Honaker v. Mahon

• Decision Date: 25 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. 28460.,28460.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Julie D. HONAKER, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel R. Honaker, deceased, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. Burgess Wall MAHON, Defendant below, Appellee.

552 S.E.2d 788

210 W.Va. 53

Julie D. HONAKER, Administratrix of the Estate of Daniel R. Honaker, deceased, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. Burgess Wall MAHON, Defendant below, Appellee.

No. 28460.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 23, 2001.

Decided May 25, 2001.

Marvin W. Masters, Masters & Taylor, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for appellant.

Mary H. Sanders, James R. Akers, II, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Charleston, West Virginia, for appellee. STARCHER, Justice.

In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County, the plaintiff appeals two March 20, 2000 orders denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside a jury verdict adverse to the plaintiff, and refusing to grant the plaintiff a new trial. The plaintiff, now appellant, contends that a new trial is warranted because the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, imposing a duty of care greater than that of a reasonable, prudent person upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff also contends that the jury's verdict should have been set aside because the defendant introduced prejudicial evidence in violation of the trial court's rulings on a motion in limine.

After carefully reviewing the limited record presented by the parties, we agree with the plaintiff-appellant's arguments. As set forth below, we reverse the trial court's orders, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Background

The plaintiff below and appellant, Julie D. Honaker, seeks to recover underinsured motorist insurance benefits for an automobile wreck that resulted in the death of her husband, Daniel R. Honaker. The facts surrounding that wreck are greatly disputed by the parties.

The wreck occurred on March 23, 1996, at an intersection of two roads near Caldwell, West Virginia. Mr. Honaker approached the intersection from the north on Stonehouse Road, a secondary road, and stopped intending to turn left and head east on U.S. Route 60. Conversely, at the same time, a Chevrolet Blazer traveling west on Route 60 slowed as it approached the intersection and began to make a right turn onto Stonehouse Road. As the Blazer was turning, Mr. Honaker entered the intersection and began to turn left to drive eastward.

Some distance behind the Blazer was another vehicle heading west on Route 60 driven by defendant below and appellee, Burgess Wall Mahon. Defendant Mahon was a high school senior on his way to pick up his girlfriend for the school prom.

As Mr. Honaker was making his left turn, his vehicle was struck by defendant Mahon's vehicle. Mr. Honaker was killed instantly.

The plaintiff concedes that a small portion of Mr. Honaker's vehicle was in defendant Mahon's westbound lane. However, the plaintiff asserts that defendant Mahon, hurrying to take his girlfriend to the prom, crossed the double-yellow line in the center of Route 60, and entered Mr. Honaker's lane in an attempt to illegally pass the turning Blazer. When defendant Mahon passed the Blazer and entered the eastbound lane, the plaintiff argues that Mahon caused the collision that killed Mr. Honaker.

The defendant, meanwhile, takes the position that he did nothing wrong. The defendant argues that he was in his own lane when Mr. Honaker suddenly pulled out in front of him, causing the collision.

The plaintiff, representing Mr. Honaker's estate, sought to recover damages from defendant Mahon's liability insurance carrier. The defendant's liability insurance carrier paid the $100,000.00 limits of Mr. Mahon's policy to the estate, and in return Mr. Mahon was personally released from liability.

The plaintiff then sought coverage from her own underinsured motorist insurance carrier, USF & G, but the insurance carrier refused to offer any of the $100,000.00 policy limits. The plaintiff then filed the instant action against her insurance carrier to recover underinsured motorist benefits. USF & G chose to defend the action in the name of the defendant driver, Mr. Mahon.¹

After several years of litigation and one mistrial, the plaintiff's claim proceeded to trial against the insurance carrier in a bifurcated format, such that the jury only heard evidence regarding whether either Mr. Honaker or defendant Mahon was negligent, and whether that negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's damages. No evidence was presented regarding the plaintiff's damages, and accordingly, the plaintiff did not testify at trial.²

After several days of trial, on October 22, 1999, the jury returned a verdict finding that defendant Mahon was only 40% responsible for the collision, and that Mr. Honaker was 60% responsible. Based upon this apportionment of liability, the circuit court entered a judgment for the defendant. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979)

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Following the jury's verdict, the plaintiff filed motions to set aside the verdict and sought a new trial. In two orders dated March 20, 2000, the circuit court denied the plaintiff's motions.

