Homart Development Co. v. County of Hennepin

Decision Date03 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. C0-94-2485,C0-94-2485
Citation538 N.W.2d 907
PartiesHOMART DEVELOPMENT CO., Petitioner, Relator, v. COUNTY OF HENNEPIN, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The term day in Minn.Stat. § 278.05, subd. 6(b) (1992) comprises the 24-hour period extending from one midnight to the next midnight.

2. The furnishing of a property tax appraisal by facsimile transmission at least five days before a property tax hearing complies with the requirements of Minn.Stat. § 278.05, subd. 6(b) (1992).

Thomas R. Wilhelmy, James E. Dorsey, Minneapolis, for relator.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark Kapter Maher, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

This case comes to us on certiorari to the Minnesota Tax Court. Relator, Homart Development Co., challenged the 1991 and 1992 assessments of the market value for its real property located in Bloomington, Minnesota. Pursuant to the statute which establishes the procedure for the prehearing exchange of appraisals in property tax cases, Homart was to furnish its appraisal to the attorney for Hennepin County on the fifth day before the tax assessment hearing. On that day, Homart sent its appraisal to the attorney by facsimile transmission. The appraisal was transmitted after the normal business hours of the attorney's office and after the attorney had left for the day.

The tax court held that sending an appraisal by facsimile transmission after the normal business hours of the recipient did not meet the statutory requirement of furnishing the appraisal at least five days before the hearing, and, as a result, excluded Homart's appraisal and the expert appraisal testimony from the hearing. In its order, the court adopted the market value submitted by Hennepin County's expert appraiser, a market value which was significantly more than what Homart's expert appraiser had estimated. On appeal, Homart argues that the court erred in excluding its appraisal and expert appraisal testimony from the hearing. We reverse.

I.

The property that is the subject of this appeal is located in the northwest quadrant of the intersection of Interstate 494 and France Avenue in Bloomington, Minnesota. The property, consisting of approximately 179,564 square feet of land, has been improved with a fourteen-story Class A office building known as the Minnesota Center and a five-level parking ramp. The multi-tenant office building and ramp were constructed in 1987, and the office building contains 274,218 square feet of net rentable area. In 1991 and 1992, Homart was the owner and manager of the property.

The property tax assessments giving rise to this action took place on January 2, 1991 and January 2, 1992. On May 15, 1992 and February 24, 1993, Homart filed separate petitions with the tax court challenging Hennepin County's assessments of the market value of the property. The petitions were consolidated, twice set for hearing and continued, with a third hearing set for April 12, 1994.

When settlement talks broke down and the April 12 hearing became imminent, counsel for Homart, Thomas R. Wilhelmy, and counsel for Hennepin County (the County) began discussing various discovery issues, including the furnishing of property tax appraisals prior to hearing. The parties were required by statute to furnish their property tax appraisals to each other at least five days before the hearing on Tuesday, April 12. The last day to furnish the appraisals within the statutory period was Tuesday, April 5. 1

In a March 29, 1994 letter to counsel for the County, Wilhelmy raised the issue of appraisal exchange and suggested that the parties "[agree] to a physical exchange the afternoon of April 5th." The next day, March 30, 1994, Wilhelmy telephoned Assistant Hennepin County Attorney Mark Kapter Maher concerning the exchange. During the conversation, Maher informed Wilhelmy that the County was not in a position to agree to a physical exchange of appraisals on the afternoon of April 5, as suggested in Wilhelmy's letter. But Maher did confirm that the appraisal exchange was to take place on that date.

At approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 5, Maher received two copies of the County's appraisal from its appraiser. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Maher received a telephone call from Wilhelmy, who asked whether an exchange of appraisals by mail would be acceptable. Maher said no, stating that under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, an exchange by mail was required to have taken place three days earlier. Wilhelmy then informed Maher that he was in Duluth at the offices of Ramsland and Vigen, appraisers for Homart, and, according to Maher, Wilhelmy indicated that "delivery of [Homart's] appraisal could not be made at that point." Wilhelmy asked Maher for the fax number of his office and indicated that he would fax the appraisal to Maher's office. Maher gave Wilhelmy the fax number of his office, and the telephone conversation ended. 2 Maher then made arrangements to deliver the County's appraisal to Wilhelmy. The County's appraisal was delivered to Wilhelmy's law office by personal messenger at 4:39 p.m. that afternoon.

