Honeycutt v. State
| Decision Date | 28 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-0105-CR-201.,49A05-0105-CR-201. |
| Parties | Jonathan P. HONEYCUTT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Patricia Caress McMath Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Appellant Defendant, Jonathan P. Honeycutt (Jonathan), appeals his conviction for failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 9-26-1-1.
We reverse.
Jonathan raises two issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and restate as follows: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious bodily injury.
The facts relevant to our disposition are as follows. On May 8, 1998, Jonathan and his brothers, Darrell Honeycutt (Darrell) and Samuel Honeycutt (Samuel), went to a couple of bars. After leaving the last bar, Jonathan, Darrell and Samuel got into a four (4) door vehicle. Jonathan was driving, Darrell was in the passenger seat, and Samuel was in the back seat behind the driver. At some point, the brothers got into an argument, and Samuel wanted out of the vehicle.
Samuel testified that he asked Jonathan to stop the vehicle several times. However, Jonathan did not stop. Samuel testified, (R. 80). When asked who pushed him out of the vehicle, Samuel testified that it was Darrell who pushed him.
While he was in the street, Samuel alleged that Jonathan positioned the vehicle over his body and revved the engine for approximately fifteen (15) seconds. Samuel testified that he asked Jonathan to help get him out of the street. Jonathan pulled Samuel out of the street and placed him in a driveway. Samuel testified that he did not ask for further assistance. Jonathan wanted Samuel to get back in the vehicle with him and Darrell and go home, but Samuel stated, (R. 93). Samuel testified that Jonathan then took his hat, got back into the vehicle, and, again, positioned the vehicle over his body, revved the engine for approximately fifteen (15) seconds, and drove off.
Jonathan and Darrell drove home without Samuel. Jonathan, Darrell and Samuel lived in the same home, which was three (3) blocks from the scene. Approximately ten (10) to (20) twenty minutes after Jonathan and Darrell arrived at home, the police knocked on their door. Samuel told a police officer that (R.40).
On May 13, 1998, the State filed an information against Jonathan and Darrell, charging them with Count I, criminal recklessness, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 35-42-2-2; and Count II, failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class D felony, Ind.Code § 9-26-1-1. The counts read as follows:
(Appellant's Appendix at 22). The information was later amended to delete Darrell from Counts I and II and to add Count III, charging Darrell with criminal recklessness for pushing Samuel out of the vehicle. On December 27, 2000, a bench trial was held. At trial, Samuel testified that he was not actually struck by the vehicle that Jonathan was driving. Samuel stated that his leg broke when he fell out or was pushed out of the vehicle. After the State rested, the defense moved for an involuntary dismissal as to all counts. Regarding Count I, Jonathan's counsel stated, "it's clear that there's absolutely no factual basis for that count." (R. 126). The State did not respond, and the trial court dismissed Count I. The trial court also granted the defense's motion as to Count III. The trial continued on Count II, and Jonathan testified. In order for the parties and the court to research Count II, the trial court continued the case until January 10, 2001.
After hearing arguments on January 10, 2001, the trial court found Jonathan guilty of Count II. On March 23, 2001, Jonathan was sentenced. The trial court entered judgment of conviction as a Class A misdemeanor and imposed a sentence of 365 days, with 353 days suspended.
Jonathan now appeals.
Jonathan argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for failure to stop after an accident resulting in serious bodily injury. Specifically, Jonathan argues that Ind. Code § 9-26-1-1 does not apply to this situation. We agree.
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Mabbitt v. State, 703 N.E.2d 698, 700 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Id. Reversal is only appropriate when reasonable persons would be unable to form inferences as to each material element of the offense. Id.
Ind.Code § 9-26-1-1 provides:
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