Holodak v. Lockwood

• Decision Date: 03 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-4510,97-4510
• Citation: 726 So.2d 815
• Parties: Edward F. HOLODAK and Suzanne Domenico, Appellants, v. Robert E. LOCKWOOD, As Clerk of the Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

726 So.2d 815

Edward F. HOLODAK and Suzanne Domenico, Appellants, v. Robert E. LOCKWOOD, As Clerk of the Court of the 17th Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, Florida, Appellee.

No. 97-4510

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

February 3, 1999.

Edward F. Holodak of the Law Offices of Tucker & Tighe, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.

Tamara M. Scrudders, Assistant County Attorney, Anthony C. Musto, Chief Appellate Counsel, and John J. Copelan, Jr., County Attorney for Broward County, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Edward Holodak and Suzanne Domenico ("Appellants") appeal an order dismissing with prejudice their fourth amended complaint against Robert Lockwood, Clerk of the Broward County Circuit Court ("Clerk"). Treating the factual allegations of the amended complaint as true, as we are required to do, and considering them in the light most favorable to the appellants, we find that the trial court properly dismissed appellants' claims.

Appellants received citations for various traffic law violations. Pursuant to section 318.14, Florida Statutes (1995), they timely paid the fines imposed by mailing payment by check to the Clerk of the Court. However, because the Clerk failed to timely record the payments and subsequently notified the State Department of Motor Vehicles that appellants had not paid the tickets, appellants were assessed late fees and their driver's licenses were suspended.

In their fourth amended complaint, appellants sued the Clerk in his official capacity, claiming damages for negligence, libel and libel per se and seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that appellants had not shown that the Clerk owed them any statutory or common-law duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent acts. In support of its ruling, the court cited Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n. v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.1985), Seguine v. City of Miami, 627 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993),Friedberg v. Town of Longboat Key, 504 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Layton v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 676 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

In Trianon, the Florida Supreme Court held that in order to hold a governmental entity liable for its negligence, a plaintiff must allege and prove two elements:

(1) That the governmental entity owed the specific claimant (as opposed to the public generally) either a "statutory" or "common law" duty of care that was breached; and

(2) That the challenged conduct of the government involved an "operational" rather than a "planning" level of decision-making.

The plaintiffs in Trianon were condominium unit-owners seeking damages against the City of Hialeah building inspectors for negligence in inspecting their condominium building and certifying it for occupancy. The supreme court held that unless the plaintiffs could show that the city owed either an underlying common-law or statutory duty of care to the individual condominium owners with respect to the alleged negligent conduct, there could be no governmental liability for this negligence. The Trianon plaintiffs argued that the city owed them a statutory duty of care to properly inspect construction projects pursuant to Chapter 533, Florida Statutes; that the inspection laws were enacted for the protection of individual citizens as well as the general public. The supreme court, however, determined that Chapter 533 was enacted only for the purpose of protecting the health and welfare of the public in general, and was not intended by the Legislature to create a governmental duty of care to individual property owners. Finding no statutory or common-law duty of care owed by the city to the individual property owners to inspect their building and issue certificates of occupancy, the court held that the city could not be held liable for any negligence in the performance of these acts.

Since Trianon, our courts have consistently required plaintiffs suing governmental entities for negligence to allege and prove that the defendant breached a common-law or statutory tort duty owed to the plaintiff individually and not a tort duty owed to the public generally. See Seguine, 627 So.2d at 15. In the instant case, appellants claim that the Clerk owed them a duty of care individually to properly record their payment of fines for traffic violations in a timely manner to avoid fee assessments and license suspension. They base their claim of a duty of care owed them individually upon the general statutory scheme of Chapter 318 of Florida Statutes. According to appellants, the intent of the statute, as a whole, is to benefit individual drivers by decriminalizing the driver's infraction and reducing his or her financial burden. However, a review of Chapter 318 shows that, like the statute involved in Trianon, this statute was enacted for the benefit of the public in general, not the individual licensed driver. The legislature's express purpose in enacting Chapter 318 was to "decriminalize certain [traffic] violations ..., thereby facilitating the implementation of a more uniform and expeditious system for the disposition of traffic offenses." See Fla. Stat. § 318.12 (1997); Nettleton v. Doughtie, 373 So.2d 667 (Fla.1979). Allowing a traffic offender to pay a specified penalty or complete a driver's improvement course, rather than treating minor offenses as traditional...