Holman v. Cascio, 3:02CV1523(CFD).

• Decision Date: 29 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 3:02CV1523(CFD).,3:02CV1523(CFD).
• Citation: 390 F.Supp.2d 120
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Randall C. HOLMAN, Plaintiff v. John CASCIO and Michael D'Amato, Defendants.

Page 120

390 F.Supp.2d 120

Randall C. HOLMAN, Plaintiff v. John CASCIO and Michael D'Amato, Defendants.

No. 3:02CV1523(CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

August 29, 2005.

John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, Norman A. Pattis, Bethany, CT, for Plaintiff.

Hugh F. Keefe, Lynch, Traub, Keefe & Errante, New Haven, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DRONEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Randall Holman, brought this action against the defendants, John Cascio and Michael D'Amato, two police officers of the Town of East Haven, Connecticut, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants are sued only in their individual capacities. The complaint sets forth claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This opinion considers the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

I Background

The following facts are undisputed: On October 29, 1997, Holman was arrested by the defendants at a nursing home in East Haven and charged with the state offenses of breach of peace, criminal trespass in the first degree and interfering with a police officer. The officers arrested Holman without an arrest warrant. In October 2000, those charges were nolled¹ by an Assistant State's Attorney in the Connecticut Superior Court. Holman's false arrest claim arises from the October 29, 1997 arrest, and his malicious prosecution claim arises from the resulting prosecution.

II Summary Judgment Standard

In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(c)); accord Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991).

III Discussion

The defendants seek summary judgment on both the malicious prosecution and false arrest claims.

A) Malicious Prosecution

The complaint alleges that the defendants submitted a false written report to the State's Attorney's Office concerning the events of October 29, 1997, to support their view that Holman had committed the charged offenses. As a result, Holman claims that he was unlawfully prosecuted for a period of almost three years in the Connecticut Superior Court. The defendants seek summary judgment on Holman's malicious prosecution claim, arguing that Holman cannot demonstrate that the underlying criminal prosecution terminated in his favor because those charges were nolled by the prosecutor.

It is well settled that in order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law. Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir.2002); Christman v. Kick, 342 F.Supp.2d 82, 91 n. 9 (D.Conn.2004); Romagnano v. Town of Colchester, 354 F.Supp.2d 129, 136 (D.Conn.2004); see also Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir.2004) (While § 1983 affords plaintiffs a federal cause of action, courts generally "borrow the elements of the underlying malicious prosecution from state law"). To prevail upon a malicious prosecution claim under Connecticut law, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendants initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice. QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 360 n. 16, 773 A.2d 906 (2001). McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn. 444, 447, 446 A.2d 815 (1982); Vandersluis v. Weil, 176 Conn. 353, 356, 407 A.2d 982 (1978); Romagnano, 354 F.Supp.2d at 136 (citing cases). The pending motion for summary judgment only challenges Holman's ability to meet the second element, whether the nolle of his charges resulted in a favorable termination. The effect of a nolle on this element has been recognized as a vexing question in many reported decisions, and arises frequently in § 1983 actions for malicious prosecution.

In See v. Gosselin, 133 Conn. 158, 159, 48 A.2d 560 (1946), the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the "plaintiff's complaint contains a sufficient allegation of the termination of the criminal proceedings in his favor" in an action for malicious prosecution brought by Harold See. It was alleged that the prosecutor nolled the criminal case after the State's witnesses testified, and without a request for the nolle from See. The Court noted that "[i]t is generally held that the plaintiff must allege and prove that the criminal action terminated in his favor, either by his acquittal or in some other manner equivalent thereto." Id. (emphasis added). In holding that the allegations of the circumstances of the nolle satisfied that test, and in reversing the trial court's dismissal, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained:

When we made `discharge' a condition of bringing an action of malicious prosecution, it signified the termination of the particular prosecution. It is not necessary that the accused should have been acquitted. It is sufficient if he was discharged without a trial under circumstances amounting to an abandonment of the prosecution without request from or by arrangement with him.

Id. at 160, 48 A.2d 560. More recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court also rejected a narrow interpretation of the "favorable termination" element in the context of a vexatious litigation claim (the counterpart to malicious prosecution, where the underlying action was a civil suit rather than a criminal prosecution), and clarified that:

Notwithstanding our recitation of the term `favorable termination' (emphasis added) in Vandersluis [176 Conn. 353, 407 A.2d 982] and a few other cases ... we have never required a plaintiff in a vexatious suit action to prove a favorable termination either by pointing to an adjudication on the merits in his favor or by showing affirmatively that the circumstances of the termination indicated his innocence or nonliability, so long as the proceeding has terminated without consideration.

DeLaurentis v. City of New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 251, 597 A.2d 807 (1991); see also Russo v. City of Hartford, 184 F.Supp.2d 169, 186 (D.Conn.2002) ("The DeLaurentis court proceeded to distance Connecticut law from a strict interpretation of `favorable termination'"); Thayer v. Electro-Methods, Inc., 2004 WL 3105966 at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct., Dec 7, 2004) ("Our Supreme Court has not adopted a strict interpretation of `favorable termination'").

In determining whether the element of "favorable termination" of a malicious prosecution action has been satisfied, dispositions of criminal cases other than through an acquittal have received considerable attention from the Connecticut Superior Court and the federal courts. See, e.g., Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853-54 (2d Cir.1992) (discussing whether a criminal case was favorably terminated when the defendant received accelerated rehabilitation under Connecticut law). The effect of a nolle by a prosecutor has received the most attention, and some decisions state that the entry of a nolle cannot be the basis for a plaintiff to satisfy the "favorable termination" element of a malicious prosecution claim. See Simpson v. Denardo, 2004 WL 1737444 (D.Conn., July 29, 2004) ("A nolle prosequi does not qualify as a favorable termination for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim"); Walsh v. Sousa, 2004 WL 717169 (D.Conn. March 25, 2004) ("A nolle prosequi is not a favorable termination of the type required to support a malicious prosecution claim"). The majority of decisions applying Connecticut law, however, hold that a nolle of the criminal charge may still permit the plaintiff to satisfy that element if the circumstances of the nolle satisfy the See v. Gosselin test of "an abandonment of the prosecution without request from or by an arrangement with [the defendant]." More specifically, the decisions hold that a nolle will preclude a subsequent case for malicious prosecution when it was made as part of a plea bargain or under other circumstances that indicate that the defendant received the nolle in exchange for providing something of benefit to the state or victim.² For example, if some charges were nolled in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense, those nolled charges could not be the basis for a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. If, however, a charge was nolled by the prosecutor without the request of the defendant, that could satisfy the element if the circumstances of the nolle indicated an "abandonment of the prosecution." The factual circumstances surrounding the nolle are material and when disputed, must be resolved by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Jackson v. Smith, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 72, 2003 WL 21771938 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jul 14, 2003) (nolle, which was conditioned on future noncontact between the defendant and the victim, was not sufficient to constitute a "favorable" termination under See...