The plaintiff now appeals.

II. Discussion

The plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in not setting aside the jury's verdict and granting the plaintiff a new trial, and sets forth two grounds why the circuit court's decision was in error. First, the plaintiff contends that the circuit court's instruction to the jury that Mr. Honaker was required to "ensure" that he could enter the intersection safely was prejudicial and not supported by law. Second, the plaintiff contends that a new trial should have been awarded due to inflammatory questions asked by defense counsel in violation of the circuit court's order on a motion in limine.

A. Jury Instructions

The first issue raised by the plaintiff concerns the instructions, proffered by the defendant and given by the trial court to the jury, regarding the standard of care which Mr. Honaker was required to exercise. We first review jury instructions to determine whether the instructions were a correct statement of the law. See, e.g., Syllabus Point 4, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). "An instruction which does not correctly state the law is erroneous and should be refused." Syllabus Point 2, State v. Collins, 154 W.Va. 771, 180 S.E.2d 54 (1971).

The defendant proffered the following jury instruction (with emphasis added), and the instruction was given by the trial court:

The laws of this State required Daniel Honaker, making a left turn on a two-way roadway, to only make the turn when he could do so with reasonable safety. The laws of this [S]tate also required Mr. Honaker to yield the right-of-way to oncoming traffic and to keep a careful lookout for other vehicles to ensure such movement could be made safely.

The plaintiff argues that this instruction, by requiring Mr. Honaker to "ensure such movement could be made safely," incorrectly required Mr. Honaker to guarantee his own safety despite the acts or omissions of the defendant. The plaintiff further contends that the jury placed a great deal of importance on the instruction because it requested that the trial court re-read the instruction before deciding the case.

In its brief to this Court, the defendant cites to no cases in our jurisprudence, and no statutes in the West Virginia Code, which impose upon a driver a duty to "ensure" that actions can be performed "safely." Instead, the defendant urges that this Court should review the instruction as a whole and examine the entire instruction to determine its accuracy. The defendant contends that, upon a full reading of the instruction, it is clear that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury that Mr. Honaker had a duty to "ensure" that his actions could be performed "safely." See, e.g., State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995)

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It is axiomatic in the context of negligence lawsuits that a party has a duty to exercise "due care." In other words, people are required to exercise the same degree of care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent person in like circumstances.

"Negligence" is either the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances, or doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done. Negligence occurs when a party engages in "conduct unaccompanied by that degree of consideration attributable to the man of ordinary prudence under like circumstances." Syllabus Point 4, Patton v. City of Grafton, 116 W.Va. 311, 180 S.E. 267 (1935). "Negligence is the violation of the duty of taking care under the given circumstances. It is not absolute; but is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, manner or person." Syllabus Point 1, Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 41 W.Va. 511, 23 S.E. 582 (1895).

Under principles of ordinary negligence, people are not required to guarantee, "ensure" or otherwise take extraordinary caution to make certain that their actions will be accomplished safely. Instead, each person is required to act only as an ordinary, prudent person:

This criterion— the man of ordinary prudence— is neither an automaton nor an exceptional man, but an ordinary member of the community. Being an ordinary person, the law makes allowance for mere errors in his judgment and does not visualize him as exercising extraordinary care. Normality is the quintessence of this characterization.

Syllabus Point 6, Patton v. City of Grafton, 116 W.Va. 311, 180 S.E. 267 (1935).

Our jurisprudence holds that Mr. Honaker was charged with exercising the care of a reasonable prudent person under similar circumstances. He was not charged with acting as an "automaton" or as an "exceptional man," ensuring his safety or that of any other person.

Accordingly, we find that the circuit court's jury instruction unfairly misled the jury concerning the standard of care required of Mr. Honaker, and was therefore erroneous. "An erroneous instruction is presumed to be prejudicial and...