Homebuilders Association of Georgia v. Morris, A99A0184.

Decision Date21 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. A99A0184.,A99A0184.
Citation518 S.E.2d 194,238 Ga. App. 194
PartiesHOMEBUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA v. MORRIS.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Whiteman, Smith & Hamilton, Charles C. Hamilton, Atlanta, for appellant.

Douglas E. Smith, Gainesville, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Chief Judge.

This is a workers' compensation case of first impression involving the application of OCGA § 34-9-11.1(b), which provides that an employer's insurer shall have a subrogation lien against an injured employee's right of action against a person other than the employer. The issue presented by this case is whether evidence of the employee's comparative/contributory negligence or assumption of the risk is relevant in determining an insurer's recovery pursuant to this Code section. We conclude that under the plain terms of OCGA § 34-9-11.1(b) such evidence is irrelevant to an insurer's subrogation claim.

Morris worked on a construction crew placing prefabricated trusses on the roof of a building. He stepped on a truss that had been placed across an open span between the building's walls. A joint in the truss gave way causing Morris to fall ten feet to the ground. Homebuilders Association of Georgia, Inc., the workers' compensation insurer, paid medical benefits on behalf of Morris totaling $117,902 and income benefits to Morris totaling $62,620.

Morris sued Georgia Mountain Components, Inc., the designer of the truss and joint, for breach of warranties and negligent design. Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-11.1, Homebuilders moved to intervene on the ground that it had a subrogation lien up to the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid to Morris. The trial court granted the motion and allowed Homebuilders to intervene. Georgia Mountain and Morris subsequently settled their dispute for $200,000, and Georgia Mountain was dismissed from the suit. Morris contested Homebuilders' subrogation claim on the ground that OCGA § 34-9-11.1(b) requires an injured employee to be "fully and completely compensated" for all his economic and noneconomic losses before an employer/insurer is entitled to any portion of the employee's recovery against a third-party tortfeasor. Morris insisted that the $200,000 settlement with Georgia Mountain had not fully and completely compensated him for his losses. To resolve the issue, the trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial with only Morris and Homebuilders as parties.

On the day of trial, Morris made a motion in limine to prevent Homebuilders from introducing any evidence of Morris' contributory or comparative negligence or his assumption of the risk. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that OCGA § 34-9-11.1(b) does not permit consideration of any evidence of the employee's contributory/comparative negligence or assumption of the risk in the court's calculation of whether the employee had been fully and completely compensated for his injuries.

The suit proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a special verdict awarding Morris a total of $924,902 in compensatory damages, which consisted of $117,902 in past medical expenses, $75,000 in past pain and suffering, $112,000 in past lost earnings, $175,000 in future medical expenses, $225,000 in future pain and suffering, and $220,000 in future lost earnings. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and ordered that Homebuilders, as intervenor, take nothing from the settlement funds. Homebuilders appeals from the judgment, challenging the court's exclusion of evidence of Morris' comparative/contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. American Petroleum Products v. Mom and Pop Stores, 231 Ga.App. 1, 7(3), 497 S.E.2d 616 (1998). However, "`the grant of a motion in limine excluding evidence is a judicial power which must be exercised with great care.' [Cit.]" Id.

Homebuilders argues the court abused its discretion in granting the motion in limine because Morris' losses in his tort action against Georgia Mountain must be determined with regard to state tort law principles. Under those principles, Homebuilders claims, if Georgia Mountain had remained a party in the case the court properly would have allowed the jury to hear evidence of Morris' contributory/comparative negligence and assumption of the risk of...

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18 cases
  • Canal Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 1 Agosto 2002
    ...compensation to the jury to render an advisory finding of fact. See generally Hammond v. Lee, supra; Homebuilders Assn. of Ga. v. Morris, 238 Ga.App. 194, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999). But, under the statute, the legal duty to make the determination that the employee has been made whole still rema......
  • Hand v. Pettitt
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 24 Octubre 2002
    ...without the trial court having any evidentiary foundation for the ruling in the context of the trial. Homebuilders Assn. of Ga. v. Morris, 238 Ga.App. 194, 195, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999). Where the exclusion of evidence is required as a matter of law, the trial court does not abuse its discreti......
  • EZ Green Assocs., LLC v. Ga.-Pac. Corp.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 16 Marzo 2015
    ...Bryan v. Brown Childs Realty Co., 252 Ga.App. 502, 506(1)(b), 556 S.E.2d 554 (2001) ; accord Homebuilders Ass'n of Georgia v. Morris, 238 Ga.App. 194, 195, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999).10 See Bennett v. Quick, 305 Ga.App. 415, 416, 699 S.E.2d 539 (2010) (noting that “[t]he burden is upon the party......
  • Walker v. Tensor Mach., Ltd., S15Q1222.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 16 Noviembre 2015
    ...as a result of defenses available to the defendant. Id. at 872(2), 570 S.E.2d 60 (2002), quoting Homebuilders Assn. of Ga. v. Morris, 238 Ga.App. 194, 196, 518 S.E.2d 194 (1999). That is, OCGA § 34–9–11.1 speaks of full compensation for the employee's economic and noneconomic damages, and "......
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