Honea v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 19 June 1933
• Docket Number: No. 4-3140.,4-3140.
• Citation: 61 S.W.2d 436
• Parties: HONEA et al. v. FEDERAL LAND BANK OF ST. LOUIS.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

61 S.W.2d 436

HONEA et al. v. FEDERAL LAND BANK OF ST. LOUIS.

No. 4-3140.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 19, 1933.

Appeal from Hempstead Chancery Court, Pratt P. Bacon, Chancellor.

Suit by the Federal Land Bank of St. Louis against P. M. Honea and others. From confirmation of sale of land under a decree of foreclosure, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

L. F. Monroe, of Hope, for appellants.

E. F. McFaddin, of Hope, for appellee.

Trieber & Lasley, of Little Rock, amici curiæ.

SMITH, Justice.

Appellants owned a tract of land, which was ordered sold under a decree of the Hempstead chancery court foreclosing a mortgage thereon which they had given to appellee. There was a sale of the land as directed by the decree, and the report of the commissioner who had made the sale came on for confirmation at the ensuing term of the court. Appellants filed objections to the confirmation of the report reading as follows:

"The defendants admit the indebtedness, and admit the foreclosure decree was validly rendered, and the sale validly conducted, and that the plaintiff bid the full debt, interest and costs, and that there is no deficiency judgment, and that the property brought its fair value.

"But the defendants except and object to the approval of this sale at this time because of Act No. 21 of the Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas of 1933, which act was duly and validly passed, and had a due and valid emergency clause, and became the law of Arkansas immediately upon its passage and approval, and signing by the Governor; and that the said law was validly passed, approved and signed by the Governor of Arkansas on the 9th day of February, 1933.

"These defendants state that under the said act of the legislature it is provided in section 2 that decree confirming sales shall only be rendered during the first three days of the regular term of court as fixed by law; that the regular term of the Hempstead Chancery Court was on the first Monday in March, 1933, which day was the 6th day of March, 1933; and that the Hempstead Chancery Court was duly in session that day and on that day duly adjourned until May 5, 1933, and was not in session in Hempstead County on March 7th or March 8th, 1933; and that now this sale comes on to be approved on the 5th day of May, 1933, which is an adjourned day of that court; and, therefore, the sale should not be approved at this time.

"Wherefore, defendants except and object to the approval of the sale."

Section 2 of Act No. 21, above referred to, reads as follows: "Section 2. On account of the congestion of court dockets by foreclosure suits, and to provide time for trying other cases, foreclosure decrees, and decrees confirming foreclosure sales, shall only be rendered during the first three days of the regular term of the court as fixed by law."

Upon hearing the objections to the confirmation of the report of sale, the following facts were made to appear: The regular March, 1933, term of the Hempstead chancery court convened on the first Monday in March, which was March 6, 1933, and the day appointed by law for the convening of that term of court. After being in session the day of March 6th, the court adjourned until May 5, 1933. On March 7th the chancellor of the district held an adjourned session of the Nevada chancery court, and on March 8th an adjourned session of the Clark chancery court was held. On May 5th the court returned to continue the March term of the Hempstead chancery court, pursuant to the adjourning order above mentioned, and on that day the commissioner's report of the sale of appellant's land was heard and confirmed, over the objections and exceptions of appellants.

For the reversal of this decree it is insisted that May 5th was not one of the first three days of the regular term of the Hempstead chancery court within the meaning of section 2 of Act No. 21 of the Acts of 1933. Appellee insists, for the affirmance of the decree, not only that May 5th was one of the first three days of the regular term, but it is insisted also that it is immaterial whether this is true or not, for the reason that the entire act, of which section 2 is a part, is unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of the contract evidenced by the mortgage which the decree had ordered foreclosed.

Very interesting and able briefs were filed on the question of the constitutionality of the act by opposing counsel; but we do not find it necessary to decide that question to dispose of this appeal. It has long been the rule of this and other courts not to pass on a constitutional question unless a decision on that point is necessary to a determination of the case. The rule and the reason therefor was stated in the case of Smith v. Garretson, 176 Ark. 834, 4 S.W.(2d) 520, 522, as follows: "In Railway Co. v. Smith, 60 Ark. 221-240, 29 S. W. 752, 754, Judge Battle, speaking for the court, quoted from Judge Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 231, par. 2, as follows: `Neither will a court, as a general rule, pass upon a constitutional question, and decide a statute to be invalid, unless a decision upon that very point becomes necessary to the determination of the cause. "While courts cannot shun the discussion of constitutional questions when fairly presented, they will not go out of their way to find such topics. They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally, nor on trivial occasions. It is both proper and more respectful to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional questions only when that is the very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision carries a weight with it to which no extrajudicial disquisition is entitled." In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question is raised, though it may be legitimately presented by the record, yet, if the record also presents some other and clear ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render...