Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Decision Date | 18 July 1928 |
Docket Number | Civil 2696 |
Citation | 269 P. 501,34 Ariz. 201 |
Parties | HOME ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, a Corporation, Insurance Carrier, and E. PAYNE PALMER, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of VANADIUM MINING COMPANY, Employer, Petitioners, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA and R. B. SIMS, BURT H. CLINGAN, and H. S. McCLUSKEY, as Members of the Industrial Commission of Arizona, Respondents |
Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Original proceeding for Writ of Certiorari to set aside award of the Industrial Commission In re William L Connor, Deceased. Award for benefit of vocational rehabilitation fund affirmed.
Mr John J. Taheny, for Respondents.
While discharging his duty as an employee of E. Payne Palmer, doing business under the name of Vanadium Mining Company, William L. Connor was killed on October 18, 1926, in an accident arising out of and occurring in his employment. Both the employer and employee were subject to the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state, and the carrier of the insurance was the Home Accident Insurance Company. After a hearing before the Industrial Commission, which established the fact that Connor left no dependents, that body made an order directing the insurance carrier to pay the burial expenses of $150 and the further sum of $850 for the benefit of the rehabilitation fund of the state. The petitioners, being dissatisfied with this order, asked for a rehearing. This was denied, and they have brought the proceedings here by certiorari, asking this court to set aside that portion of the order directing the payment of $850, but raising no objection to the item of $150.
The ground upon which a rehearing was sought and the petition in this court based, is that the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law under which this portion of the award was made -- subdivision 9, division (A) of section 70, chapter 83, Session Laws of 1925 -- is unconstitutional and void in so far as it directs the payment of $850 for the purpose therein designated. It reads as follows:
The constitutionality of this provision is assailed upon several grounds, but the one upon which petitioners chiefly rely is that it embraces a subject not covered in section 8 of article 18 of the Constitution of the state of Arizona, as amended in 1925, pursuant to chapter 82, Session Laws of that year, and consequently that it and the award made under it are without constitutional warrant or support, and are therefore void. The following is the exact language of this section:
It is the contention of petitioners that this provision empowers the legislature to enact a Workmen's Compensation Law applicable to workmen engaged in certain employments, by which compensation shall be required to be paid by the employer to his workmen in case of injury and to their dependents in case of death. In other words, their position is that it authorizes legislation compelling the employer to pay compensation to his employees and their dependents, but not to the employees of any other employer or to the state for their benefit, and consequently that the provision that an employer shall pay into the state treasury the sum of $850, to be used for the promotion of vocational rehabilitation of persons disabled in industry or otherwise, when the employee killed is without dependents, embraces a class, the workmen of other employers, not enumerated in or contemplated by section 8, article 18, as amended, and is therefore without constitutional warrant.
In support of this view the case of Yosemite Lumber Co. et al. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California et al., 187 Cal. 774, 20 A.L.R. 994, 204 P. 226, is cited, and a reading of that opinion discloses that, under a constitutional mandate somewhat similar to section 8, as amended, the court did hold that a provision in an act for the vocational re-education and rehabilitation of workmen disabled in industry, pretty much the same as subdivision 9, supra, was invalid, and based its ruling upon the ground that the express grant of power to require employers to compensate their workmen and their dependents implies that the power to compel them to compensate the state for the benefit of the workmen of others is not granted. "The language of neither one of these parts of the section shows or expresses," the court said, "an intent to add another liability to that expressly stated," and it held that the maxim, "The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another," was applicable.
There is no question but that this view is correct, when the power to enact legislation does not exist independently of the Constitution, because a provision in that instrument directing the legislature to enact particular legislation necessarily carries with it no authority to enact something not included therein. But, when such power does exist, irrespective of the Constitution, it is not lost by a provision therein making it the duty of the legislature to enact something else relating to the same subject, because, unlike Congress, whose only powers are those granted by the Constitution of the United States, the legislatures of the states have all legislative power, except that withheld from them by the state Constitutions, or surrendered to the federal government. In Clark v. Boyce, 20 Ariz. 544, 185 P. 136, this court said:
"The Legislature has all power not prohibited to it by the state or federal Constitution."
In Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Mendez, 19 Ariz. 151, 166 P. 278, it used this language:
In construing section 6, article 9, Constitution of this state, which provides that "incorporated cities, towns and villages may be vested by law with power to make local improvements by special assessments, or by special taxation of property benefited," this court, in Brown v. Electrical District No. 2, 26 Ariz. 181, 223 P. 1068, used the following language:
That the legislature could, under its general powers, enact a law requiring employers to pay the state a certain sum for the promotion of the vocational rehabilitation of those disabled in industry, the same as it could a Workmen's Compensation Law, both being within the police power of the state, there is no question. No affirmative investiture of...
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