Majeske v. Bay City Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 27 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-CV-10485-BC.,00-CV-10485-BC.
• Citation: 177 F.Supp.2d 666
• Parties: Gary MAJESKE, Plaintiff, v. The BAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

177 F.Supp.2d 666

Gary MAJESKE, Plaintiff, v. The BAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. 00-CV-10485-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

December 27, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David R. Skinner, Skinner Professional Law Corp., Bay City, MI, for Plaintiff.

Timothy R. Winship, Raymond M. Davis, Thrun, Maatsch, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND

LAWSON, District Judge.

This matter is presently before the Court on the motion by the plaintiff, Gary Majeske, to remand the case to the Bay County, Michigan Circuit Court where he originally filed the matter. The plaintiff claims that the defendant improvidently removed the case to this Court because there is no substantial federal question sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, or in the alternative, the state law claims predominate over the federal claims. Because the Court finds that Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint states a federal cause of action over which this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and because 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) does not allow remand of the entire case when a viable federal question claim is pleaded, the Court will deny the motion.

I.

The plaintiff originally filed this action in the Bay County, Michigan Circuit Court on December 5, 2000. The plaintiff is an administrative employee under contract with Bay City Public Schools and a member of the Bay City Association of School Administrators (BCASA). BCASA represents administrative personnel employed as principals and assistant principals through a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into with Bay City Public Schools. The plaintiff formerly held the administrative position of Assistant Principal of Western High School and was allegedly removed without explanation from that position. The plaintiff brought suit in state court alleging claims founded on breach of contract, declaratory judgment, wrongful termination, age discrimination, defamation and denial of due process rights secured by the Constitutions of Michigan and the United States.

Count IV of the complaint, entitled "Denial of Due Process," contains the following allegations:

36. Defendant is an incorporated subdivision of the government of the State of Michigan.

37. All rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Michigan are secured to the Plaintiff. (Collective Bargaining Agreement § 4.10)

38. Plaintiff is possessed of valuable personal rights arising from his longstanding relationship with Defendant, and under his Employment Agreement with Defendant. (Exhibit A).

39. Certain procedural safeguards, including the right to "final and binding" arbitration are available to Plaintiff pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, § 9.25.

. . . . .

41. Plaintiff's rights to due process under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Michigan have been denied.

Compl. ¶¶ 36-39, 41.

On December 28, 2000, defendant filed a timely notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) invoking this Court's subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The defendant asserts that because of the allegations in Count IV of the complaint, the case is a "civil action arising under the Constitution of the United States," and plaintiff's other claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact." Notice of Removal at 2. In riposte, the plaintiff filed a motion to remand contending that plaintiff's claims are premised on contract theory, and that "no relief arising directly and solely under a federal right, as separate and distinct from any state claim, is sought." Mot. to Remand ¶ 8. The plaintiff argues that his due process claim was made purely in reference to the defendant's breach of his collective bargaining agreement, which itself guaranteed due process protections, raises no substantial question of federal interest, and is only an alternate theory of recovery. Id. ¶ 7. The plaintiff also argues that remand is justified because issues of state law predominate over any perceived federal claims in his complaint. Id. ¶ 9. The defendant responded that the plaintiff alleged a federal due process claim in his complaint, and that this claim in the plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint" is sufficient for removal. The plaintiff filed a memorandum reply, and the Court entertained oral argument in open court on March 13, 2001.

II.

A.

The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 require that a defendant demonstrate that a district court would have original jurisdiction over a civil action in order to invoke this Court's removal jurisdiction. Long v. Bando Mfg. of America, Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir.2000). The party seeking removal bears the burden of demonstrating that the district court has original jurisdiction. Id.; Conrad v. Robinson, 871 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir.1989). "Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts resolved in favor of remand." Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir.1996). See also Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of Ontario v. City of Detroit, 874 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir.1989).

The defendant's removal petition is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which provides that "[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties." District courts have original jurisdiction over "actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "[B]ecause the `arising under' language of § 1441(b) is almost identical to the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the scope of removal jurisdiction based on the existence of a federal question under § 1441(b) is considered to be identical to the scope of federal question jurisdiction under § 1331." Long, 201 F.3d at 757-58.

A claim falls within this Court's original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded Complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)). Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, federal jurisdiction is determined by the allegations on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Long, 201 F.3d at 758. The plaintiff is the "master of his complaint," and the fact that a claim could be stated under federal law does not prevent him from stating it under state law only. Alexander v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir.1994).

In this case, the plaintiff does not invoke any federal statutory authority to support his claims for relief. Although in some circumstances a cause of action can be brought against governmental agents for a violation of specific constitutional rights, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), a Bivens claim, which seeks damages under a constitutional provision itself, cannot be brought against state or municipal entities. See Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 501-03 (6th Cir.1987) overruled on other grounds 872 F.2d 772, 773 (6th Cir.1989).

However, lack of reference to a specific federal law in the complaint is not controlling. See North American Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir.1978). "[It] is ... a court's responsibility, in considering either the propriety of removal or the propriety of remand, to look beyond the statutory citations in the pleadings to the nature of the claims as they appear on the face of the complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed." Hood v. City of Boston, 891 F.Supp. 51, 54 (D.Mass.1995). In Hood, the plaintiff pleaded violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions but failed to state anywhere in his complaint that he was invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 53-54. Looking at the nature of the claims presented by the complaint, the Court nevertheless found it reasonable to conclude that the complaint claimed a violation of federal rights, which necessarily must be presented under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 54; see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (reaffirming that only notice pleading is required in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Although Hood eventually upheld the plaintiff's dismissal of his federal claims and remanded the case, it affirmed that original jurisdiction existed in the first instance.

In this case, the plaintiff argues that his due process claim is merely an alternative theory of recovery which, under Christianson v. Colt Ind. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809-10, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988), is insufficient to invoke this Court's jurisdiction. Although it is true that federal-question jurisdiction exists only in cases in which the complaint "`establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law,'" id. at 808, 108 S.Ct. 2166 (quoting Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)), the plaintiff misconstrues the import of Christianson. As the Court of Appeals noted in Long, federal question jurisdiction may arise where a well-pleaded...