Holman v. State
| Decision Date | 14 June 1922 |
| Docket Number | (No. 6984.) |
| Parties | HOLMAN v. STATE. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, El Paso County; W. D. Howe, Judge.
C. H. Holman was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Moore & Smith and L. A. Dale, all of El Paso, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of El Paso county of manslaughter, and his punishment fixed at two years in the penitentiary.
By his bills of exception appellant complains of the admission of a conversation had between his wife and certain officers at the city hall in El Paso about 20 minutes after the shooting of deceased on the occasion in question. There is no qualification of the trial judge to these bills of exception, nor any statement on any of them as to the ground of the supposed admissibility of this evidence. The objections were that said testimony was hearsay, and not in the presence of appellant; that same was a violation of the rule inhibiting the wife testifying against her husband; that it was hurtful as injecting the theory of cruel treatment of his wife on the part of appellant. Our presumption is that this testimony was admitted as res gestæ. Part of same was inadmissible beyond question. Res gestæ can never go beyond the facts of the transaction as they spontaneously express themselves through the agency of the acts or declarations of some participant in such transaction. Narration of past events, not so connected with such transaction as to illumine same, is not res gestæ. Expressions of personal feelings and opinions, when other than the reflection of the acts or conduct of a party to the offense, would not seem ordinarily to be admissible. To make admissible any statement or act occurring after the transaction has ended, it must be shown by the party offering such testimony, or by the facts in evidence, that the person so speaking or acting was so affected, or is so affected, by the transaction as to render likely the spontaneity of the utterance or act offered, and to exclude the idea that same was or is a mere narration of past events. We do not think the fact that the utterance or act is that of the wife of the accused would make it inadmissible. Cook v. State, 22 Tex. App. 525, 3 S. W. 749; Robbins v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 367, 166 S. W. 529; Thompson v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 417, 178 S. W. 1195.
In the instant case we observe that the only fact shown as establishing a predicate for the introduction of this testimony is that the woman was crying when the officers saw her at the city hall 20 minutes after the shooting. When did she begin crying? Was her crying the result of excitement caused by the shooting, or was it because she was sorrowing over the death of the man with whom she was? Where had she been in the interim? What had been her conduct and situation since the shooting? These facts are not shown. Twenty minutes is not time sufficient to justify the exclusion of a statement claimed to be res gestæ if the condition of excitement had been continuous from the shooting, but the fact of crying at a point of time 20 minutes afterward, unaccompanied by other evidence as to mental condition then and theretofore, would not suffice to establish a predicate for the admission of a then made statement as res gestæ.
That part of said conversation relating to the fact of the complaints to the officers made by said woman, as well as the explanatory statement made by one officer to his brother officer that she had been complaining to him for three or four months, would be inadmissible and hurtful to appellant, and could not be taken as the expression of any part of said transaction speaking through the woman. Nor would her statement that "she thought it was going to be her," or that "she knew there was going to be trouble." Her thoughts and fears were but those of one not a party to the killing. This is also true of her expression of sympathy with deceased and vindictiveness against appellant, as contained in her statement to the effect, "Why was that poor man killed; he was innocent," and the further statement regarding her husband, "Why wasn't that s____ of a b____ killed himself." In so far as the statements of this woman confined themselves to the facts surrounding the shooting, we believe same admissible as res gestæ if a proper predicate be laid.
The complaints set forth in bills of exception Nos. 3 and 4 of the supposed res gestæ statement of Mrs. Holman, contains other inadmissible matters stated in said conversation. What she said of her separation from appellant, and as to his being a pimp, and that he had...
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State v. Greenlee
... ... Without discussing the Texas decisions in detail, it is to be admitted that they establish a quite liberal rule, though there is a more recent decision by that court which indicates a limit beyond which it will not go. Holman v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 364, 243 S. W. 1093. Counsel also call attention to a somewhat similar statute in Utah, referred to in State v. Botha, 27 Utah, 289, 75 P. 731, and to an early Georgia decision (Biggs v. State, 29 Ga. 723, 76 Am. Dec. 630), and upon these authorities [269 P. 333] it is urged ... ...
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Graham v. State
... ... No reversible error has been shown ... The judgment is affirmed ... Opinion approved by the Court ... --------------- ... 1 McCormick & Ray, Texas Evidence, § 915 (2d ed. 1956) ... 2 Smith v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 349, 152 S.W.2d 751; Holman v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 364, 243 S.W. 1093; Patterson v. State Tex.Cr.App., 458 S.W.2d 658; Bennett v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 382 S.W.2d 930; Oldham v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 322 S.W.2d 616 ... 3 In Miranda, the Court said that its decision was 'not intended to hamper the traditional function of ... ...
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State v. Greenlee
...there is a more recent decision by that court which indicates a limit beyond which it will not go. Holman v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. 364, 243 S.W. 1093. Counsel also call attention to a somewhat similar statute in Utah, referred to in State v. Botha, 27 Utah 289, 75 P. 731, and to an early Georg......
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Rubenstein v. State, 37900
... ... Be this as it may, appellant was in a jail cell and had been interrogated by other officers prior to this conversation. Under none of the authorities cited in Notes 1--3 of Moore v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 380 S.W.2d 626, could this statement be held to have been spontaneously made. See also Holman v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 364, 243 S.W. 1093; McBride v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 378, 27 S.W.2d 1100; Bradford v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 191, 54 S.W.2d 516; Hamilton v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 205, 135 S.W.2d 476; Trammell v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 224, 167 S.W.2d 171; Oldham v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 322 ... ...