Holman v. Commonwealth
Decision Date | 17 April 2018 |
Docket Number | Record No. 1919-16-2 |
Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
Parties | RASHID HAKIM HOLMAN v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Petty, Beales and AtLee
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Lauren P. Whitley, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, a judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond ("trial court") found appellant Rashid Hakim Holman guilty of violating his probation. It revoked his suspended sentences, and reimposed three years, with all but nine months suspended. On appeal, Holman argues the trial court erred in: (1) considering facts from a previous criminal proceeding where no facts from that case were introduced in his probation revocation hearing; and (2) admitting hearsay statements from a probation violation report, violating Holman's right to confrontation. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Reid v. Commonwealth, 65Va. App. 745, 753, 781 S.E.2d 373, 377 (2016) (citation omitted) (quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 536, 619 S.E.2d 16, 65 (2005)). So viewed, the evidence is as follows:
In 2014, Holman was convicted of statutory burglary and possession of marijuana. He received a sentence of ten years and twelve months in prison, with nine years and ten months suspended. Later that year, he was convicted of domestic assault and battery, third offense, and was sentenced to five years in prison, with four years suspended. He was placed on supervised probation for all offenses. In 2016, Holman was charged with grand larceny. The trial court issued a capias, alleging that this new charge violated the good behavior condition of Holman's suspended sentence.1 Holman's probation officer filed a probation violation report with the trial court. The report detailed several violations of the conditions of Holman's supervised probation, including Holman's new felony charge, failing to report his April 2016 arrest for that crime within three days to his probation officer, missing a scheduled visit with his probation officer in August 2016, and his failure to request and obtain permission to change his residence four times between October 2015 and September 2016.
The revocation hearing, as well as the trial for the new larceny charge, were set for the same day in October 2016. At the conclusion of the larceny trial, the trial court found Holman not guilty of that offense. The judge noted that he was "95 percent sure" of Holman's guilt, but acquitted Holman on the new larceny charge because he was not sure the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He explained:
The trial court then turned to the revocation matter. Holman requested a continuance because he contested the allegations in the probation violation report, and the probation officer was not available to testify. The trial court granted the request and re-scheduled the revocation hearing for the following month. Although the trial judge agreed to continue the revocation hearing to secure the presence of the probation officer, he expressed some skepticism as to why it was necessary, observing: He also told defense counsel, "I hope you realize and explained to your client that I'm certainly going to consider what I heard in this thing in the course of this revocation."
When the parties returned for the revocation hearing, Holman's probation officer, Hunter Reed, testified. Reed took over Holman's supervision in July 2016. He authored the major violation report; however, he relied on another probation officer's case notes for events that took place prior to July 2016, as he only had direct knowledge of events that took place after he assumed supervision. At the conclusion of Reed's testimony, defense counsel objected to "anything in the probation violation [report], confrontation clause, that Mr. Reed doesn't have personal knowledge of." The trial court responded, The following exchange took place between defense counsel and the trial court:
At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court found:
The trial court revoked Holman's suspended sentences, and reimposed three years in the penitentiary, with all but nine months suspended.
We first address Holman's argument that the trial court erred in considering the facts from his grand larceny trial during the revocation proceeding without specifying the exact evidence it relied upon when deciding to revoke his suspended sentences. Rule 5A:18 reads, in relevant part: "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless anobjection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Holman concedes that he failed to preserve this issue for appellate review, but relies on the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18. "Application of the ends of justice exception is appropriate when the judgment of the trial court was error and application of the exception is necessary to avoid a grave injustice or the denial of essential rights." Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 (2005). The ends of justice exception, however, "is narrow and is to be used sparingly." Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 203, 219, 590 S.E.2d 602, 609 (2004) (en banc) (quoting Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997)).
Holman argues the ends of justice exception applies because he "had no notice of what specific evidence was used against him, or that the evidence of this trial where he was acquitted would be the basis the trial court would rely heavily upon to revoke his suspended sentence." He relies upon Hess v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 738, 441 S.E.2d 29 (1994), in which this Court held that a trial court may revoke probation based upon evidence from an earlier prosecution over which the same judge presided, but must "stat[e] for or mak[e] part of the record the specific evidence upon which he relied." Id. at 739-40, 441 S.E.2d at 30. Hess is distinct from this case, however, because — unlike Holman — Hess timely objected at trial, and thus did not need to satisfy the exacting requirements of the "ends of justice" exception.
Holman fails to demonstrate how the trial court's failure to recite specific evidence amounts to a "grave injustice or the denial of essential rights." First, Holman had ample notice that his grand larceny charge would be material to the revocation proceeding, as it was included in the major violation report, which Holman possessed in advance of the scheduled hearings. In addition, the revocation hearing was initially scheduled to take place immediately after the grand larceny trial, before the same judge. It did not occur at that time only because Holman requesteda continuance. Holman also had specific notice that the judge planned to consider the evidence from the grand larceny case in the revocation proceeding. After Holman requested a continuance upon his acquittal for the grand larceny charge, the trial court told counsel: "I hope you realize and explained to your client that I'm certainly going to consider what I heard in this thing in the course of this revocation." Finally, even if the trial court failed to specify what particular facts from the larceny trial were most salient to his decision to revoke, it nonetheless expressly stated that it was "95 percent sure of the defendant's guilt" in the grand larceny case, and found that this...
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