Hood v. City of Boston, Civ. A. No. 94-10634-REK.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 94-10634-REK.
• Parties: Frank HOOD, Plaintiff v. CITY OF BOSTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

891 F. Supp. 51

Frank HOOD, Plaintiff v. CITY OF BOSTON, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 94-10634-REK.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

June 28, 1995.

Margaret A. Burnham, Susan J. Goldstein, Burnham, Hines & Dilday, Boston, MA, for Frank Hood.

Kevin S. McDermott, City of Boston Law Dept., Kimberly M. Saillant, Corp. Counsel Law Dept., Boston, MA, for City of Boston, Terrance O'Toole, William J. Feeney, Jr., J. Gallagher and 8 Unknown Police Officers.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KEETON, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a black male, filed in a state court this civil action against the City of Boston and several police officers, all of whom are white males. Defendants removed to this court (Docket No. 1, filed April 4, 1994). Plaintiff moved to remand (Docket No. 2, filed April 8, 1994). This court stated a willingness to remand if plaintiff would waive all federal law claims over which this court has jurisdiction to provide a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff declined to file such a waiver, and the court denied the motion to remand on May 2, 1994 (Docket No. 6).

During jury selection on June 12, 1995, at side bar, plaintiff's counsel called attention to the fact that the jury panel included only one black person. Later in the proceedings, again at side-bar, plaintiff's counsel called attention to defendants' use of one of their peremptory challenges to exclude from the jury the black member of the jury panel. Jury selection was completed on June 12, 1995, but resumption of the trial was delayed while the court completed jury trial in a criminal case.

Before any further proceedings in this case in the presence of the jury, plaintiff filed a motion to strike the jury and renewed his request for remand (Docket No. 42, filed June 13, 1995). After further hearings on these matters on June 16, 19, and 21, 1995, scheduling problems independent of the dispute over the peremptory challenge having arisen, I discharged the jury because of those problems, without objection by any party. Also, during the hearing on June 21, 1995, the plaintiff elected to file a stipulation as follows:

The plaintiff hereby waives any claims under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. The plaintiff acknowledges that unless the plaintiff is able to satisfy the threats, intimidation or coercion elements of section 11H of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, plaintiff will not be entitled to recover on the theory of a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

This stipulation having been filed, I conclude, for the reasons stated in this Memorandum and Order, that it is appropriate to dismiss the claims before this court over which it has had jurisdiction by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and, because all remaining claims are state law claims, remand all those claims to the state court from which this civil action was removed.

I.

The original complaint, as it was filed in state court, was not made a part of the record in this court until a copy was attached, as Exhibit A, to the plaintiff's submission filed June 21, 1995 (Docket No. ___).

The amended complaint, filed by plaintiff on December 9, 1994 (after the court had denied plaintiff's first motion to remand), alleges several common law torts.

It also alleges:

38. By engaging in the conduct described herein, the individual defendants interfered by means of threats, intimidation and/or coercion with the plaintiff's exercise and enjoyment of his rights as secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth, including the right to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force, from unreasonable search and seizure, from being subject to arrest without probable cause, from being denied medical attention, from being deprived of liberty without due process of law, and from false imprisonment, all guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

39. The individual defendants, therefore, are liable to the plaintiff for violating his civil rights under M.G.L. c. 12, sec. 11H-11I.

Neither the complaint nor the amended complaint makes any reference to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nevertheless, both the complaint and the amended complaint allege, inter alia, that defendants violated plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and seek, inter alia, punitive damages for such violations. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that is within the "original jurisdiction" of this court, as that phrase is used in the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).

Also, as will be explained more fully below, all claims for punitive damages are without merit as state law claims; if any claims for punitive damages could lead to a judgment for plaintiff, they could do so only as federal claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The complaint and amended complaint also state claims under M.G.L. c. 12, § 11(I) for alleged violations of the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Although plaintiff does not explicitly refer to the Declaration of Rights in the paragraph quoted above, he does allege interference with "rights as secured by the United States Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth...." I interpret this allegation as referring to the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as well as other "laws of the Commonwealth." Moreover, the opening sentence of the complaint and amended complaint describes the action as one to recover damages "for violation of his rights protected by ... the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights...."

II.

A.

Although the parties disagree whether the claims under M.G.L. c. 12, § 11(I), based on alleged violations of the United States Constitution, arise under federal law for purposes of determining whether removal of these claims was proper, it is undisputed (1) that the claims for punitive damages are of a type over which this court has original jurisdiction, (2) that the claim for punitive damages against the City of Boston must fail as a matter of law, and (3) that, as a matter of law, the only claims for punitive damages that may lie are those that are federal claims against defendants in their individual capacities. Briefly, I explain why.

The law of the Commonwealth, on which plaintiff relies for his state law claims, does not allow for punitive damages for common law torts or for the statutory violations alleged in this case.

Federal law provides no basis for awarding punitive damages against the municipal defendant in this case or against the individual defendants in their official capacities. Under federal law the municipality has absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for punitive damages. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). A suit for damages against an individual in his or her official capacity as an officer of a municipality is in legal effect a suit against the municipality, any award being enforceable not against assets of the individual but against the municipality. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, the municipality's immunity applies as well to suits against each of the defendant officers in his official capacity.

B.

Even though no formal motion was made to the court seeking dismissal of the punitive damages claims, I advised the parties in conference of my conclusion, for the reasons stated above, that it would be appropriate to dismiss sua sponte all punitive damages claims except those made against defendants in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff's counsel then, during the conference on June 16, 1995, stipulated to dismissal of all punitive damages claims, and not alone those the court had concluded were without merit as a matter of law.

After further submissions and consultation, the plaintiff on June 21, 1995 filed the additional stipulation quoted above.

III.

Even after plaintiff's voluntary dismissal on June 16, 1995, of the punitive damages claims, substantial issues concerning original jurisdiction, propriety of removal, and propriety of remand remained for decision.

A.

Plaintiff has alleged that defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff maintains, nevertheless, that his allegations of violations of federal constitutional rights, as stated in the complaint and amended complaint, do not state federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (over which this court may exercise original jurisdiction) and instead assert only state claims under M.G.L. c. 12, § 11(I).

According to this state statute,

Any person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in section 11H, may institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief as provided for in said section, including the award of compensatory money damages.

Under § 11(H), incorporated by reference in § 11(I), the interference, or attempted interference with legal rights must occur "by threats, intimidation or coercion." Bell v. Mazza, 394 Mass. 176, 474 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (1985).

Moreover, nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff state that he is invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which a claim based on allegations of violations of federal constitutional rights may be brought in a federal court.

It is a basic principle of adjudication that a plaintiff is master of his or her claim. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 411-12, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913). But it is also a court's responsibility, in considering either the propriety of removal or the propriety of remand, to...