Holton v. Boman, 72-1248.

• Citation: 493 F.2d 1176
• Decision Date: 28 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 72-1248.,72-1248.
• Parties: Willard HOLTON, d/b/a Holton Cartage, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry L. BOMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

493 F.2d 1176 (1974)

Willard HOLTON, d/b/a Holton Cartage, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerry L. BOMAN et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 72-1248.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 27, 1973.

Decided March 28, 1974.

Frank J. Galvin, Jr., Hammond, Ind., for plaintiff-appellant.

Grant Van Horne, Auburn, Ind., Carl J. Suedhoff, Jr., Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant-appellee.

Before KILEY, Senior Circuit Judge, CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge.^*

KILEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Willard Holton, an Illinois resident, brought a tort action seeking damages against H. Charles Winans and other defendants arising from the conversion of his property. The district court granted Winans' motion for summary judgment on the ground that as county prosecutor he was immune from civil liability. Holton then moved for leave to file an amended complaint against Winans, based upon various civil rights statutes.¹ The court denied the motion and Holton has appealed. We reverse and remand.²

On May 25, 1969 plaintiff's tractor-trailer was removed from his premises. About a month later the tractor turned up in Auburn, Indiana in the possession of Jerry L. Boman, Bob Albright and Boman-Albright, Inc. Holton learned of this and went to Auburn several times, trying unsuccessfully to regain possession.

Holton thereafter brought his suit against Boman, Albright and Boman-Albright, Inc. During the course of discovery he decided to join the county prosecutor, Winans, as a party defendant. An amended complaint was then filed alleging that Winans participated in a conspiracy to deprive Holton of his tractor-trailer. In a subsequently amended complaint Holton additionally alleged that Winans: tortiously failed to perform his official duties by failing to assist him in regaining possession of his tractor-trailer; and interfered with a contract between Holton and a third party.³

After further discovery Holton concluded that he had a civil rights action against Winans and proffered a second amended complaint repeating substantially the allegations of tortious misconduct in violation of Holton's civil right to equal protection of Indiana law, and seeking damages. The district court denied leave to file the amended civil rights complaint on the ground that it would be prejudicial to the defendants, who had completed their discovery, to permit Holton to raise a new theory.

Holton contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to file the second amended complaint.

The vital question before us is whether a prosecutor is immune from liability for damages sought in a civil rights action predicated on the prosecutor's refusal to assist a citizen in regaining his property which is in the alleged unlawful possession of other persons.

Prosecutorial immunity is derived from the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judges are immune from liabilities under suits arising from acts performed within the scope of their judicial duties. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). This Circuit, however, has held a judge liable for damages when he acted outside the scope of his duties. Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963). Since prosecutorial immunity is derived from judicial immunity, it follows from Spires that a prosecuting attorney is not immune from liability for damages for acts outside of the scope of his official duties and without authority of law.

In Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965), Judge Ely addressed himself to this issue by stating:

We believe, however, that when a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other than his quasi-judicial capacity, then the reason for his immunity — integral relationship between his acts and the judicial process — ceases to exist. If he acts in the role of a policeman, then why should he not be liable, as is the policeman, if, in so acting, he has deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution and laws? See Monroe v. Pape, supra, 365 U.S. 167 at 187, 81 S.Ct. 473 5 L.Ed.2d 492; see also Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182, L.R.A.1916F, 399 (1916), cited in Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 at 405. To us, it seems neither appropriate nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other. Id., at 536-537.

In accord with Robichaud, this Circuit recently held that a prosecutor is not absolutely immune from liability for damages even if it can be concluded that he was acting within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. Hampton v. City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974). There the court was unpersuaded by defendants-prosecutors' arguments that the drafting of a search warrant which was executed and gathering evidence constituted activities within the scope of prosecutorial immunity. Judge Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that "the availability of immunity depends on the character of the conduct under attack." Id., at p. 608.

Holton's second amended complaint alleges that Winans in his capacity as prosecuting attorney did under color of law deprive him, as "a...