Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White

• Decision Date: 05 February 1944
• Citation: 177 S.W.2d 545,180 Tenn. 585
• Parties: HOME BENEFICIAL ASS'N v. WHITE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

177 S.W.2d 545

180 Tenn. 585

HOME BENEFICIAL ASS'N v. WHITE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

February 5, 1944

Error to Circuit Court, Davidson County; R. P. Dews, Judge.

Action by Nora White against Home Beneficial Association on an industrial life insurance policy. From a judgment for plaintiff for one-third of the face value of the policy plaintiff appealed to the circuit court, which rendered judgment for plaintiff for full value of the policy, and defendant brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

B. H. Hagey, of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.

J. F Doty, of Nashville, for defendant in error.

GAILOR Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Davidson County against the Home Beneficial Association for $220 which was the face value of a policy of industrial life insurance in which Nora White was beneficiary and her husband, John White, the insured. The suit was commenced by Nora White against the Insurance Company in the General Sessions Court of Davidson County, and from a judgment in that Court for $73.33, one-third of the face value of the policy, the plaintiff appealed to the Circuit Court. In that Court, on the trial de novo, which was had on a stipulation of facts, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the full value of the policy. After a motion for a new trial was overruled, the Insurance Company has perfected its appeal to this Court and made two assignments of error:

(1) That the Circuit Court erred in holding a limitation of liability unreasonable and against public policy, and

(2) In refusing to reduce the judgment from $220 to $73.33 in accordance with the provisions of that limitation.

The sole question presented on the appeal is whether or not the following clause of the policy is unreasonable and against public policy:

'Section 4. In the event of death resulting wholly or in part directly or indirectly, from an intentional act of any person other than insured, the company's liability shall be one-third of the amount that otherwise would be payable under the policy.'

It is stipulated that John White, the insured, was stabbed to death on the 6th day of March, 1942, and that therefore his death resulted from an intentional act of a person other than the insured, and that his death would so fall within the provision of limitation above quoted.

The policy of insurance involved in this appeal is one of industrial insurance with premiums payable weekly. It was issued by the Lincoln Income Life Insurance Company of Louisville, Kentucky, and the liability assumed by the present defendant. As we see it, the provision of the policy which is under attack means merely that, if the insured be the victim of an intentional homicide, the beneficiary will be paid only one-third of the face value of the policy.

'* * * the policy of the State for a quarter of a century has been to place industrial insurance in a different class from that of ordinary life insurance.' Moorman v. Interstate Life & Accident Co., 173 Tenn. 549, 552, 121 S.W.2d 562, 563.

'It is the function of a court to interpret and enforce contracts as they are written, notwithstanding they may contain terms which may be thought harsh and unjust. A court is not at liberty to make a new contract for parties who have spoken for themselves.' Smithart v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 525, 71 S.W.2d 1059, 1063.

Neither plaintiff nor defendant cites any authority for or against holding the foregoing provision of the policy void as against public policy. The learned Trial Judge found merely the fact without giving reasons and held that the provision 'is an unreasonable proviso and against public policy and therefore void.'

In the case of the Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Lawson, 144 Tenn. 78, 87, et seq., 229 S.W. 741, this Court discussed at length, and with the citation of many authorities, the grounds upon which a...