Hood, Matter of

• Decision Date: 10 June 1996
• Citation: 930 S.W.2d 575
• Parties: In the Matter of Kayla Lynn HOOD, A Minor. David VINEYARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Heather Elaine HOOD, Donna Hood, and Allen Hood, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 575

930 S.W.2d 575

In the Matter of Kayla Lynn HOOD, A Minor.

David VINEYARD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Heather Elaine HOOD, Donna Hood, and Allen Hood,

Respondents-Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Eastern Section.

June 10, 1996.

Published Pursuant to Tenn.Ct.App.R. 11.

Charles M. Clifford, Maryville, for petitioner-appellant.

Robert M. Cohen, Maryville, Charles W. Burson, Attorney General & Reporter, and Jennifer Helton Small, Deputy Attorney General, for the State of Tennessee, for respondents-appellees.

OPINION

SUSANO, Judge.

In this case, David Vineyard seeks to legitimate and establish a parent-child relationship with his alleged daughter, Kayla Lynn Hood, who was born to Heather Elaine Hood (Mother) on November 8, 1994. Mother opposes Vineyard's attempt to legitimate the child on the ground that she has not consented to the child's legitimation. ¹ Mother and her parents filed a motion to dismiss, which the juvenile court granted, holding, in effect, that a putative father has no avenue by which to legitimate his child, absent the mother's consent, under Tennessee's legitimation statutes. In so ruling, the court apparently relied upon T.C.A. § 36-2-202(c), ² which provides as follows:

Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize a putative father to legitimate a child or to execute any voluntary acknowledgment of paternity without the consent of the mother of such child.

(Emphasis added). Because Vineyard's issues on this appeal bring into question the validity of this code section, we directed the parties to serve copies of their briefs on the Attorney General, the Honorable Charles W. Burson, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 32, T.R.A.P.

General Burson has filed a written response regarding the validity of T.C.A. § 36-2-202(c), as it pertains to Vineyard's petition to legitimate his alleged child. In his response, he certified his conclusion that the statute "is unconstitutional to the extent that it allows an unmarried woman to prevent a putative father from legitimating his alleged biological child." Thus, the unusual posture of this case presents us, on the pleadings, with the question of the constitutionality of T.C.A. § 36-2-202(c).

I

Our standard of review in a case such as this is set forth in McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tenn.1991):

In light of the fact that this case was dismissed on a motion for judgment on the pleadings ... we are bound to treat as false all allegations of the Defendant, the moving party, which are denied, and as true all well-pleaded allegations contained in the pleadings of the Plaintiff, the opponent of the motion. See Trigg v. Middle Tenn. Elec. Membership Corp., 533 S.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Tenn.App.1975). In other words, on an appeal from an order allowing a judgment on the pleadings, as in this case, all well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be accepted as true. Trigg at 733 (citing Darwin v. Town of Cookeville, 170 Tenn. 508, 97 S.W.2d 838 (1936); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 53 Tenn. 489 (1871)). Conclusions of law are not admitted nor should judgment on the pleadings be granted unless the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment.

Id. We review the instant case with this standard in mind.

II

The facts as set forth in Vineyard's petition are as follows. The child was born out of wedlock on November 8, 1994. Mother is an unmarried minor in the custody of her parents, respondents Donna and Allen Hood. Vineyard is the natural father, and Mother and her parents have acknowledged him as such. Mother has allowed Vineyard to visit with his child since her birth. Vineyard has offered support for the child, which has been accepted, and he is fully capable and willing to provide continuing support. Finally, Vineyard desires to establish a legal parent-child relationship with his daughter. Vineyard's petition requests a declaration that he is the child's biological father. He also seeks the setting of an equitable amount of child support; reasonable visitation rights; and that his daughter's name be changed to Kayla Lynn Vineyard. In other words, Vineyard seeks to legitimate his child.

The respondents argue that the Tennessee legitimation statutes do not allow a putative father to legitimate a child without the consent of the child's mother. The juvenile court, ostensibly ³ relying upon T.C.A. § 36-2-202(c), agreed and dismissed the petition.

III

The language and effect of T.C.A. § 36-2-202(c) is clear: no putative father may legitimate his child without the consent of the child's mother, regardless of the circumstances. We now address the question of whether this rule passes constitutional muster under established principles of due process. The Attorney General takes the following position on this question:

that portion of the statute which allows an unmarried woman to prevent the putative father from filing proceedings to legitimate his child constitutes a denial of due process under both the Tennessee and United States Constitutions ...

We agree.

The United States Supreme Court examined the extent to which the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution protects a natural father's biological relationship with his child in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). In Stanley, the Court struck down a statute creating an irrebuttable presumption that all unwed fathers are unfit parents, and mandating that children of unwed fathers would automatically become wards of the state upon the mother's death. The Court described the father's liberty interest in a relationship with his natural children as follows:

The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic relationships."

* * * * * *

The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), "basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious ... than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953).

Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212. Significantly, the Court made it clear that these rights extend to unwed fathers as well as those married: "Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony." Id., 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1213. The Stanley Court concluded that

as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him ...

Id., 405 U.S. at 649, 92 S.Ct. at 1211.

The nature, and boundaries, of the parental rights of an unwed father were further explored in the case of Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). Lehr recognized and held that an unwed father's constitutional rights in a relationship with his child are initially inchoate, and, before they gain due process protection, must be developed through the father's pursuit of such a relationship and his demonstration of parental responsibility by offering financial and emotional support of his child. The Court stated the following in this regard:

When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child," Caban [v. Mohammed ], 441 U.S. , at 392, 99 S.Ct. [1760], at 1768 [60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) ], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a father toward his children."

* * * * * *

The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development.

Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2993.

Tennessee jurisprudence also recognizes that an unwed father is entitled to due process protection of his parental rights under certain circumstances. In 1989, the Court of Appeals was faced with an issue similar to that at bar, and with comparable facts, in the case of In re Adoption of Hutto, 777 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn.App.1989). In Hutto the natural parents filed competing petitions in juvenile court--the father filed what amounted to a legitimation petition, and the mother and her husband filed a petition to adopt the child. The court stated the following:

Appellants argue "the trial court lacked authority to order the child legitimated pursuant to the adversarial counterclaim of the natural father over the objection of the mother", and insist that Matter of A, 735 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn.App.1987); Cooper v. Thompson, 710 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn.App.1985) and Cunningham v. Golden, 652 S.W.2d 910 (Tenn.App.1983) are authorities for their position. These cases are inapposite since the actions were, in effect, seeking a declaration of illegitimacy of a presumptively legitimate child having been born to a woman while married to another man. Appellants also argue the legitimation statutes do not contemplate an adversarial proceeding. This is correct insofar as the proceeding relates to the issue of paternity; however, the parties stipulated Fowler was the biological father of the child who was "not born in lawful wedlock". On these facts a biological parent may petition the court for an order of...