Home Fund, Inc. v. Garland
Decision Date | 21 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 17582,17582 |
Citation | 520 S.W.2d 939 |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Parties | HOME FUND, INC., et al., Appellants, v. O. D. GARLAND, Appellee. |
Kenneth Beanland, San Antonio, for appellants, Home Fund, Inc. and Carl Raymond Crites.
Richard T. Haase, San Antonio, for appellant, Henderson Glass.
L. Royce Coleman, Jr., Denton, for appellee.
In appellee's two cross-points he contends that this Court erred on each of the two occasions that it entered orders granting to the appellants an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts.
In his first cross-point he contends that on neither occasion when we granted such extensions did appellants show the existence of good cause why they could not have filed the statement of facts before the applicable deadline.
In his second cross-point appellee contends that the form of appellants' two motions for an extension of time and the form of the evidence offered to this Court in connection with such motions for the purpose of showing the existence of good cause for an extension of time was legally insufficient and that this Court erred for that additional reason in granting each of the two motions for an extension of time for filing the statement of facts.
We sustain both of appellee's cross-points.
It was undisputed that July 22, 1974, was the last day of the 60 day period prescribed by Rule 386, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, for the filing of the statement of facts and transcript.
Did good cause exist within the 60 day period why appellants could not have filed the statement of facts within the 60 day period?
On July 22, 1974, the last day of the 60 day period, appellants filed their first motion for an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts. The appellants did not at any time file any affidavits in support of this first motion, and did not ever attempt at any time to furnish this Court any legitimate evidence which we could consider tending to prove that the appellants did have good cause for not filing the statement of facts within the 60 day period . The appellee did not oppose the motions.
On August 2, 1974, with the record in that state, we granted appellants' first motion for an extension of time and extended the time in which appellants could file the statement of facts to August 21, 1974.
Appellee now contends that we erred in granting that first extension of time. After briefing the question we are convinced that we did err in granting appellants' first motion for an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts.
The record shows the following facts: The court reporter's certificate to the statement of facts, certifying it to be correct, was signed on July 16, 1974 (this shows it was in existence as of that date); the certificate of appellants' counsel which appears at the bottom of the first motion for extension of time states that they mailed a copy of the motion to appellee's counsel on July 18, 1974; and the motion itself alleged that the statement of facts was at that time completed.
The unsworn grounds alleged by appellants in their first motion for the purpose of showing good cause for not filing the statement of facts within the 60 day period prescribed by Rule 386 were:
The Supreme Court in Matlock v. Matlock, 151 Tex. 308, 249 S.W.2d 587 (1952), held that there must be a showing that good cause existed within the 60 day period why the transcript and statement of facts could not be filed within that period and further that Rule 386 gives a court of civil appeals very little discretion whether to permit the late filing of a statement of facts or transcript. See also Gibson v. McCullough, 294 S.W.2d 759 ( ).
No evidence of any kind in the form of affidavits or otherwise was offered by appellants to this Court in support of their unsworn first motion in an effort to show that they had good cause within the 60 day period why they could not file the statement of facts in this Court before that period expired.
The statement of facts is shown by the reporter's certificate thereon to have been prepared by July 16, 1974. Appellants' first motion alleges that the statement of facts was complete and appellants' counsel's certificate at the bottom of the motion certifies that a copy of the motion was on July 18, 1974, sent to appellee's counsel. No showing at all is made that the statement of facts was presented to appellee's counsel for approval in the interval between July 16, 1974 and the July 22, 1974, deadline. Appellants made no showing at all that they even tried to get it approved and filed by July 22, 1974.
Under the facts shown by the record in this case, as a matter of law, good cause was not shown to have existed within the 60 day period why the statement of facts could not have been filed within such period. Since appellants did not show the existence of good cause so as to be entitled under Rule 386 to a late filing, this Court erred in granting appellants' first motion for an extension of time, for it had no discretion to permit a late filing in the absence of a showing of good cause. See Matlock v. Matlock, supra; Watson v. Jones, 348 S.W.2d 414 ( ); Ortiz v. Associated Employers Lloyds, 294 S.W.2d 880 ( ); Schrader v. Garcia, 516 S.W.2d 687 (Corpus Christi Civ.App., 1974); Pollard v. American Hospital and Life Insurance Company, 472 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Sup., 1971); Consolidated Casualty Insurance Company v. Wade, 373 S.W.2d 841 (Corpus Christi Civ.App., 1963, writ dism.), and Warner v. Cox, 500 S.W.2d 251 ( ).
This Court erred in granting appellants' first motion for an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts for the additional reason that such unsworn motion, not supported by affidavits or any other legitimate evidence which an appellate court could consider, was not a legally sufficient basis for the granting of such an extension of time.
The law is that the facts alleged in the motion and relied on by the applicant as constituting the good cause for permitting him to file the statement of facts late must be proved by affidavit or by some other legitimate form of evidence that can be considered by an appellate court. Without such proof a court of civil appeals is not authorized to grant the extension of time prayed for. Rehkopf v. Texarkana Newspapers, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 939 (Texarkana Civ.App., 1970, ref., n.r.e.); Bean v. City of Arlington, 464 S.W.2d 208 ( ); Rhodes v. Turner,164 S.W.2d 743 ( ); Carter v. City of Fort Worth, 357 S.W.2d 581 (Fort Worth Civ.App., 1962, ref., n.r.e.), and Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 187 S.W.2d 688 ( ), in which opinion the Court said the following:
Did appellants show good cause to exist why they could not file the statement of facts by August 21, 1974?
In view of our holding above expressed relative to appellants' first motion for an extension of time in which to file the statement of facts, all matters involved herein relating to their second motion for another extension of time have become immaterial. However, we will discuss the question of whether good cause existed for granting the second motion.
When this Court granted the first motion it extended the time for filing the statement of facts to August 21, 1974.
The grounds relied upon and alleged in the appellants' second motion for extension of time as showing good cause for permitting the late filing of the statement of facts are as follows:
This second motion was also an unsworn motion. Long after the motion was tendered to this Court for filing, this Court received an affidavit from appellants' attorney wherein he alleged that the matters alleged in the motion were true. No other affidavits and no other evidence of any kind were offered to this Court in support of the motion.
As stated, the court reporter's certificate shows the statement of facts was complete as of July 16, 1974. The first motion for an extension, together with the certificate of appellee's counsel thereon, shows the statement of facts was completed as early as July 18, 1974.
In appellants' second motion for extension of time, they admit that their counsel approved the statement of facts and sent it to appellee's counsel on August 1, 1974. The motion does not allege a...
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