Libertarian Nat'l Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n

• Decision Date: 18 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 11–cv–562 (RLW).
• Citation: 930 F.Supp.2d 154
• Parties: LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

930 F.Supp.2d 154

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, INC., Plaintiff,

v.FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–cv–562 (RLW).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

March 18, 2013.

Allen Joseph Dickerson, Alan Gura, Gura & Possessky, PLLC, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.

Kevin Paul Hancock, David Brett Kolker, Harry Jacobs Summers, Federal Election Commission, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT L. WILKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”) has been left a bequest that it is unable to take in one lump sum payment because Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) believes that, due to the large amount of the bequest, to do so would violate the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–57. The FEC instead requires, as they have for decades, that the LNC receive annual payments from the bequest at the maximum contribution amount a living individual could donate. Thus the LNC will receive the full bequest, but over a number of years. The LNC does not want to wait, and challenges the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) as applied to bequests. As part of this challenge, the LNC asks this Court to enjoin the FEC from enforcing the FECA with respect to bequests, and also requests this Court, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437h, to certify one question to the en banc United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The FEC has opposed the motion for certification, and moved for summary judgment. The parties appeared before this Court for oral argument on the pending motions on February 25, 2013. Based on the parties' briefs, the arguments presented to this Court, and a review of the relevant law, for the reasons stated below the LNC's motion to certify (Dkt. No. 25) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and the FEC's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 29) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. History of This Case

Raymond Groves Burrington died on April 26, 2007. (Dkt. No. 13, ¶ 14). His will left a residuary bequest to the LNC of an amount eventually determined to be $217,734.00. ( Id.). The LNC is the national committee of the Libertarian Party of the United States. (Dkt. No. 25–3, ¶ 1). Prior to the bequest, Burrington had made only one donation to the Libertarian Party: a $25.00 gift on May 19, 1998. ( Id. ¶ 26). The Libertarian Party had no knowledge of Burrington's bequest until after his passing. ( Id. ¶ 25).

Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), no “person” can contribute more than $32,400.00 to a national political committee annually.¹ In addition, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1), no political committee can “solicit, receive or direct to another person” any amount not subject to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1). The statute defines “person” as follows: “The term ‘person’ includes an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of persons, but such term does not include the Federal Government or any authority of the Federal Government.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(11).

The FEC has determined that the word “person” in 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) includes testamentary estates. See, e.g., FEC Advisory Opinions 2004–02 & 1999–14. Thus, the LNC can only accept annual distributions from Burrington's gift at the maximum threshold set by 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1) & 441a(c), rather than accepting the gift all at once. (Dkt. No. 13, ¶ 15). The LNC objects to the statutory framework preventing the organization from receiving all of the money in one lump sum on the grounds that the framework “violates the First Amendment speech and associational rights of the LNC and its supporters.” ( Id. ¶ 23).

The LNC's First Amended Complaint “seeks to enjoin application of the Party Limit to the contribution, solicitation, acceptance, and spending of decedents' bequests, as said application violates the LNC's First Amendment speech and associational rights and those of its supporters.” ( Id. ¶ 3). It has moved this Court, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437h, to certify the following question to the en banc Court of Appeals:

Does imposing annual contribution limits against testamentary bequests directed at, or accepted or solicited by political party committees, violate First Amendment speech and associational rights?

(Dkt. No. 25). The FEC requested that the parties first create a factual record “to determine which constitutional claims, if any, merit certification to the Court of Appeals.” (Dkt. No. 15, ¶ 6). The parties completed discovery in February 2012. ( See Minute Order, Feb. 10, 2012). The LNC filed its Motion to Certify on May 4, 2012. (Dkt. No. 25). The FEC opposed that Motion, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, on July 6, 2012. ( See Dkt. Nos. 28 & 29).

At the conclusion of discovery in this case, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact. LNC objects to many of the FEC's facts, claiming they improperly quote previous Supreme Court opinions and are thus not “facts” at all, present inadmissible hearsay, or both. ( See Dkt. No. 30, at 2–3). The FEC responds by claiming that the facts the LNC objects to are legislative facts, which are “not subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (Dkt. No. 37, at 1). Legislative facts are “general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy,” Friends of the Earth v. Reilly, 966 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C.Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted), are “without reference to specific parties,” and “need not be developed through evidentiary hearings,” Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1161–62 (D.C.Cir.1979). LNC also claims the FEC's objections to certain facts are obfuscatory because they purport to present objections when they often merely restate the facts with different language. ( See, e.g., Dkt. No. 36, at 6 (“This is not an objection—it is an admission rephrasing the proposed fact.”)). The Court overrules the LNC's hearsay objections for the reasons set forth by the FEC; however, because the Court will narrow the issue as described infra, many of the facts proffered by the parties are no longer relevant.

II. Legal FrameworkA. Campaign Finance Law

As is well known, our Bill of Rights states that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech....” U.S. CONST. amend. I. And “the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But, of course, this does not end this matter, because Congress has passed, and the Supreme Court has upheld, laws that purport to limit speech—particularly in the manner of campaign contributions. They have done so in part to prevent corruption, or the appearance of corruption. A brief overview of the state of the law regarding campaign finance is warranted. This will look at the current state of affairs with a particular focus on the law with respect to campaign contributions—what is at issue in this litigation—and will address campaign expenditures only in passing.

The first law limiting the unrestricted flow of money into politics came more than 100 years ago. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (discussing history, including passage of the Tillman Act in 1907), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). But the bedrock case regarding limits on contributions related to political efforts remains Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).²Buckley involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1974 FECA amendments, as well as related provisions of the Tax Code. Id. at 6, 96 S.Ct. 612. The case dealt with contributions, expenditures, and reporting requirements; this analysis will focus on only the first of those three. The Supreme Court did not hold contribution limits to the same constitutional scrutiny as expenditure limits, stating that “a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication.” Id. at 20, 96 S.Ct. 612. This is so because a contribution limitation “involves little direct restraint on [one's] political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Id. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612. Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the FECA's limits on contributions withstood a facial constitutional challenge. “Congress was surely entitled to conclude ... that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.” Id. at 28, 96 S.Ct. 612.

The Buckley Court considered whether limiting contributions would make it more difficult for minor parties to amass sufficient funds. They concluded that contribution limits “would appear to benefit minor-party and independent candidates relative to their major-party opponents because major-party candidates receive far more money in large contributions.” Id. at 33, 96 S.Ct. 612. And in addressing an overbreadth challenge to contribution limits, namely the proposition that most large contributors do not seek improper influence, the Court agreed with that proposition generally, but nonetheless stated that because of the difficulty in determining suspect contributions, “Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires...