Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 81-1133.

Decision Date31 August 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-1133.,81-1133.
Citation324 NW 2d 207
PartiesArnold HOLM, Appellant, v. SPONCO MFG., INC., et al., Respondents.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, Joseph W. Anthony and Andrew J. Mitchell, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan, R. Gregory Stephens and James F. Roegge, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

YETKA, Justice.

Appellant Holm was severely injured on September 10, 1973, when he came in contact with a high voltage power line while operating an aerial ladder manufactured by the respondent, Sponco Mfg., Inc. Holm commenced a lawsuit against Sponco alleging negligence and strict products liability. Appellant stipulated that the danger of electrocution from contact with a high voltage wire was obvious, that he knew of the danger, and that he was familiar with warning decals on the machine which warned against the specific hazard which caused his injury. The Hennepin County District Court granted Sponco's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the rule of law in Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976), was controlling. Appellant appeals from that order and the entry of judgment thereon. We reverse and remand for trial.

At the time of the accident, Arnold Holm was a 58-year-old employee of Naegele Advertising, Inc.1 Approximately 80% of his time was spent working as an electrician's assistant where his primary duty was to install light fixtures on Naegele's billboards so they could be illuminated at night. On September 10, 1973, Laval Hylback, an electrician, and appellant Holm were assigned to prepare an advertising billboard for illumination by mounting light fixtures on the billboard. The advertising billboard was located on Highway 12 between Tamarach Avenue and Brimhall Avenue on the west end of Long Lake, Minnesota. The billboard was approximately 25 feet high; within 16 feet of the billboard was a high voltage electrical line approximately 31 feet off the ground. In order to attach the fixtures, Holm and Hylback were required to use an aerial ladder purchased by their employer from Sponco.

The aerial ladder had an automatic worker's platform at the top section of the ladder with a remote control device which permitted operation of the ladder from the platform. The remote control device consisted of a series of four (4) toggle switches which, when pressed, caused the ladder to move up, down, left, or right.

Holm was familiar with the aerial ladder. He had received instructions on the use of it from Naegele employees. He had used this or a similar aerial ladder for 3 years, during which time he had operated it more than 2,000 times. Moreover, Holm maintained that he was familiar enough with the controls that he could operate the ladder without looking at the control panel direction labels. Prior to September 10, 1973, Holm had had difficulty positioning the aerial ladder. Specifically, when moving the ladder to a designated spot, the ladder "carried over" or drifted after the power was discontinued. However, Holm had learned to work with the ladder so that the drifting was not a problem.

Holm had worked with the aerial ladder on billboards near electrical lines on prior occasions. He knew that the aerial ladder was not insulated. Holm was aware that he could be electrocuted if he or the ladder came in contact with an electrical line. Holm acknowledged that it was his practice to avoid the electrical lines by at least 15 feet. Holm was also aware of the various warning labels on the aerial ladder and truck and, in particular, of the 10 and 15 feet clearance recommendations.

At approximately 10:00 a.m., Hylback and Holm extended the aerial ladder such that they could climb up the ladder to the top of the billboard. Using the aerial ladder, the two men maneuvered one 18-foot long fixture up to the top of the billboard and began to bolt the fixture in place. Holm's intentions were to ride the ladder to the ground, controlling it by using the remote control device on the platform, to pick up the second 18-foot fixture that would be required to complete the job, and to return to the top of the billboard. In returning to the ground, Holm maneuvered the aerial ladder and the automatic worker's platform on which he was standing in a clockwise, northeasterly direction. While doing so, he struck the electrical powerline with his right arm below the shoulder.

In opposition to Sponco's motion for summary judgment, Holm filed an affidavit of an expert witness, testifying that the aerial ladder was defective and unreasonably dangerous because it lacked safety devices such as insulation, sensors, and other limiting or proximity warning devices which would have either warned appellant of the proximity of the electrical wires or would have prevented the electrical current from passing through appellant to ground. Sponco's expert also indicated that it was not a reasonable engineering practice to fail to include such safety devices where it was foreseeable that the aerial ladder would be used near electrical wires.

The issue raised on this appeal is whether the manufacturer of an aerial ladder in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user is liable to the user if that defective condition is obvious.

In Halvorson v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976), this court appeared to have adopted the latent-patent danger rule which relieves a manufacturer from liability if the dangers of his product are obvious to the user. Comment, Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Apparently Adopts the Latent-Patent Doctrine, 3 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 241 (1977). In Halvorson, the court held that a manufacturer does not owe an injured plaintiff "any duty to install safety devices on its crane to guard against the risk of electrocution when the record demonstrated that the risk was: (1) obvious; (2) known by all employees involved; and (3) specifically warned against * * *." 307 Minn. at 57, 240 N.W.2d 308.

Appellant requests that Halvorson be directly overruled, contending (1) that it already has been implicitly overruled, (2) that the latent-patent rule is inconsistent with the current trend in products liability law, (3) that the policy considerations underpinning strict product liability are not served by adherence to Halvorson, and (4) that the latent-patent rule alters the basic allocation of liability under Minnesota's comparative fault statute. Respondent argues that the rule of law laid down in Halvorson is logical and fair by requiring "that the user of the product should, in the final analysis, be held accountable for his own conduct in the use of the product in the face of obvious and known risks." The district court found that the stipulated facts compelled the grant of respondent's motion for summary judgment based on Halvorson. The court expressed doubt as to Halvorson's continued validity, however, and appeared to invite reversal by this court. We agree with the district court's excellent analysis of the law contained in its memorandum accompanying its order.

A succinct statement of the latent-patent rule is found in Campo v. Scofield,2 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950):

The manufacturer of a machine or any other article, dangerous because of the way in which it functions, and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers. * * *
If a manufacturer does everything necessary to make the machine function properly for the purpose for which it is designed, if the machine is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer has satisfied the law\'s demands.

Id. at 471-72, 95 N.E.2d at 803-04. Citing Campo, the Halvorson court concluded that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, could not recover for defective product design under either a strict liability or negligence theory because the danger was obvious. Halvorson, 307 Minn. 48, 57, 240 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1976).

Since Halvorson, the position of this court on the obviousness question has been uncertain. In Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976) (decided a week before Halvorson), plaintiff was a teen-age boy who was severely injured when he accidentally contacted an 8,000 volt uninsulated electrical transmission line while trimming a tree in his father's backyard. The court refused to bar recovery, noting instead that although the ordinary city dweller (including plaintiff) would know that the overhead utility lines in the backyard transmitted electricity, "he should not be expected to anticipate the presence of a such a lethal charge * * *." Id. at 33, 239 N.W.2d at 194. Thus, while the danger was obvious, the extent of the danger was not.

In Goblirsch v. Western Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 246 N.W.2d 687 (1976), the plaintiff lost his right hand while attempting to push wet corn down the intact chute of a corn-grinding machine, a task he had performed many times. Without reference to Campo or Halvorson, and without discussion of the apparently obvious danger, a jury verdict for the defendant was upheld based on plaintiff's assumption of the risk.

In Bigham v. J.C Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 1978), we approved the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Halvorson found in Bjerk v. Universal Engineering Corp., 552 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1977). In Bjerk, the plaintiff was injured after crawling under a metal guard in order to grease a rock-crushing machine while it was operating. The instruction manual specifically warned against greasing the crusher while in motion. Although the manufacturer argued that Halvorson was controlling, the court distinguished Halvorson and determined that the danger was not obvious as a matter of law....

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