Hoofnagle v. Alden
| Decision Date | 11 March 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25,675 |
| Citation | 213 N.W. 53,170 Minn. 414 |
| Parties | T. E. HOOFNAGLE v. W. A. ALDEN |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant appealed fro an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Guilford, J., denying his motion for a new trial. Reversed.
When judgment sustaining demurrer does not prevent plaintiff's bringing second action.
1. The judgment entered upon an order sustaining a demurrer on the ground that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action does not preclude the plaintiff from suing again if he states additional facts in the second complaint supplying the omission which made the first complaint demurrable.
When final judgment in first action is bar to second action.
2. When the complaint in the first action states facts sufficient to permit plaintiff to prove everything necessary to the establishment of the cause of action pleaded in the second action, a final judgment on the merits in the first action is a bar to the maintenance of the second action.
What is concluded by a former adjudication.
3. A former adjudication is conclusive not only as to questions actually litigated, but as to all questions within the issues whether formally litigated or not.
One test by which to determine whether a given issue was presented in the former action is to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff in the second action would have authorized a judgment for him in the first action.
Judgment on the merits, from which no appeal is taken, is conclusive.
4. It is immaterial whether a wrong reason was given for the direction of the verdict in defendant's favor in the first action, or whether the judgment entered thereon was right or wrong, the judgment having been rendered on the merits and no appeal having been taken therefrom.
The cause of action could not be split into several actions.
5. A claim for damages caused by the destruction of leased property, due to the lessee's failure to exercise the degree of care required by the lease, and his inability to restore the property at the expiration of the term constitute one cause of action which cannot be split up into several suits.
Actions 1 C.J. p. 1111 n. 1; p. 1116 n. 83.
Judgments, 34 C.J. p. 769 n. 12, 13; p. 800 n. 82; p. 804 n. 7; p. 805 n. 14; p. 902 n. 92; p. 930 n. 17.
Grimes & Maxwell, for appellant.
Leonard, Street & Deinard, for respondent.
In October, 1923, the respondent and one Ledbetter commenced an action against appellant in the district court of Hennepin county, which resulted in the entry of a judgment in appellant's favor. Respondent then commenced a second action and appellant pleaded the judgment in the former action as a bar.
The complaint in the first action set out three alleged causes of action. It stated certain facts common to all, viz: That plaintiffs owned real property in Cass county, used as a summer resort; that on April 9, 1923, they leased the property to the appellant for a term expiring December 1, 1923; that on September 3, 1923, a number of the buildings were destroyed by fire; that the lease contained a clause reading thus:
"It is agreed that the said second party will exercise due and proper care in the operation and care of said premises and buildings and the personal property, furnishings, furniture and fixtures leased and that he will surrender, deliver up and restore to said first parties at the termination of this lease, all of said property in as good condition as it now is, ordinary wear and tear and damage by the elements excepted."
In pleading the first cause of action, it was alleged that the appellant had been incapacitated from restoring the property to plaintiffs at the expiration of the term of the lease in the condition in which it was when he took it. A demurrer was interposed to this cause of action and sustained on the ground that the facts stated did not constitute a cause of action. The complaint was not amended and only the second and third causes of action were litigated on the merits.
In the second cause of action, after pleading the lease and the covenant above quoted, it was alleged that:
Appellant "wholly failed to exercise proper care in the operation and care of said premises and buildings and the personal property, furnishings, furniture and fixtures leased, in this, to-wit: That shortly after the said W. A. Alden took possession of said premises at the beginning of the term for which said premises were demised, the said W. A. Alden gave the said premises into the sole possession, custody and control of his son, one W. E. Alden, then and there well knowing that the said W. E. Alden was not a fit and proper person to be given control of the said premises, and was not a reliable man, and then and there well knowing that the said W. E. Alden had incendiary tendencies and could not be trusted with the care and custody of said property; that thereafter the said W. A. Alden, defendant herein, failed to exercise any supervision or control of the said premises, but continued to entrust the said premises to his said son."
It was then alleged that appellant's son set fire to some of the buildings, which were destroyed with the equipment and furniture.
The third cause of action was for waste committed by setting fire to the buildings in the manner already stated.
Judgment for $50,000 was demanded on the several causes of action.
The complaint in the second action pleads the lease and the covenant therein above quoted, alleges that, without notice to respondent and without his knowledge, the appellant assigned the lease to W. E. Alden and Anna S. Alden, his wife, and gave them possession of the property, which they retained until September 3, 1923, when W. E. Alden set fire to the buildings; that by reason thereof appellant failed and neglected to surrender and restore the property to respondent...
To continue reading
Request your trial