Holman v. Industrial Stamping & Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 350,No. 6,6,350
• Parties: Hollice HOLMAN, Marshall G. Meek, Albert E. Cavanaugh, Michael Aiphonse McCann, Ross J. Pandolfino, Glenn A. Gulick, Joseph F. Mehal, Jr., John L. Hill, George D. Harkins, Vernon Shores and Eugene Pugh, for and on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated as a class, Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees, v. INDUSTRIAL STAMPING and MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Division of Vinco Corporation, a corporation, Mechanics Educational Society of America (M. E. S. A. Union) Local, of Detroit, Michigan, an unincorporated association or Labor Union, George White, President of said Mechanics Educational Society of America, Local, and Matt E. Smith, Secretary-Treasurer of M. E. S. A. Local, of Detroit, Michigan, Defendants, Appellants and Appellees. Motion
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 322

74 N.W.2d 322

344 Mich. 235

Hollice HOLMAN, Marshall G. Meek, Albert E. Cavanaugh Michael Aiphonse McCann, Ross J. Pandolfino, Glenn A Gulick, Joseph F. Mehal, Jr., John L. Hill, George D Harkins, Vernon Shores and Eugene Pugh, for and on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated as a class Plaintiffs, Appellants and Appellees, v. INDUSTRIAL STAMPING and MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Division of Vinco Corporation, a corporation, Mechanics Educational Society of America (M. E. S. A. Union) Local No. 6, of Detroit, Michigan, an unincorporated association or Labor Union, George White, President of said Mechanics Educational Society of America, Local No. 6, and Matt E. Smith, Secretary-Treasurer of M. E. S. A. Local No. 6, of Detroit, Michigan, Defendants, Appellants and Appellees.

Motion No. 350.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 28, 1955.

Edward N. Barnard, Detroit, for plaintiffs, appellants and appellees.

James P. Hannan, Detroit, and Jack G. Day, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants and appellees.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Detroit, for Industrial Stamping & Mfg. Co., defendant, appellant and appellee.

Theophil C. Kammholz, Gen. Counsel, David P. Findling, Associate Gen. Counsel, Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Norton J. Come, Duane Beeson, Attorneys, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for N. L. R. B.

Before the Entire Bench.

BUTZEL, Justice.

The Industrial Stamping and Manufacing Company, a division of Vinco Corporation, hereinafter referred to as defendant company, engages in the business of stamping and plating automobile parts. Until September, 1954, its operations were conducted in Detroit, Michigan, at two locations, hereinafter referred to as the Epworth plant (stamping) and the Beaufait plant (plating). The employees of both plants were unionized and had collective bargaining contracts with defendant company, the Epworth union being Local 174, UAW-CIO and the Beaufait union being AFL Metal Polishers, Local 1.

On September 24, 1954, defendant company purchased the land, buildings, machinery and inventory of the Detroit Boulevard plant of Parker-Wolverine Division of the Udylite Corporation, whose business was competitive with its own. The employees of this Boulevard plant were also unionized, the stamping employees being represented by the Mechanics Educational Society of America, hereinafter called MESA, and the plating employees by Local 189, UAW-CIO, each having collective bargaining contracts with Parker-Wolverine. Upon consummation of the purchase Parker-Wolverine notified its employees of the sale to defendant company, advised them of the termination of their employment with Parker-Wolverine, and further advised that defendant company planned to offer many of them employment at the same plant. Almost contemporaneously with the purchase and only a few days later, defendant company did hire many of these former Parker-Wolverine employees and continued the operation of the Boulevard plant. Its plan was to eventually merge all operations into the Boulevard plant by transferring equipment and employees from Epworth and Beaufait.

On September 27, 1954, defendant company also filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the board, asking that the four groups of employees at the three plants (Epworth, Beaufait, Boulevard stamping and Boulevard plating) be considered as a single bargaining unit and requesting the board to conduct an election to determine which union should become the sole bargaining representative. Locals 174 and 189 UAW-CIO filed similar petitions. MESA and AFL Metal Polishers, Local 1, were permitted to intervene and they objected to the petitions on the ground that their existing contracts were a bar to the proceedings. In its 'Decision and Direction of Election' dated March 21, 1955, the board overruled this objection saying:

'We view the consolidated operations as being comparable to an entirely new operation. Therfore, the contracts of Local 1 and MESA covering only a fraction of the enlarged employee complement are not a bar to a present determination of representatives.' (Citing Greyhound Garage of Jacksonville, Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 902 at 904; New Jersey Natural Gas Company, 101 N.L.R.B. 215 at 252; Herman Lowenstein, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 377 at 379.)

