Honeysuckle v. Curtis H. Stout, Inc.
| Citation | 2009 Ark. App. 696,374 S.W.3d 14 |
| Decision Date | 21 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. CA 08–1073.,CA 08–1073. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arkansas |
| Parties | Carlos HONEYSUCKLE, Appellant v. CURTIS H. STOUT, INC., Valley Forge Insurance Co., Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund and Michael S. McCarthy, Appellees. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
McMath Woods, P.A., Little Rock, by: James Bruce McMath, for appellant.
Philip Hicky, II, Forrest City, for appellee.
[Ark. App. 1]This case arises from a jurisdictional dispute and the application of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, , Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-105(a). The central issue is whether the employer's exclusive remedy, immunity from suit, extends to appellee, Michael S. McCarthy, to bar a wrongful death action filed in Pulaski County Circuit Court on behalf of appellant Carlos Honeysuckle, a deceased employee of Curtis H. Stout, Inc., which resulted from a plane crash wherein Honeysuckle was a passenger and McCarthy was the pilot. Appellant raises three questions in challenging the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission: (1) Whether McCarthy was Honeysuckle's employer within the meaning of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act at the time of the incident in regard to the actionscomplained of; (2) Whether Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-105(a)[Ark. App. 2]extends immunity, for injuries caused to a co-employee, to a “principal, officer, director, stockholder ...” without regard to whether such person is “acting in the capacity as an employer,” with regard to the actions complained of; (3) Whether under Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-105(a) a “principal, officer, director, stockholder” is necessarily “acting in the capacity as an employer” with regard to the conduct causing an injury to a co-employee, simply by virtue of the injury occurring during the course and scope of employment. We reverse the Commission's determination that McCarthy was an employer under the Act at the time of the accident, which was the basis of the Commission's decision that it had exclusive jurisdiction of the matter and that the exclusive remedy applied.
The actions of McCarthy, for which Honeysuckle sought damages in the Pulaski County Circuit Court action, arise from Honeysuckle's claims that McCarthy failed to use reasonable care and skill in maintaining and operating the aircraft whose failure resulted in Honeysuckle's death. The failure of the aircraft occurred during the return flight from a business trip made by McCarthy and Honeysuckle on behalf of their employer, Curtis H. Stout, Inc. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., is an Arkansas corporation that sells electrical components to public utilities and private companies. It has places of business in multiple states. At all relevant times, McCarthy was an employee, president, member of the board of directors, and a major stockholder in Curtis H. Stout, Inc. Similarly, at all relevant times, Honeysuckle was an employee of Curtis H. Stout, Inc. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., was founded by McCarthy's grandfather.
[Ark. App. 3]McCarthy was an instrument-rated pilot and duly licensed to fly a Model 114A 4–place single engine Aero Commander aircraft that he owned. He used the aircraft from time to time as a means of transportation in connection with the business of Curtis H. Stout, Inc. At times prior to the accident in issue, McCarthy had carried employees of the company on business trips. McCarthy had used the aircraft in connection with Curtis H. Stout, Inc., on business trips on more than eighty (80) flights between June 2000 and October 2002. McCarthy's and Honeysuckle's jobs required each of them to travel. The company reimbursed each employee for his expenses related to his travel. When McCarthy used his aircraft in connection with business trips, the company reimbursed him on a cost of operation basis.
On December 5, 2002, Honeysuckle and McCarthy, after arriving at the offices of the company located in Little Rock, Arkansas, went to the Little Rock airport in McCarthy's car and boarded the aircraft owned by McCarthy. McCarthy piloted his aircraft, and Honeysuckle was a passenger. Upon arrival at the Addison, Texas, airport, they were picked up by a business associate of the company and went to a business meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, they returned to the Addison airport where they boarded McCarthy's aircraft for the return trip to Little Rock. On the return trip, the aircraft experienced a loss of engine power and McCarthy attempted an emergency landing at Memorial Field in Hot Springs, Arkansas. Due to the loss of engine power, the aircraft crashed in a residential area approximately one mile southwest of the Hot Springs airport. Honeysuckle was fatally injured in the crash, and McCarthy was severely injured. Claims were filed on behalf of both [Ark. App. 4]McCarthy and the Administratrix of the Estate of Carlos Honeysuckle for workers' compensation before the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission in connection with the accidental injuries they sustained as a result of the aircraft accident.
