Holt v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. CACR 08-170.,CACR 08-170. |
| Citation | 290 S.W.3d 21,104 Ark. App. 198 |
| Parties | Amanda Gail HOLT, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, Kent C. Krause, Deputy Public Defender, by Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, and Misty Steele, Law Student Admitted to Practice Pursuant to Rule XV of the Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
We affirm appellant's convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture and for three counts of exposing a child to a chemical substance or methamphetamine.
It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-403(c)(5)(A) (Supp.2007). It is likewise unlawful for any adult, with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, to knowingly cause or permit a child under eighteen years of age to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have any contact with a chemical substance or methamphetamine. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-230(b)(1) (Repl.2006). For purposes of this statute, "chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a precursor in the manufacture of methamphetamine, or any other chemical intended to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-27-230(a)(1)(A) (Repl.2006).
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support these convictions. Our standard of review for a sufficiency challenge is as follows:
We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture.
Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence.
Cluck v. State, 365 Ark. 166, 170-71, 226 S.W.3d 780, 783-84 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant expressly concedes on appeal that there is substantial evidence that methamphetamine was manufactured in the residence at 4108 Vinson Road, a small mobile home, on September 21, 2006; that she was present in the residence when the methamphetamine was being manufactured; and that she knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured. There was, in addition, substantial evidence that appellant had been staying at the residence for a few weeks. On September 21, 2006, a police officer responded to a report that three small children were playing in the road in front of the residence. He observed appellant's three children— ages four, three, and not yet two— playing outside when he arrived. They were only semi-dressed and smelled of methamphetamine. When the officer approached the residence, he detected the strong chemical odor associated with methamphetamine manufacture emanating from within and permeating the air around the residence. The officer knocked on the door, which was answered by Michael Hogue. Hogue came out on the front porch and closed the door. The officer asked to speak to appellant, and Hogue went back inside the residence to get her. The officer heard movement coming from the bedroom to the right (the only room in the residence with a bed), and appellant came to the door. Asked if she knew where her children were, appellant said that she did not know they were up yet because she had been asleep.
The officer, concerned about the chemical odor, obtained Hogue's permission to search the residence. The residence was filthy and contained only one bed. The bed was located in the bedroom to the right, where officers discovered a functioning methamphetamine lab with a reaction in process. Items found in the bedroom included a razor blade and plastic bag on the dresser, hypodermic needles, tubing, coffee filters, a glass smoking pipe, a salt container stained with iodine as commonly found in methamphetamine labs, a large cardboard box containing boxes of matches, a pair of scissors, a gas torch, a hot plate that was warm to the touch, and a black satchel containing hydrochloric acid generator together with bottles of liquid in which the pill-soak portion of the manufacturing process was then taking place. Many of these items were in plain view. The satchel was found under the headboard of the bed after the mattresses were removed. Articles of children's clothing were found in a dresser drawer that also contained drug paraphernalia. Appellant's children were the only children residing in the residence. The children were decontaminated at a hospital, where they were diagnosed as neglected because of exposure to drug use and manufacturing. Hair follicle tests showed that all three of the children tested positive for exposure to methamphetamine and that the youngest child appeared to have actually ingested cocaine as well.
Appellant argues that, because she was not the sole occupant or owner of the residence, the evidence is insufficient to show that she possessed the drug paraphernalia. We do not agree.
In order to prove possession, it is not necessary to prove literal physical possession of contraband. See Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). Contraband is deemed to be constructively possessed if the location of the contraband was under the dominion and control of the accused. See Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222 (1998). Although constructive possession may be implied when contraband is in the joint control of the accused and another person, joint occupancy, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish possession or joint possession. Abshure v. State, 79 Ark.App. 317, 87 S.W.3d 822 (2002). The State is also required to establish that (1) the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband, and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband. Id.
Loy v. State, 88 Ark.App. 91, 101, 195 S.W.3d 370, 374-75 (2004). Here, appellant admits that she knew that the manufacture of methamphetamine was being carried out at the residence. We also think it significant that appellant stated that she had been sleeping immediately before police appeared. However, the only place suitable for sleeping in the trailer was a bedroom where methamphetamine was being manufactured, and the bed was covered with and surrounded by substances and paraphernalia used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. A jury is not required to abandon common sense in evaluating the ordinary affairs of life, and it may infer a defendant's guilt from such improbable explanations of incriminating conduct. See Walley v. State, 353 Ark. 586, 112 S.W.3d 349 (2003). Given that many of the items were in plain view or found with her children's clothing, and that methamphetamine was actually being manufactured at the time of her arrest, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to show that she knew that the items were drug paraphernalia and that she exercised care, control, and management over them. On this basis, we affirm appellant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture.
We also hold that the evidence supports appellant's convictions of knowingly permitting a child to be exposed to methamphetamine. Appellant's admission that she knew methamphetamine was being manufactured, together with the evidence already recited, is sufficient to prove the element of knowing exposure to methamphetamine. However, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-230(b)(1) (Repl.2006), the State must also prove that appellant did so with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that appellant intended to manufacture methamphetamine. We have held, supra, that substantial evidence supports appellant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture. Furthermore, laboratory analysis of the paraphernalia verified the presence of both pseudoephedrine (a methamphetamine precursor) and actual methamphetamine in glass vials found in the residence that were used in the manufacturing process. Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401(g)(1) (Supp.2007), the presence of these substances on the paraphernalia gives rise to a presumption that the possessor (in this case, appellant) has engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step in the manufacture of methamphetamine. We cannot say that the fact-finder was, on this record, required to find that appellant had rebutted the presumption by submission of evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that she attempted to manufacture methamphetamine. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-64-401(g)(2) (Supp.2007).
Affirmed in part.
GLADWIN, ROBBINS, VAUGHT, and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree.
Although I believe that appellant's conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance is not supported by substantial evidence, I believe the other counts on which the appellant was convicted can be affirmed.
Appellant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture. It is unlawful for a person to use, or possess with the intent...
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