Holmes v. Fed. Election Comm'n
Decision Date | 20 April 2015 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14–1243 RMC |
Citation | 99 F.Supp.3d 123 |
Parties | Laura Holmes, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Federal Election Commission, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Allen Joseph Dickerson Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Erin R. Chlopak, Steve Nicholas Hajjar, Benjamin A. Streeter, III, Kevin Deeley, Federal Election Commission, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Laura Holmes and Paul Jost challenge the constitutionality of a provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that limits individual donors to contributing $2,600 per election to candidates running for federal office. Plaintiffs insist that they do not oppose the amount of money that an individual may contribute to a candidate for an election ($2,600), acknowledging that any such challenge would be foreclosed by Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that the central question, which has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court, is whether FECA's per-election contribution structure is unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments because it allegedly allows some contributors to give twice as much money to some candidates for use in the general election while denying others that same right. Specifically, Plaintiffs state that FECA's contribution restriction did not allow them to combine their primary and general election contributions ($2,600 per election) in order to give $5,200 to successful primary candidates for use in the 2014 general election. Plaintiffs complain that FECA's per-election limit unfairly benefits contributors supporting candidates who were unopposed in their primary contests because those contributors could give $2,600 before the primary, and the unopposed candidate could later use those funds during the general election campaign (for a total of $5,200). Conversely, Plaintiffs argue, the limit disadvantages contributors who wish to support general election candidates who faced substantial opposition in their primaries because those contributors could not give $5,200 for use in the general election.
“In an abundance of caution,” this Court initially certified two constitutional questions to the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Holmes v. FEC, No. CV 14–1243(RMC), –––F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––,2014 WL 6190937, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2014) (Certification Order) [Dkt. 19]. The Circuit, however, remanded the case at the request of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to enlarge the record for appellate review and to determine whether any constitutional questions were appropriate for certification. Plaintiffs filed a motion for certification [Dkt. 25]; FEC opposed, seeking summary judgment [Dkt. 27].1 The parties presented oral argument on March 31, 2015.
After full consideration of the entire record and all arguments, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' challenge to FECA's temporal per-election restrictions on individual contributions to federal candidates constitutes a veiled attack on the contribution limit set by Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court as a legitimate means to combat corruption. Because Plaintiffs' claims rest on issues of settled law, the Court will deny Plaintiffs' motion for certification and grant FEC's motion for summary judgment.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded this case “in order to provide the parties an opportunity to develop, by expedited discovery or otherwise, the factual record necessary for en banc review of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge.” Order [Dkt. 21]. The Circuit further ordered: Id.2 After a period of discovery, this Court ordered the parties to file briefs on the certification issue as well as proposed findings of fact. See Order [Dkt. 24].
The Circuit granted FEC's motion for remand because, in the main, FEC sought a more fully developed record. Accordingly, this Court has included the majority of FEC's proposed facts here with only slight modifications. Indeed, this Court “is inclined to be overinclusive rather than underinclusive when presented with close evidentiary disputes, preferring to convey as detailed a record as possible to the reviewing court.” Cao v. FEC, 688 F.Supp.2d 498, 504 (E.D.La.), aff'd sub nom In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir.2010) ); see also Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, 9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2411 (3d ed.) ().
Both parties have raised numerous objections to their opponents' proposed findings of facts. Plaintiffs chiefly object to the relevance of many of FEC's proposed facts. Pl. Objections [Dkt. 38–3] at 3. Plaintiffs also argue that FEC's “findings of fact contain[ ] conclusory and argumentative phrases that are both irrelevant and inappropriate for certification,” id. at 3 n. 3, and that certain proposed facts are derived from inadmissible hearsay or improper expert opinion, see, e.g., id. at 7. FEC argues that Plaintiffs' facts are “incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading.” FEC Responses [Dkt. 30] at 2.
This Court has considered all of the above objections in entering its Factual Findings and overrules most of Plaintiffs' relevance objections. See Cao, 688 F.Supp.2d at 505 () . The Court also overrules most of Plaintiffs' admissibility objections because the facts to which they object are legislative facts, which are “general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy, are without reference to specific parties, and need not be developed through evidentiary hearings.”Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. FEC (LNC ), 930 F.Supp.2d 154, 157 (D.D.C.2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted). This Court has omitted or modified any proposed finding of fact that was argumentative or drew legal conclusions.
Regulatory Framework: Statutory Contribution Limits
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