Honchariw v. Cnty. of Stanislaus

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 1:16-cv-01183-NONE-BAM,1:16-cv-01183-NONE-BAM
• Parties: Nicholas HONCHARIW, Trustee, Honchariw Family Trust, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS ; Board of Supervisors of County of Stanislaus, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

530 F.Supp.3d 939

Nicholas HONCHARIW, Trustee, Honchariw Family Trust, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF STANISLAUS ; Board of Supervisors of County of Stanislaus, Defendants.

No. 1:16-cv-01183-NONE-BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California.

Signed March 31, 2021

Nicholas James Honchariw, Attorney at Law, Tiburon, CA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew D. Zinn, Shute Mihaly & Weinberg, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Dale A. Drozd, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pursuant to a Ninth Circuit's order remanding this case in light of the Supreme Court's decision in this matter, the court set a dispositive motion schedule in order to facilitate reconsideration of the previously assigned district judge's November 14, 2016 order dismissing this case with prejudice. (Doc. No. 21.) Plaintiff Nicholas Honchariw, as trustee for the Honchariw Family Trust, brought this action against defendants County of Stanislaus (the "County") and the Board of Supervisors of the County of Stanislaus (the "Board") seeking just compensation for temporary regulatory takings under the Fifth Amendment and denial of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"). (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 9.) In this court's November 14, 2016 order granting defendants’ motion to the dismiss, the court found that plaintiff's takings claim¹ was not ripe for federal adjudication under the decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), overruled in part by Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L.Ed.2d 558 (2019), and that his due process claim was time-barred. (Doc. No. 13 at 8–11.) Accordingly, the court entered judgment in defendants’ favor and dismissed this action on November 14, 2016. (Doc. No. 14.) Plaintiff appealed the judgment. (Doc. No. 15.) After the Ninth Circuit affirmed this court's judgment (Doc. No. 18), plaintiff sought review in the Supreme Court (Doc. No. 28-1). Following its decision in Knick , in which Williamson County was partially overruled, the Supreme Court remanded this case back to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. See Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus , Cal., ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2772, 204 L.Ed.2d 1153 (2019). The Ninth Circuit in turn remanded this case to this court for reconsideration in light of the decision in Knick . (Doc. No. 21).

Rather than reconsidering its decision without the benefit of further input from the parties, the court instructed them to file a new round of briefing. (Doc. No. 25.) Thereafter, on September 27, 2019, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that the court should still enter judgment in their favor, notwithstanding the decision in Knick . (Doc. No. 27 at 1–3.) Plaintiff opposed defendants’ motion on October 18, 2019 (Doc. No. 31), and defendants replied thereto six days later (Doc. No. 32).

BACKGROUND²

In 1992, plaintiff was named as the trustee to 33 acres of real property, also known as the Honchariw Family Trust, located along the Stanislaus River. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 14, 16.) The controversy in this case sprung from defendants’ alleged temporary regulatory taking of plaintiff's real property. It all began in June 2006, when plaintiff proposed to the County that his real property be subdivided into ten lots. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 17, 20.) The Stanislaus County Planning Commission rejected his proposal and plaintiff appealed that decision to the Board, which in turn affirmed the Commission's rejection on March 24, 2009, without making any findings. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 28.) In response, on June 22, 2009, plaintiff filed a writ of administrative mandamus against defendants in the Stanislaus County Superior Court challenging the Board's decision. (Id. ¶ 36.) Although the state trial court initially affirmed the Board's decision, the California Court of Appeal later reversed that determination. (Id. ¶¶ 45–47). The state appellate court found that the Board's rejection of plaintiff's proposal without making any findings was inconsistent with California law, and it ordered the trial court to direct the Board to reconsider its decision and, if the Board were to disapprove of plaintiff's proposal again, it must do so with "written findings." Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus , 200 Cal. App. 4th 1066, 1081–82, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 874 (2011) (" Honchariw I "). Following these instructions, the state trial court issued the prescribed order to the Board. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 47.) On reconsideration, the Board changed course and approved plaintiff's application to subdivide his real property on May 22, 2012. (Id. ¶ 49.)

On December 12, 2012, plaintiff brought another suit against defendants in state court, this time seeking damages for (1) temporary taking of his property by inverse condemnation under California and federal constitutions, and (2) the denial of his substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. ¶ 61; Doc. No. 7-2 ¶¶ 41, 47.) The state trial court ultimately dismissed plaintiff's claims as untimely under the California Subdivision Map Act, and the state appellate court affirmed that dismissal order in June 2015. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 65); Honchariw v. Cty. of Stanislaus , 238 Cal. App. 4th 1, 4, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 (2015) (" Honchariw II "). Plaintiff then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, but that petition was denied on August 19, 2015.³ (Doc. Nos. 1 ¶ 71; 7-4.)

After waiting approximately a year, plaintiff brought his takings and due process claims here in federal court on August 10, 2016. (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 77–90.) Plaintiff claims that he was deprived of substantially viable economic use of his property from March 2009—when defendants rejected his application to subdivide his property—to May 2012—when defendants finally approved his application to subdivide the property. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 80–85.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. The standard of review on a 12(c) motion is "functionally identical" to its counterpart, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), with timing being the "principal difference" between them.

Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc. , 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989). "On a 12(c) motion, the court considers ‘the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.’ " L–7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC , 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court "must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Fleming v. Pickard , 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) ; see also Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the allegations of the moving party which have been denied [by the non-moving party] are assumed to be false."). To survive a 12(c) motion, "a plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Lowden v. T-Mobile USA Inc. , 378 F. App'x 693, 694 (9th Cir. 2010)⁴ (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).

"A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party's pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Marshall Naify Revocable Tr. v. United States , 672 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Fajardo v. Cty. of Los Angeles , 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999) ); see also Fleming , 581 F.3d at 925 (noting that "judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law").

ANALYSIS

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff's takings and due process claims based on the statute of limitations under California law. (Doc. Nos. 27 at 6–8, 18–19; 32 at 2–4, 9–10; see also Doc. No. 13 at 10–11.) While plaintiff's claims are based on different legal theories, both are based on the same alleged misconduct: defendants’ "arbitrary and capricious" delay in approving plaintiff's application to subdivide his real property. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 3.) For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that both of plaintiff's claims are time-barred and must be dismissed. The court turns first to plaintiff's takings claim.

A. Plaintiff's Takings Claim is Time-Barred

Defendants contend that plaintiff's takings claim is time-barred. (Doc. No. 27 at 6–8.) Plaintiff opposes the pending motion on the ground that his takings claim is not subject to any statute of limitations. (Doc. No. 31 at 8). As a preliminary matter, the court must therefore decide whether there is an applicable statute of limitations governing the initiation of plaintiff's takings claim. To determine this, the court must first identify the nature of that claim.

Plaintiff does not bring his takings claim in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that reliance on § 1983 is unnecessary because his takings claim "is rooted in the Constitution itself" and is "self-executing"—though, plaintiff cites no authority in support of this interpretation of the Constitution and § 1983. (See Doc. Nos. 1 ¶¶ 77–85; 31 at 8.) More importantly, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[t]aking claims must be brought under § 1983."

Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill , 353 F.3d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles , 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Plaintiff has no cause of action directly under the United States Constitution. We have previously held that a...