Hooks v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY

• Decision Date: 13 February 1963
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 7353.
• Citation: 214 F. Supp. 4
• Parties: Willie C. HOOKS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

214 F. Supp. 4

Willie C. HOOKS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. No. 7353.

United States District Court N. D. New York.

February 13, 1963.

Goldbas & Goldbas, Utica, N. Y., Mackenzie, Smith, Lewis, Michell & Hughes, Syracuse, N. Y., George S. Sullivan, Syracuse, N. Y., of counsel, for plaintiff.

Kernan & Kernan, Utica, N. Y., James S. Kernan, Jr., Utica, N. Y., of counsel, for defendant.

JAMES T. FOLEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Willie C. Hooks, an itinerant farm worker, was struck by a train of the defendant railroad company on the morning of July 2, 1958 and severely injured. The accident happened while Hooks was crossing over on foot the four mainline tracks of the railroad at a farm crossing located on the Koury farm in open country near Oriskany, New York. After a well-tried presentation by experienced lawyers, a verdict of $30,000.00 was returned by a jury in plaintiff's favor, and the important question is whether the verdict should be allowed to stand. My judgment, after a review again of my rough notes and excerpts of the transcript of the testimony of the plaintiff furnished to me is that the jury verdict must fall and be disregarded as a matter of law. The sole ground for such decision is the insufficiency and inadequacy in the proof of the plaintiff, as I view it, to carry the burden he must under the law of New York that he was free from contributory negligence in any degree that may have caused or contributed to cause the accident.

I am frank to state that during the trial there was doubt in my mind on this important issue of contributory negligence. Some concern by the jury on the issue is evidenced by its return after approximately an hour of deliberation with a question concerning the possible apportionment of negligence. It was for the reason of doubt in my mind that decision was reserved upon the motion by the defendant for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, and after the return of the verdict upon the renewal of such motion, together with the alternative motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial. (F.R.Civ.Proc. rule 50(b); Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77.) Such reservation, particularly when there is doubt on a substantial point of law and insufficient time under trial pressures to absorb all the factual disputes, was made in accordance with settled and practical policy in this Circuit. (Fratta v. Grace Line, 2 Cir., 139 F.2d 743, 744; 5 Moore's Fed.Prac. (2nd Ed.) pg. 2320.) If I am wrong now in this ruling, the verdict can be reinstated by the federal appellate Court of this Circuit.

In its motions against the verdict, the defendant raises other points: the sufficiency of the evidence to prove negligence on its part under the New York concept of due and timely warning that must be applied; the private nature of the crossing that might make the plaintiff a trespasser instead of a licensee or invitee and thus affect the degree of care due and the type of warning to be given by the railroad under the circumstances and to be considered as factual questions by the jury in determining the responsibility of the railroad for the happening of the accident. I am content with the determination made at the trial as to these questions and the reasoning with which they were charged and left with the jury as questions of fact. There is no merit in the challenge to the amount of the verdict inasmuch as the injuries were serious, the medical and hospital expenses very costly, and the evidence of permanent disability sufficient. I am not conscious of serious error in the reception or admission of testimony or exhibit evidence, and this summary is made to emphasize the singleness of the issue, contributory negligence, upon which the ruling herein is made.

Supreme Court Justice Bergan of New York, one of its ablest and now Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Third Department, in his clear and concise style, characterized the problem of contributory negligence in these railroad crossing cases as it must be weighed in sufficiency for submission to a jury, or in upholding the verdict if submitted, as a delicate one with a long and controverted history in the New York Courts. (Fischer v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (1947), 188 Misc. 72, 73, 66 N.Y.S.2d 557; see also Shoifet v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 2 Cir., 265 F.2d 208.) Negligence law is a volatile field of law, and it is agreed the term negligence itself is quite incapable of precise standards of accurate definition. The facts of life and the exercise of common sense and good judgment are the most reliable guides for application to the particular facts involved that are different in each case. (Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 641, 50 S.Ct. 440, 74 L.Ed. 1082; Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104, 54 S.Ct. 580, 78 L.Ed. 1149; Schulz v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 525, 76 S. Ct. 608, 100 L.Ed. 668.) Many may not be aware, but the question is open in the United States Supreme Court whether state or federal principles are to control these diversity cases as to sufficiency of evidence to take the case to the jury or to support a verdict. (Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437, 444-445, 79 S.Ct. 921, 3 L.Ed.2d 935; O'Connor v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 2 Cir., 308 F.2d 911, 914; 5 Moore's Fed.Prac. (2nd Ed.) Section 38.10.) If federal standards were to be the measure, the burden placed upon the present plaintiff to show freedom from contributory negligence would be considerable. Justice Holmes bluntly stated that when a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him, and he knows that he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him. (Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70, 48 S.Ct. 24, 72 L.Ed. 167.) The decision was limited by Justice Cardozo in Pokora only to qualify the dicta that under certain circumstances of known danger a driver, before crossing, would have to stop and get out of his vehicle. (Pokora, supra; see Butler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., D.C., 46 F.Supp. 905, 908.) However, my reasoning is based upon New York authorities that in my judgment particularly fit this factual situation on the issue of contributory negligence. Further, it should be noted that I am extremely conscious, and always have been as a trial judge, that the verdict of a jury should not be lightly disregarded or set aside. My approach has been to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and to give the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports, even though contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn. (5 Moore's Fed.Prac. (2nd Ed.) pg. 2316; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520.)

A simple résumé of the acts and conduct of the...