Holt v. W. Virginia-American Water Co.
Decision Date | 12 June 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 13-0744,13-0744 |
Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | Roger F. Holt v. West Virginia-American Water Company |
Had Mr. Holt merely sought to challenge, through his lawsuit in the case sub judice, West Virginia-American Water Company's ("WVAW") rates or late charges on his regular monthly water bill that were not related to the series of water line leaks recounted in the majority's opinion, I would wholeheartedly agree with the majority's decision herein. However, in its zeal to quash Mr. Holt's complaint, the majority of the Court has failed to appreciate the true import of Mr. Holt's claims, which challenge not only WVAW's imposition of late charges upon water usage attributable to WVAW's own faulty meter and efforts to collect the same, but also WVAW's termination of Mr. Holt's water service for his failure to pay such late charges in direct contravention of the order of the Public Service Commission of West Virginia ("PSC") specifically prohibiting WVAW from terminating Mr. Holt's water service during the pendency of the underlying proceedings as long as he continued to timely pay his customary monthly water bills. The parties do not dispute that, throughout the pendency of the PSC proceedings, Mr. Holt continued to pay his monthly water bills in an amount commensurate with his customary water usage prior to the occurrence of the various leaks in his water line. Through his lawsuit against WVAW in the case sub judice, Mr. Holt simply seeks recompense for the damages he incurred as a resultof WVAW's blatant disregard for the PSC's order and its use of allegedly unfair trade practices in the handling of his account. Because the language of W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105 (a) (3) specifically does not preclude Mr. Holt's cause of action against WVAW under the facts of this case, I adamantly dissent.
A. The Majority Misapplied the Plain Language of W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a)(3)
To uphold its dismissal of Mr. Holt's lawsuit against WVAW, the majority determined that W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a) (3) (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2006) applies to preclude the claims he has asserted therein. However, an examination of the legislative intent underlying the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act and a consideration of how other courts have interpreted this statutory language reveal the flaws in the majority's interpretation and resultant application of this statute.
When this Court is faced with a matter of statutory construction, we routinely look to the intent of the Legislature in promulgating the provision at issue as an aid to understanding the meaning of the challenged language. See generally Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (). With regard to the statutory provision interpreted by the majority in this case, W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a)(3) is part of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act("WVCCPA"). In enacting the WVCCPA, the Legislature specifically adopted W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101 (1974) (Repl. Vol. 2006), which is entitled "Legislative declarations; statutory construction" and directs, in full, as follows:
(Emphasis added). Thus, it is apparent from this express statement of legislative intent that (a) this Court has been instructed to look to similar federal statutes and court decisions for guidance in construing the provisions of the WVCCPA and (b) the statutes comprising the WVCCPA are to be "liberally construed so that its beneficial purposes may be served." W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101(1).
The statutory language at the center of the instant controversy is part of theLegislature's recognized exceptions to claims covered by the WVCCPA. W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a)(3) (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2006) provides as follows:
Until the majority's opinion herein, this Court has never before interpreted this particular statutory provision. Thus, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101(1), the majority of "the [C]ourt[] [should have] be[en] guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters."1 Had the majority heeded this express statement of legislative intention, it would have appreciated that the construction it has afforded to W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a)(3) is contrary to the interpretation of similar federal language and does not effectuate the Legislature's desire that the provisions of the WVCCPA "be liberally construed so that its beneficial purposes may be served." W. Va. Code § 46A-6-101(1).
Using virtually identical language, Congress has enacted 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(4) (2010), which operates to exclude from the federal Truth in Lending Act substantially similar matters as those addressed in the exclusions to the WVCCPA set forth in W. Va. Code § 46A-1-105(a)(3). The language of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(4) provides:
(Footnote added). While several federal courts have applied this statute in cases concerning allegedly excessive or erroneous charges, none of these tribunals have considered, or applied, it in the context of claims such as those asserted by Mr. Holt claiming that a public utility, i.e., WVAW, has violated a direct order of its regulatory body, i.e., the PSC. See Aronson v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 180 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1999) ( ); Aronson v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 180 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Gattermann v. Rhodes, 898 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (unpublished op.) ( ); Monchino v. PSE & G, Co., No. 11-1733 ES, 2012 WL 1988619 (D.N.J. June 4, 2012) ( ); Huegel v. City of Easton, No. 00-CV-5077, 2003 WL 22428435 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2003) ( ); King v. Town of Waynesville, No. 1:02CV55, 2003 WL 23354657 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2003) ( ); Munson v. Orrin E. Thompson Homes, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 152 (D. Minn. 1974) ( ).3 Cf. Pollice v. National TaxFunding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000) ( ). Rather, all of the federal cases addressing a public utility customer's claims against a public utility, and finding them to be excluded by 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(4), have involved complaints about the imposition of late charges, the excessiveness of rates, or other routine billing practices. Simply stated, no federal cases have considered a public utility's callous disregard of an order issued by its governing body.
The majority's opinion focuses solely upon the fact that WVAW has filed a tariff with the PSC, which contains a listing of the utility's rates, charges, and general rules and regulations, and then concludes that all of Mr. Holt's claims arise from transactions related to said tariff. I do not dispute that had Mr. Holt's complaint focused solely on WVAW's routine billing...
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