Holtzman v. Schlesinger 8212 150

• Decision Date: 04 August 1973
• Docket Number: No. A,A
• Citation: 94 S.Ct. 8,38 L.Ed.2d 28,414 U.S. 1316
• Parties: Elizabeth HOLTZMAN et al. v. James R. SCHLESINGER et al. —150
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

414 U.S. 1316

94 S.Ct. 8

38 L.Ed.2d 28

Elizabeth HOLTZMAN et al.

v James R. SCHLESINGER et al.

No. A—150.

Aug. 4, 1973.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Circuit Justice.

My Brother MARSHALL, after a hearing, denied this application, 414 U.S. 1304, 94 S.Ct. 1, 38 L.Ed.2d 18 which in effect means that the decision of the District Court holding that the bombing of Cambodia is unconstitutional is stayed pending hearing on the merits before the Court of Appeals.

An application for stay denied by one Justice may be made to another. We do not, however, encourage the practice; and when the Term starts, the Justices all being in Washington, D.C., the practice is to refer the second application to the entire Court. That is the desirable practice to discourage 'shopping around.'

When the Court is in recess that practice cannot be followed, for the Justices are scattered. Yakima, Washington, where I have scheduled the hearing, is nearly 3,000 miles from Washington, D.C. Group action by all Members is therefore impossible.

I approached this decision, however, with deliberation, realizing that, while the judgment of my Brother MARSHALL is not binding on me, it is one to which I pay the greatest deference.

My Brother MARSHALL accurately points out that if the foreign policy goals of this Government are to be weighed the Judiciary is probably the least qualified branch to weigh them. He also states that if stays by judicial officers in cases of this kind are to be vacated the circumstances must be 'exceptional.' I agree with those premises, and I respect the views of those who share my Brother MARSHALL'S predilections.

But this case in its stark realities involves the grim consequences of a capital case. The classic capital case is whether Mr. Lew, Mr. Low, or Mr. Lucas should die. The present case involves whether Mr. X (an unknown person or persons) should die. No one knows who they are. They may be Cambodian farmers whose only 'sin' is a desire for socialized medicine to alleviate the suffering of their families and neighbors. Or Mr. X may be the American pilot or navigator who drops a ton of bombs on a Cambodian village. The upshot is that we know that someone is about to die.

Since that is true I see no reason to balance the equities and consider the harm to our foreign policy if one or a thousand more bombs do not drop. The reason is that we live under the Constitution and in Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, it gives to Congress the power to 'declare War.' The basic question on the merits is whether Congress, within the meaning of Art. I, § 8, cl. 11, has 'declared war' in Cambodia.

It has become popular to think the President has that power to declare war. But there is not a word in the Constitution that grants that power to him. It runs only to Congress.

The Court in the Prize Cases said:

'By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war. . . . The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive power. . . . He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign nation or a domestic State. . . .

'If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.' 2 Black 635, 668, 17 L.Ed. 459.

The question of justiciability does not seem substantial. In the Prize Cases, decided in 1863, the Court entertained a complaint involving the constitutionality of the Civil War. In my time we held that President Truman in the undeclared Korean war had no power to seize the steel mills in order to increase war production. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153. The Prize Cases and the Youngstown case involved the seizure of property. But the Government conceded an oral argument that property is no more important than life under our Constitution. Our Fifth Amendment which curtails federal power under the Due Process Clause protects 'life, liberty, or property' in that order. Property is important, but if Truman could not seize it in violation of the Constitution I do not see how any President can take 'life' in violation of the Constitution.

As to 'standing,' which my Brother MARSHALL correctly states is an issue, there seems to be no substantial question that a taxpayer at one time had no standing to complain of the lawless actions of his Government. But that rule has been modified. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1955, 20 L.Ed.2d 947, the Court held that a taxpayer could invoke 'FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER WHEN HE ALLEGES THAt congressional action under the...