Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix
| Decision Date | 19 March 1946 |
| Docket Number | 9779. |
| Citation | 37 S.E.2d 649,128 W.Va. 613 |
| Parties | HOMER LAUGHLIN CHINA CO. v. HIX, Court Clerk, et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A strike, by employees of the operator of a factory, which results in curtailment to the extent of approximately seventy-five per cent of the production of one of its departments, and arises from breach of a wage contract by the striking employees, creates a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute, within the meaning of the statute, Subsection 4, Section 4, Article 6, Chapter 76, Acts of the Legislature, 1943.
2. An employee who participates in a strike, which is conducted without the authority required by, and in violation of, a wage agreement and which results in his unemployment during a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory at which he was last employed, and who voluntarily leaves his work without good cause involving fault upon the part of the employer, is subject to the disqualification for unemployment benefits imposed by statute, Subsections 1 and 4, Section 4, Article 6, Chapter 76, Acts of the Legislature, 1943.
3. An employee who engages in a strike, conducted without the authority required by, and in violation of, a wage agreement and which results in his unemployment during a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute at the factory at which he was last employed, but who, with other employees, during such strike, offers to return to work without any change in his former working conditions, striking employees of other employers in the same industry and in the same locality having been permitted by their employers to return to their former positions without change of working conditions, and who is not permitted to return to his work by the employer unless he does so as a new employee, is, within the meaning of the last sentence of Subsection 4 Section 4, Article 6, Chapter 76, Acts of the Legislature 1943, required to accept conditions of employment less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the same locality; and such action by the employer excludes such employee from disqualification for unemployment benefits under that subsection of the statute.
4. The unemployment of a striking workman, who voluntarily leaves his work without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer and participates in a strike, conducted without the authority required by a wage agreement, which results in a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory at which he was last employed, and who, during such stoppage of work, though not discharged, is separated from employment for an employing unit, performs no services and for which no wages are payable to him, and who does not return to his work until after the termination of the work stoppage, is total and not partial in character.
5. A person whose unemployment is total in character is subject to a waiting period of one week before unemployment benefits may be received by him, and he must, during such waiting period, be free from disqualification for unemployment benefits.
6. A person whose total unemployment continues for a period of two weeks and who, during the first week, is disqualified for unemployment benefits under the statute, Subsection 1, Section 4, Article 6, Chapter 76, Acts of the Legislature, 1943, because he voluntarily left his work without good cause involving fault upon the part of the employer, is, during the second week of such unemployment, subject to the waiting period of one week as required by statute, Section 2, Article 6, Chapter 97, Acts of the Legislature, 1941, continuance of his disqualification having ceased at the end of the first week of his total unemployment by reason of the action of the employer in requiring him, as a requisite of his return to work, to accept conditions of employment less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the same locality.
Arthur S. Dayton and J. Newton Harman, both of Charleston, for petitioner.
Mohler, Peters & Snyder, Chas. G. Peters, H. L. Snyder, and James G. Jeter, Jr., all of Charleston, for respondents.
This controversy presents the question whether the respondent and claimant, Floyd B. Jividen, an employee of the petitioner, The Homer Laughlin China Company, a corporation, who voluntarily ceased to work for his employer during and because of a strike which the petitioner and the respondent both admit was conducted without the requisite authority of a national labor union, and which resulted in a stoppage of work at the factory of the company, is entitled, under the unemployment compensation law of this State, to unemployment benefits during the period of his unemployment subsequent to an offer of the striking employees, including the respondent, to return to their regular work, but which offer the petitioner did not accept.
The work stoppage and the strike which brought it about began on August 2, 1943, and the cessation of work continued until the day following the settlement of the strike by arbitration on August 17, 1943. As a result of the arbitration, all the employees of the petitioner who had engaged in the strike, including the respondent, except one employee who went back to work during the strike, returned to their regular employment without change in conditions or otherwise, on or shortly after August 17, 1943. On September 16, 1943, the respondent Jividen filed his claim for unemployment compensation during the period of the work stoppage from August 2 to August 16, 1943
This proceeding has come to this Court on writ of certiorari, after passing through a series of earlier hearings and appeals which in regular course followed the decision of the Deputy of the Director of the West Virginia Department of Unemployment Compensation, denying the claim, on September 28, 1943. On appeal by the claimant, the Trial Examiner of the Director, as an appellate tribunal of the Board of Review, on November 17, 1943, reversed the decision of the Deputy, and allowed the claimant partial unemployment benefits for the period August 2 to August 16, 1943, and later, by an amended decision on December 2, 1943, allowed such benefits for the period August 9 to August 16, 1943. An appeal was taken by the employer to the Board of Review, which, on March 18, 1944, affirmed the decision and the award of the Trial Examiner of December 2, 1943. In a proceeding by the employer in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, that court affirmed the decision of the Board of Review by final judgment entered March 1, 1945. Writ of certiorari to that judgment, that being the form of appellate procedure provided by the statute, Section 27, Article 7, Chapter 1, Acts of the Legislature, Second Extraordinary Session, 1936, was granted by this Court.
The actual controversy to be determined in this proceeding is between the claimant and respondent Jividen, and the petitioner and employer, The Homer Laughlin China Company, and each of them has filed a brief here. As required by the statute, other persons are included as parties. They are designated as respondents, but they raise no issues and consequently they have filed no briefs in this Court.
The petitioner is an employer subject to the West Virginia Unemployment Compensation Law; and, for approximately nineteen years, the respondent was and still is one of its employees. The employer is a member of the United States Potters Association, an association of employers, and for many years that organization has been a party to a labor or wage agreement with the National Brotherhood of Operative Potters, to which Local No. 130, in which the respondent holds membership, belongs as a local or subordinate union. This agreement, mentioned in the record as the wage agreement, which has been in force for many years, having been renewed from time to time, deals with and establishes employer and employee relationships, wages, conditions of employment, and other related subjects. It is, in many respects, different from the usual agreement between an employer and an individual local union. Unlike the ordinary labor agreement, it is a pact between an association of employers and a national union. It prohibits a local union from settling disputes or points of disagreement between its members and the employers, and provides that these questions may be taken by the local to the national officers who in turn may submit them to a standing committee or a labor committee. It further stipulates that any attempt to ignore the foregoing provision will be considered an express violation of the agreement, and will cancel the right of the offending local to participate in the privileges and the wages which the contract affords. It appears that, by virtue of this agreement, there is in effect what is designated as a discharge agreement between the parties, which contains a provision that violation of the wage agreement shall be considered as just ground for immediate discharge of an employee without notice.
For some time prior to August 2, 1943, negotiations of a controversial nature were carried on between the company and the local union, because of the action of the company in advancing Brady E. Brown, an employee, from helper to kiln fireman, over Herman Smith, another employee. The matter progressed to the stage at which the local union decided to go on strike on August 2, 1943. Having learned of this decision upon the part of the local, the company through its representative, informed the local on July 29, 1943, that cessation of work would constitute a violation by the local of the wage agreement. The local was also notified to that effect by the president of the national union. Notwithstanding these...
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