During the early evening hours of that same day, Homart sent its appraisal to the Hennepin County Attorney's Office by facsimile transmission. The exact timing of the facsimile transmission is unclear from the record. Betty S. Ramsland, an employee of Homart's appraiser, stated in an affidavit that the transmission of the appraisal began at approximately 6:15 p.m. and continued until 7:10 p.m.; however, the fax machine at the Hennepin County Attorney's Office recorded that the appraisal was transmitted between 6:09 p.m. and 6:57 p.m. In either case, the appraisal was transmitted after the closing of the Hennepin County Attorney's Office at 5:00 p.m. and after Maher had left for the day, but before midnight on the fifth day before the hearing. Homart's appraisal consisted of approximately 150 pages, but for a reason not apparent, the last seven pages of the appraisal were not received by the County.

In addition to sending the appraisal to the County by facsimile transmission, Wilhelmy also arranged to have a messenger deliver an original version and a copy of the appraisal. At approximately 10:15 p.m. that same evening, Homart's messenger attempted to deliver the appraisal to a security guard at the Hennepin County Government Center, but the guard refused to accept the appraisal. The messenger then attempted to deliver the appraisal to the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office. The Sheriff's Office similarly refused to accept the appraisal. The following day, Wednesday, April 6, at approximately 7:30 a.m., Homart's messenger personally delivered an original version and a copy of the appraisal to a secretary at the Hennepin County Attorney's Office.

The next morning, April 7, the County filed a motion in limine to exclude Homart's appraisal and expert appraisal testimony from the hearing. The basis for the motion was Homart's alleged failure to furnish its appraisal to the County at least five days before the hearing. On April 11, the tax court issued its order, finding that "sending the appraisal by facsimile transmission at 6:15 p.m., after normal business hours, without Respondent's [County's] agreement to accept the facsimile transmission at that hour, does not meet the statutory requirement of furnishing the appraisal at least five days before the hearing." The court thus excluded Homart's appraisal and the testimony of its expert witness appraiser from the hearing. 3

The hearing started on schedule on April 12 and concluded on April 18. The Hennepin County Assessor had estimated the market value of the property at $23,665,100 for 1991 and $20,401,200 for 1992. At the hearing, Mary Gabryel, manager of operating property analysis and tax compliance for Homart, testified that Homart estimated the property to have a value of between $18,000,000 and $19,000,000 for 1991 and between $17,000,000 and $18,000,000 for 1992. Homart's expert appraiser would have testified that the estimated market value of the property was $18,000,000 for 1991 and $17,000,000 for 1992. Because Homart could not call its own appraiser as an expert witness, it called the County's expert appraiser as a hostile witness. The County's expert appraiser testified that the estimated market value of the property was $22,000,000 for 1991 and $19,000,000 for 1992.

The tax court entered judgment on September 12, 1994, and adopted the market value submitted by the County's expert appraiser. The court also ordered Homart to pay the County's expert appraiser $7,500 for his appraisal, plus $150 per hour for his testimony at the hearing. Homart moved to amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, arguing among other things that the court's ruling regarding the furnishing of appraisals effectively imposed a requirement of personal service. The court denied Homart's motion, stating that "[a]ppraisals may be sent by mail or even pony express and will not be excluded if the appraisal is received at least five days before the trial. Parties may elect to have appraisals served personally but the Court is not imposing that requirement."

On appeal, Homart argues that the tax court erred because an appraisal may be furnished at any time before midnight on the fifth day before the hearing. Homart also argues that either sending an appraisal by facsimile transmission or delivering it to a security guard complies with the requirement that it "furnish" the appraisal at least five days before the hearing. Finally, Homart argues in the alternative that the tax court's interpretation of "day" to mean "normal business hours" is unconstitutionally vague.

II.

This court's review of tax court decisions is governed by the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 271.10, subd. 1 (1994), which limits review...

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