In the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Claim styled Honeysuckle vs. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., Claim No. F214059, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission entered an order wherein it was determined that an employment relationship existed between Carlos Honeysuckle and Curtis H. Stout, at all relevant times, including December 5, 2002, and that Carlos Honeysuckle, an employee, sustained accidental and fatal injuries in the aircraft accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Curtis H. Stout, Inc., thus determining there was a “compensable injury” under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act. The claimant and those whom she represents received workers' compensation benefits in excess of $85,000 in connection with the aircraft accident.
In the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Claim styled Michael McCarthy vs. Curtis H. Stout, Inc., Claim No. F213993, the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission entered an order wherein it was determined that an employment relationship existed between Michael McCarthy and Curtis H. Stout, at all relevant times, including December 5, 2002, and that Michael McCarthy sustained accidental injuries in the aircraft accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with Curtis H. Stout, Inc., thus determining there was a “compensable injury” under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act. McCarthy received workers' compensation benefits in excess of $300,000 in connection with the aircraft [Ark. App. 5]accident.
After a claim for workers' compensation benefits had been filed, Janan Honeysuckle, as Administratrix of the Estate of Carlos Honeysuckle, filed a wrongful-death cause of action in the Pulaski County Circuit Court against McCarthy and the manufacturer of the aircraft, as well as the manufacturers of certain component parts of the aircraft, alleging negligence against McCarthy, as well as other theories of recovery against other defendants. McCarthy filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition in the Arkansas Supreme Court requesting that the court issue a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Pulaski County Circuit Court from proceeding in the cause of action based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The supreme court granted the writ and remanded the matter to the Workers' Compensation Commission for a determination of whether McCarthy was an employer under the Act.
The Commission found that McCarthy was the employer of Honeysuckle and entitled to immunity under Arkansas Code Annotated § 11–9–105 and further entitled to immunity from a third-party action under Arkansas Code Annotated § 11–9–410. This appeal followed.
The parties' arguments concern the interpretation and application of Arkansas Code Annotated § 11–9–105. The question of the correct interpretation and application of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which we decide de novo. Hempstead Cnty. Hunting Club, Inc. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2009 Ark.App. 511, 324 S.W.3d 697;Cooper Realty Inv., Inc. v. Ark. Contractors Licensing Bd., 355 Ark. 156, 134 S.W.3d 1 (2003); see also Baker Refrigeration Sys., Inc. v. Weiss, 360 Ark. 388, 201 S.W.3d 900 (2005). When [Ark. App. 6]examining an issue of statutory construction, our cardinal rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ark. Gas Consumers, Inc. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 354 Ark. 37, 49, 118 S.W.3d 109, 118 (2003). Where the language of a statuteis clear and unambiguous, this court determines legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 323, 254 S.W.3d 729, 735 (2007). The statute should be construed so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect must be given to every word in the statute if possible. Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 333 Ark. 335, 338–39, 969 S.W.2d 190, 191–92 (1998).
The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act, along with its exclusive remedy provision, is made possible by virtue of amendment 26 to the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. This amendment, set forth in article 5, section 32, of the Arkansas Constitution provides that
[t]he General Assembly shall have power to enact laws prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death of employees, and to whom said payment shall be made. It shall have power to provide the means, methods, and forum for adjudicating claims arising under said laws, and for securing payment of same. Provided, that otherwise no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and in case of death from such injuries the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall be prosecuted.
Ark. Const. art. 5, § 32, amended byArk. Const. amend. 26 (emphasis added).
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