Holst v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 20 June 1894 |
| Citation | 37 N.E. 755,161 Mass. 516 |
| Parties | HOLST v. STEWART et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Francis A. Perry, for plaintiff.
Moulton Loring & Loring, for defendants.
This case comes before us on an appeal from an order of the superior court overruling the defendants' demurrer to the declaration, on a bill of exceptions to the refusal of the court to order a judgment for the defendants upon the first and third counts on the dismissal of the plaintiff's exceptions after the first trial, and on a bill of exceptions to certain rulings and refusals to rule at the last trial. At the last trial the plaintiff waived his claim under all the counts except the second and third, and the demurrer to these two counts is all that is material under the defendants' appeal. Since the former hearing of the case in this court (see 154 Mass. 445, 28 N.E. 574) the second count has been amended, and the defects in it which were then pointed out have been remedied. The objections which are principally urged against it in its present form are--First, that the running of the railroad trains between North Stoughton and Boston was not a matter affecting the value of the farm so directly that it could be the subject of a fraudulent representation; and, secondly that it was a subject in regard to which the plaintiff had ample opportunity to obtain information for himself, and that he had no right to rely on the representations of the defendants.
As to the first objection, it seems clear that the proximity of a dwelling house to a railroad station in the vicinity of Boston is a matter which tends greatly to affect the value of the property. It is ordinarily one of the first subjects to attract the attention of a purchaser. The frequency of the arrival and departure of trains at different hours of the day is as much to be considered as the existence of the railroad. We have no doubt that this was a matter which had such a relation to the value of the property that it might be the subject of a fraudulent representation.
The most difficult question in the case grows out of the fact that the subject of the misrepresentations was one on which the plaintiff easily might have obtained information from other sources. This question arises on the demurrer, and in a slightly different form on the bill of exceptions taken at the trial. It has often been held, in general terms, that one bargaining with another must use reasonable diligence to discover for himself facts obvious to an ordinary observer,--of which the means of knowledge are equally available to both parties. If he fails to do this, he cannot maintain an action of deceit for the misrepresentation of them. Rubber Co. v. Adams, 23 Pick. 256; Brown v. Leach, 107 Mass. 364; Poland v. Brownell, 131 Mass. 138. But, in the application of this rule, the circumstances of each case should be considered to determine whether the plaintiff has been guilty of such inexcusable negligence as should preclude him, under a general rule of public policy, from having a remedy against one who has fraudulently abused his confidence. It had been held that one may recover for false representations of facts which he could have ascertained by an examination of records in the registry of deeds (Grimes v. Kimball, 3 Allen, 518-523); and that one buying a large number of carpets in a furnished house may take the seller's statement of their measurement, although he could easily measure them for himself (Lewis v. Jewell, 151 Mass. 345, 24 N.E. 52). Looking, first, at the demurrer, we are of opinion that the allegations of the second count are sufficient. It is charged that the defendants, to induce the plaintiff to purchase, falsely and fraudulently made these representations in regard to the running of trains, and that the plaintiff believed them to be true, and was thereby induced to purchase. It cannot be said that the times of the running of railroad trains is a matter so easily ascertainable by all persons, under all circumstances, that it can never be the subject of a fraudulent representation. The allegation is that it was made the subject of a fraud in this case. The circumstances are not set out in the declaration, and need not be. Moreover, it is alleged that the defendants were acting as agents of the plaintiff, and, in a relation of confidence, the plaintiff would be warranted in relying on their assertions when he would not be if they were representing only an adverse interest.
If we consider in this connection the exception taken at the trial to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial