Hooghe v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2013–CP–00845–COA.,2013–CP–00845–COA.
• Citation: 138 So.3d 240
• Parties: Thomas J. HOOGHE a/k/a Thomas Hooghe, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

138 So.3d 240

Thomas J. HOOGHE a/k/a Thomas Hooghe, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2013–CP–00845–COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 6, 2014.

Thomas J. Hooghe, appellant, pro se.

Office of the Attorney General by Scott Stuart, attorney for appellee.

Before GRIFFIS, P.J., ISHEE and MAXWELL, JJ.

GRIFFIS, P.J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Thomas Hooghe appeals the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCCR). Hooghe argues that there was no factual basis to support his guilty plea; he was prejudiced by the amended, superseding indictment; the amended, superseding indictment was the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness and misconduct; and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no error and affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On August 5, 2011, DeSoto County Deputy Sheriff Shane Foster saw a car almost come to a complete stop on Interstate 55. He called dispatch and ran the tag number. The dispatcher reported the vehicle had been stolen out of Little Rock, Arkansas. Deputy Foster stopped the vehicle.

¶ 3. Detective Jerry Owensby was dispatched to the scene. Hooghe refused to speak about the car, but told Detective Owensby that he had eaten at a steakhouse in Southaven, Mississippi, and had been driving around. Hooghe would not tell Detective Owensby where he was from or where he was going. Detective Owensby suspected that Hooghe was driving under the influence, so Hooghe was taken into custody, where he refused to provide a breath sample.

¶ 4. On December 13, 2011, Hooghe was indicted and charged with the crime of receiving stolen property, a violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–17–70 (Supp.2013). On June 29, 2012, the State filed a motion to amend the indictment to charge Hooghe as a habitual offender, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–19–81 (Rev.2007).

¶ 5. On July 18, 2012, a grand jury issued an amended, superseding indictment. Hooghe was charged with the crime of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, a violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–17–42 (Supp.2013). He was also charged under section 99–19–81 as a habitual offender.

¶ 6. On August 20, 2012, Hooghe pled guilty to the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. As part of the plea agreement, the habitual-offender charge was dropped in exchange for his guilty plea. The circuit court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Hooghe to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

¶ 7. Hooghe filed documents with the Circuit Court of DeSoto County. On January 22, 2013, the circuit judge entered an order that directed the circuit clerk to file Hooghe's documents and to treat the filed documents as a PCCR motion. In the documents, Hooghe claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, the indictment was defective, and his right to a speedy trial was violated. By order dated May 6, 2013, the circuit judge dismissed Hooghe's PCCR motion. It is from this judgment that Hooghe now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8. This Court will not reverse a trial court's dismissal of a PCCR motion unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Madden v. State, 75 So.3d 1130, 1131 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2011) (citation omitted). When reviewing questions of law, this Court's standard of review is de novo. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999)).

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the trial court erred in accepting Hooghe's guilty plea.

¶ 9. Hooghe asserts that the trial court had no factual basis to ascertain that Hooghe had any connection to the car theft in Arkansas. Also, Hooghe contends that because the car was stolen in another state, DeSoto County did not have jurisdiction to proceed.

¶ 10. Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 8.04(A)(3), titled “Entry of Guilty Plea,” provides:

Voluntariness. Before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court must determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there is a factual basis for the plea. A plea of guilty is not voluntary if induced by fear, violence, deception, or improper inducements. A showing that the plea of guilty was voluntarily and intelligently made must appear in the record.(Emphasis added). In Turner v. State, 961 So.2d 734, 736–37 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2007), this Court held that a defendant's admission of guilt amounts to an adequate factual basis, as does any record evidence before the trial court.

¶ 11. The following exchange occurred at the plea hearing:

Court: Do you understand that you're in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County and that you're offering a plea of guilty to the charge of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle?

Hooghe: I understand.

Court: Would the [S]tate please give me a factual basis for the charges against Mr. Hooghe?

State: If this case were to go to trial, the [S]tate would prove by admissible and credible evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas Hooghe did on or about August 5, 2011, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without authority take possession of or take away a motor vehicle, that being one 2003 Infiniti G35 of any value belonging to Robert McCarville, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily convert or to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession or ownership.

The facts would more specifically show that the vehicle listed in the indictment was stolen from Little Rock, Arkansas, prior to August 5, 2011. The victim, Robert McCarville, stated that he had left it, I believe, in the parking lot of a YMCA in Little Rock. He would testify that he does not know this defendant nor did he give this defendant permission to have his vehicle.

The [S]tate would also call Officer Shane Foster with the DeSoto County Sheriff's Department, who would testify that he conducted a traffic stop on that vehicle and that he ran the tag, that it came back reported stolen out of Arkansas, that this defendant, Mr. Hooghe, was driving the vehicle, and that he was taken into custody at that time.

These events occurred within DeSoto County, Mississippi, therefore within this court's jurisdiction and venue.

....

Court: Mr. Hooghe, do you understand and recall the events bringing you here today, sir?

Hooghe: One correction, sir. The arrest was August 4. That might come in down the road somewhere. It was before midnight on August 4. She [ (the prosecutor) ] says August 5.

....

Court: All right. Other than that date, Mr. Hooghe, do you have any disagreements with the factual basis as set out by the prosecutor?

Hooghe: I do not.

¶ 12. Section 97–17–42 is titled “Taking possession of or taking away a motor vehicle.” This section provides:

Any person who shall, willfully and without authority, take possession of or take away a motor vehicle of any value belonging to another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily convert it or to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession or ownership, and any person who knowingly shall aid and abet in the taking possession or taking away of the motor vehicle, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by commitment to the Department of Corrections for not more than ten (10) years.

Miss.Code Ann. § 97–17–42(1).

¶ 13. Hooghe expressly acknowledged under oath that he understood the charge he was pleading guilty to and its factual basis. He was also advised of his rights and the claims he was waiving by pleading guilty. We find that there was an adequate factual basis for the trial court to determine that Hooghe was in fact guilty of car theft. In fact, the State informed the court that the State could prove that “Thomas Hooghe did on or about August 5, 2011, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and without authority take possession of or take away a motor vehicle, that being on 2003 Infiniti G35 of any value belonging to Robert McCarville, with the intent to either permanently or temporarily convert or to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession or ownership.” Hooghe then agreed that the State had sufficient evidence to prove these facts. Thus, we find that the factual basis offered by the State was sufficient to prove each element of the crime.

¶ 14. The law presumes that a defendant prepares the plea petition “with an appreciation of its fateful consequences.” Ward v. State, 879 So.2d 452, 455 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Thus, we cannot find that the trial court was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we find that Hooghe's claim is without merit.

¶ 15. As part of this issue, Hooghe also asserts that jurisdiction was improper in DeSoto County because the car was stolen in Arkansas. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99–11–23 provides:

Where property is stolen in another state or country and brought into this state, or is stolen in one county in this state and carried into another, the offender may be indicted and tried in any county into or through which the property may have passed, or where the same may be found.

This applies to the crime of larceny. See Brown v. State, 281 So.2d 924, 927 (Miss.1973).

¶ 16. Here, the car was stolen from Arkansas. Hooghe was driving the car in Mississippi. Accordingly, based on section 99–11–23, DeSoto County had proper jurisdiction and venue. We find no merit to this argument.

II. Whether Hooghe was prejudiced by the amended, superseding indictment.

¶ 17. Hooghe claims that he was prejudiced when the grand jury handed down an amended, superseding indictment, which replaced the original indictment. Hooghe asserts that he was surprised by the new indictment, because he was not notified that the State intended to seek a new indictment. The State, he claims, failed to follow the law regarding the amendment of an indictment.

¶ 18. As noted in the facts, Hooghe was initially indicted for receiving stolen property. The State filed a motion to amend the indictment, which was served on Hooghe on June 29, 2012. The motion to amend the indictment provided that the amendment was “one of form and not of substance.” The State,...