Holtz v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 12 April 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 18120,18120 |
Parties | HOLTZ v. ELGIN, JOLIET & EASTERN RY. CO. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Robert H. Moore, J. Edwin Smith, Gary, F. Edward Dumas, Fowler, for appellant.
Harlan L. Hackbert, Chicago, Ill., Knapp, Cushing, Hershberger & Stevenson, Chicago, Ill., Glen D. Peters and Peters & Highland, all of Hammond, William S. Isham, Fowler, of counsel, for appellee.
This case had its origin in a truck-train railroad crossing accident in which appellant received personal injuries for which he sought to recover damages. At the conclusion of appellant's evidence a verdict was directed for appellee, and such action is questioned here.
In determining whether a peremptory instruction should be given, directing a verdict, the court must accept as true all facts which the evidence tends to prove and draw against the party requesting such instruction all inferences which the jury might reasonably draw. In case of conflicting evidence only that evidence most favorable to the party against whom the instruction is requested will be considered. Kettner v. Jay, 1940, 107 Ind.App. 643, 26 N.E.2d 546; State ex rel. Thompson v. City of Greencastle, 1942, 111 Ind.App 640, 40 N.E.2d 388; Hummel v. New York Cent. R. Co., 1946, 117 Ind.App. 22, 66 N.E.2d 901; Indianapolis Railways v. Williams, 1945, 115 Ind.App. 383, 59 N.E.2d 586; Orey v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N.Y., 1939, 215 Ind. 305, 19 N.E.2d 547. 'A peremptory instruction should be given only when the evidence is clearly insufficient to establish one or more of the facts essential to the plaintiff's right to a recovery.' Boston v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 1945, 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327. Where there is no evidence, whatever, to maintain an issue it is the duty of the court so to inform the jury. Craig v. Citizens Trust Company, 1940, 217 Ind. 434, 26 N.E.2d 1006.
We therefore must examine the facts and inferences therefrom most favorable to appellant.
The statement hereafter set forth of the evidence most favorable to appellant is based upon the recital of the evidence as set forth in appellant's brief. Appellee admits that it 'contains a fair narrative statement of the evidence,' and makes no additions or corrections. It must therefore 'be taken to be accurate and sufficient for a full understanding of the questions [presented] for decision'. Rule 2-17. Appellant, in his reply brief, has attempted to set out evidence of additional facts. Such omissions may not be supplied by a reply brief. Lyons v. Souder, 1914, 56 Ind.App. 443, 105 N.E. 511; Modern Woodmen of America v. Ball, 1922, 77 Ind.App. 388, 131 N.E. 539; Smith v. Gowan-Stobo's Estate, 1942, 112 Ind.App. 11, 41 N.E.2d 630; Waters v. Delagrange, 1915, 183 Ind. 497, 109 N.E. 758; Interstate Public Service Co. v. Moore, 1929, 88 Ind.App. 439, 161 N.E. 633.
In the words of the Supreme Court in Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. Jones, 1911, 176 Ind. 221, 95 N.E. 567, 569: 'No doubt, on proper showing, the Appellate Court would have granted appellant's petition to amend the brief.
A paved public highway known as Route No. 52 runs in a more or less easterly and westerly direction, and at a point approximately four miles west of Troy, Illinois, intersects appellee's right-of-way and tracks at right angles. The accident happened at this crossing.
There were two advertising signs west of the railroad and north of the road. There was a grove of trees 151 feet north of the north line of the highway and 105 feet west of the west line of the railroad right-of-way. Stationary crossing (cross-buck) signs were located at the crossing.
From a point approximately 200 feet west of the railroad track the highway sloped toward and across the railroad crossing. In the first 100 feet west of the tracks the road declined two and three-fourths inches. The decline during the second 100 feet was about two and one-fourth inches, and during the third 100 feet it declined one-half inch.
On February 17, 1941, at 11:45 A.M. appellant was operating a ton and a half Ford truck loaded with four and a half tons of coal, going east as he approached the crossing. His speed was approximately 20 miles per hour according to one witness and between 20 and 25 miles per hour according to another witness. He had driven across this crossing once before, that same morning, while it was still dark.
The weather was snowy and blustery, a condition not uncommon in the locality at that season, and the highway was covered with snow and ice. It was a dark, cloudy day.
Appellant testified: Other witnesses testified that going 25 to 30 miles an hour it would take 200 to 300 feet to stop the truck on the ice.
At that time only two trains a day passed over this crossing, one going each way Both were operated by the same locomotive and crew. Inasmuch as there were no facilities for turning the locomotive around, the locomotive was operated backward going one way.
On this occasion the train was approaching the crossing from the north. The locomotive was proceeding south, but headed north and was pulling from 40 to 50 cars.
Appellant's truck was approximately 400 to 500 feet west of the crossing when first seen by a member of the train crew. At that time the forward end of the train was approximately 100 to 150 feet north of the crossing.
After the locomotive was across the crossing, or while on the crossing, the section man who was in the cab of the locomotive, told the engineer, 'that that truck is is not going to get stopped.' The fireman looked back and testified that the truck was about 200 feet away, going from one side of the road to the other. The section man testified he didn't see the truck until they were in the center of the highway. It was then between 200 and 300 feet away and swaying and sliding. The engineer testified, The engineer immediately put the train into emergency stop and stopped in about four car lengths.
The truck hit the north end of the third car from the locomotive, about 240 feet from the locomotive.
Appellant's version of the accident was as follows: ...
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