The board further determined that defendant company was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Management Relations Act, hereinafter referred to as the LMRA; that the appropriate bargaining unit consisted of employees at all three plants; and directed that an election be held. It also settled certain questions regarding eligibility to vote in the election. The election was held and defendant MESA was selected as the bargaining representative and was duly certified as such by the board.

Thereafter, defendant company and MESA commenced negotiations for a new contract presumably to settle, inter alia, the question of the adjustment of seniority rights as between defendant company's employees at the Epworth and Beaufait plants and the rehired employees of the newly acquired Boulevard plant, an issue necessarily raised by the consolidation of the different units each with its own seniority list. Prior to the completion of negotiations readjustments in employment became necessary resulting in the laying off of certain employees. The seniority rule adopted in reference to these layoffs resulted in the dismissal of some of the employees at the Epworth and Beaufait plants and a retention of some of the employees at the Boulevard plant, these being the rehired Parker-Wolverine employees. In addition there were certain other job classification adjustments alleged to be to the detriment of Epworth and Beaufait employees.

Plaintiffs are and represent a number of employees at the Epworth and Beaufait plants, now members of defendant MESA. They contend that they were discriminated against by defendant MESA and/or the defendant company in the matter of the layoffs and job classifications. It is their position that the seniority of the Boulevard employees should date from September 27, 1954, the date such employees were rehired by defendant company following the purchase of that plant from Parker-Wolverine and that plaintiffs' seniority rights therefore took precedence, notwithstanding such old employees might have been doing like work even possibly at the same bench or machines for years while in the employ of Parker-Wolverine.

Plaintiffs filed charges with the board against MESA and the company alleging that the foregoing constituted unfair labor practices as defined in the LMRA. After these charges had been submitted to the board and while they were being considered by it, plaintiffs filed a bill of complaint in the circuit court for the county of Wayne in chancery praying for the issuance of an injunction restraining defendants MESA and company from discriminating against plaintiffs in regard to seniority and restraining defendants from taking any action which recognizes a date other than September 27, 1954, for seniority of the former employees of Parker-Wolverine. They asked for other miscellaneous relief. An ex parte restraining order was issued. Thereafter defendant company moved the court to dismiss the bill or in the alternative to dismiss the temporary restraining order and defendant MESA moved to dismiss the bill. Both motions were premised on the State court's lack of jurisdiction in the matter. The court below dissolved the restraining order,

'* * * the court being of the opinion that this court had no jurisdiction to issue said temporary restraining order for the reason that jurisdiction is in the National Labor Relations Board.'

However, the court also entered an order denying the motions to dismiss the bill of complaint. On leave granted, both sides have appealed, plaintiffs from the order dissolving the injunction and defendant company from the order denying dismissal of the bill. We granted a stay of the order dissolving the injunction.

Under the facts presented, is the State court precluded from taking jurisdiction in view of the policy and provisions of the National Labor Management Relations Act and the action of the National Labor Relations Board? We are directly concerned with one aspect of the so-called problem of 'Federal pre-emption' in the labor relations field, as well as certain other legal concepts

Plaintiffs' ultimate contention is that seniority for the former employees of Parker-Wolverine can only date from September 27, 1954. They claim that the decision of the board designating all plants and employees as one bargaining unit and directing an election also determined that the seniority date of the former employees of Parker-Wolverine was September 27, 1954, the date they were rehired by defendant company. Both defendants have consistently denied that the directive of the board contained such a finding. The brief amicus curiae filed in this court and cause by the National Labor Relations Board similarly denies plaintiffs' contention. While the decision of the board did speak of September 27, 1954, as the hiring date for the Boulevard employees, it did so only in the context in regard to who would be eligible to vote in the election for a bargaining representative. The question of seniority is quite different and, as we shall note, generally based upon many considerations only one of which is 'hiring' date. The decision on the charges filed with the board by plaintiffs, to which we shall later refer, stated that the election directive was not determinative of seniority status. We find plaintiffs' contention in that regard without merit.

While plaintiffs do not (and cannot here or under the act itself directly) contest the election directive and certification, we point out that the unit was determined, the election is directed and the bargaining representative certified pursuant to...