lien in favor of respondent on certain valuable real property which, by the interlocutory order, was at the same time distributed to the appellant. All deferred payments on both of these money items were to bear interest at the rate of four per cent per annum, such interest to be likewise secured.
The court awarded the care and custody of the children to the respondent, with the right of visitation at reasonable times reserved to the appellant. With respect to the support and education of the children, the court directed that the interlocutory order provide, and it did provide, that '* * * the plaintiff [appellant], Fred A. Holm, shall pay all hospital, doctor and dental bills incurred in the care of said children, and in addition thereto that when said children, or either of them, are attending school away from the home of the defendant [respondent] that plaintiff shall pay the costs of such schooling, including the living expenses and necessary clothing for such child or children and that plaintiff shall likewise pay to each of said children a reasonable monthly allowance to take care of their incidental expenditures, it being the purpose of the court to provide that the plaintiff shall pay for all the expenditures for the care and keep of said children save and except that defendant shall furnish the children with living quarters...
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