Holton v. State

• Decision Date: 20 July 1891
• Citation: 28 Fla. 303,9 So. 716
• Parties: HOLTON v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

9 So. 716

28 Fla. 303

HOLTON v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court

July 20, 1891

Error to circuit court, Columbia county; JOHN F. WHITE, Judge.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Chapter 3760, Laws 1887, entitled 'An act to protect females of immature age and judgment from licentiousness,' held not to be obnoxious to that provision of section 16, art. 3, Const. 1885, that provides 'Each law enacted in the legislature shall embrace but one subject, and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title.'

2. A liberal rule of construction should be applied when the constitutionality of legislative enactments are questioned and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act assailed.

3. An indictment under the provisions of chapter 3760, Laws 1887 is sufficient if it charges the offense in the language of the statute, every necessary ingredient of the crime being included in the words of the state.

4. It is unnecessary, in such an indictment, to allege that the act charged was with or without consent, or with or without force, or that it was knowingly or willfully committed.

5. In such cases, testimony as to the prior habits or character of the female is inadmissible, as it is immaterial.

COUNSEL

B. B. Black well, for plaintiff in error.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

TAYLOR J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted at the summer term, 1890, of the circuit court for Columbia county, in the third judicial circuit, under the provisions of chapter 3760, Laws 1887, as follows: 'The grand jurors for the state of Florida, duly chosen, impaneled, and sworn diligently to inquire and true presentment make, in and for the body of the county of Columbia, and third judicial circuit of said state, upon their oaths present that Frank Holton, late of said county laborer, on the first day of August, A. D. 1890, at and in the county, circuit, and state aforesaid, with force and arms, unlawfully did then and there carnally know and have carnal intercourse with one Irene Alexander, an unmarried female under the age of seventeen years; and that the said Irene Alexander thereby became pregnant with child, and was delivered of a child. So the jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do say that the said Frank Holton, at the time aforesaid, and in the county, state, and circuit aforesaid, did commit the crime of having carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of seventeen years of age, against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida, and contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided.'

The defendant was tried and convicted at the February term, 1891, and sentenced, as the statute provides, to two years' imprisonment in the state's prison. From this judgment and sentence a writ of error is taken to this court.

Before the trial the defendant by his counsel moved to quash the indictment on the following grounds: '(1) Because the indictment only recites the statute, and does not contain sufficient allegation of the offense under the statute. It should allege 'knowingly and willfully.' (2) Because the indictment does not allege sufficiently whether the carnal knowledge was with the consent of the female mentioned, or whether by force. (3) Because said indictment does not set forth an offense falling within the statute. (4) Because the facts and circumstances of the offense charged are not set forth in the indictment. (5) Because the indictment is indefinite, uncertain, and double. (6) The clause of the statute under which the defendant is indicted is not expressed in the title of the act.' This motion was denied, to which exception was taken, and its denial is the first of the errors assigned. After verdict, motion in arrest of judgment was made upon the following grounds: '(1) Because the clause of the statute upon which the indictment is based is unconstitutional. (2) Because the whole statute is unconstitutional. (3) Because the indictment is only a recital of the statute, and does not contain sufficient allegation to charge an offense under the statute. (4) Because the indictment is double, indefinite, and uncertain.' This motion to arrest the judgment was also denied, to which exception was taken, and its denial is the second error assigned. As the motion to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment involve substantially the same questions, they will be discussed together. The first objection to the indictment is that it is couched only in the language of the statute, and that it does not contain sufficient allegation of the offense under the statute; and it is contended that it should allege the act to have been 'knowingly and willfully' done. The crime here charged is strictly statutory, and every necessary ingredient of the offense is contained within the words of the statute, that is as follows: 'That whosoever shall have carnal intercourse with any unmarried female who is under the age of seventeen years, or whosoever shall procure for prostitution, or cause to be prostituted, any such female, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction therefor shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for two years.' This statute really constructs three distinct offenses: first, the carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under 17 years of age; second, the procuring of any such female for the purposes of prostitution; and, third, the causing of any such female to be prostituted,--all of them punishable with the same penalty, but requiring a different state of facts to constitute each one. The necessary ingredients of the first of these offenses are the carnal intercourse with a female who shall be unmarried, and who shall be under the age of 17 years. Whether such intercourse was with or without her consent can make no difference; neither does it matter whether the female be of previous purity or impurity of life. The object of the law is to deter men, by the severe penalty imposed, from voluntarily seeking intercourse with unmarried females within the prohibited age; not only that the pure may be shielded from contamination, but that the fallen shall be deprived of the opportunity to further continue their life of sin. We think the indictment sufficiently charges the offense; indeed, we are unable to see how anything further could be added to its allegations that would make its description of the offense more full or complete. It charges the carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under the age of 17 years. If these several facts are proved, the crime is made out. Tilly v. State, 21 Fla. 242; Stevens v. State, 18 Fla. 903; Snowden v. State, 17 Fla. 386; Humphreys v. State, Id. 381. It is further contended that this indictment should allege whether the intercourse was by force, or with the female's consent. This position is untenable. The crime here charged may be committed without force, and with the female's consent. If committed with force and against her consent, it would be punishable as rape, but the indictment in such case would have to contain apt words in order to bring the offense within the statute definition of rape. It is not pretended here that there was either force or want of consent; but, as we have seen, the offense is perpetrable in the absence of both these features; hence there was no necessity to allege either. Another contention is that the indictment should have alleged the offense to have been 'knowingly and willifully' done. This position is also untenable. It is unlawful per se to carry on such practices with any female not the lawful wife of the malfeasor, and we think that the offense here, so far as intent is involved, comes within the rule that a man shall be held...