Hoole v. Dorroh

• Decision Date: 27 December 1897
• Citation: 22 So. 829,75 Miss. 257
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHARD C. HOOLE v. WILLIAM G. DORROH

22 So. 829

75 Miss. 257

RICHARD C. HOOLE v. WILLIAM G. DORROH

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 27, 1897

December 1897

FROM the circuit court of Madison county.

Reversed and remanded.

F. B Pratt, for appellant.

This action was brought under § 1068 of the code of 1892. The point to which I invite attention is the meaning of the words "before the expiration of his contract, " and the meaning of the words at the end of the section, "damage which he may have sustained by reason thereof." It is not always a safe rule, or a true rule of construction, to decide according to the strict letter of the statute, but the courts will consider its fair meaning, and will explain it differently from the letter, in order to pursue the intent. Broom's Legal Maxims, 536. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice oppression or an absurd consequence. United States v Kirby, 7 Wall. [ U.S.], 485. The construction given in the opinion of this court in Armistead v. Chatters, 71 Miss. 509, to the clause ''before the expiration of his contract, " is to make it mean ''before the expiration of the time for which the laborer had contracted." I submit that this construction would, in many instances, make the statute inconsistent and lead to injustice, oppression anti absurd consequences, I contend that the correct construction of this phrase is to make it mean ''before the termination of the contract, " whether such termination is the result of a breach of the contract on the part of the laborer or on the part of the employer, or the result of a mutual rescission of the contract by employer or employe.

As to the offenses mentioned in the statute of "wilfully interfering with, " "enticing away, " "inducing a laborer to leave, " "inducing a renter to leave, " the phrase before the expiration of contract can have no application unless we give it the construction of termination of contract, for how can a laborer be interfered with, enticed away or induced to leave his employer after he has already broken his contract and left his employer? and how can a renter be induced to leave the rented premises after he has already moved away?, But give it the construction which I claim for it, and it is consistent in imposing a penalty for enticing away, etc., before termination of contract for any cause. If the legislature had intended to make it unlawful for anyone to employ a laborer after he had quit his former employer, and before the end of the time for which he had contracted with him, would it not have made an exception of cases where the laborer had quit his employer for just cause, as where he did not pay him as agreed, where he failed to furnish him sufficient food as agreed, where he treated him in a cruel and brutal manner, and where he discharged him and refused consent for anyone to employ him?

The statute is but declaratory of the common law on the subject, enlarging its scope and affixing penalties, etc. The purpose of the legislature was manifestly to declare the common law doctrine, and to extend its scope and to make it effective by penalty of double damage and fine. And we must look to the decisions under the common law doctrine in expounding and construing this statute. At common law it was necessary, in order for the master to recover, that the act should have been committed while employe was in actual service, before dissolution of relation of master and servant, and that the act of the defendant was the cause of the dissolution. Says the court, in Butterfield v. Ashley, 2 Gray [Mass.], 254: "Inducements must be presented to the servant, while he is in the service, which caused him to leave it; after he has, of his own accord, left the service, and is out of it, he cannot be enticed from it." Says the court, in Caughey v. Smith, 47 N.Y., 250: "To maintain an action for enticement from service, it must appear that the servant was in actual service of the master, and that the moving cause of dissolution was the inducement held out by the defendant." If, before the servant had met with the defendant there had been an abandonment of the service, it cannot be maintained that there was an enticement therefrom. If I am correct in the proper construction of the clause, ''before expiration of his contract, " then the defendant was guilty of no violation of the statute. For the defendant had no interview with Abe Green until after Abe had violated his contract and quit work and had been looking for employment for several days, and appellant did no act until after Abe had moved his effects from appellee's premises.

But if I am wrong in the construction of both clauses of the statute, and the construction given in Armistead v. Chatters is the correct one, then I submit that the statute is unconstitutional in this: it is in violation of the constitution of this state, which reads: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property except by due process of law." The statute, whether construed as in Armistead v. Chatters or as construed by the writer, is in violation of section one of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, which provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and which clause has been construed as prohibitory of class legislation. I claim that our statute, even with the construction contended for, is open to the objection that it is class legislation. It makes a rule for laborers and for employers of laborers, which does not apply to employers and employes generally.

"A person living under our constitution has the right to adopt and follow such lawful and industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see fit. Liberty, in the sense used in the constitution, means the right not only of freedom from servitude, etc., but the right of one to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, trade or vocation." People v. Golson, 109 N.Y. 389.

The right to contract for labor, which is property, is protected by the constitution. This class of legislation is a species of sumptuary legislation, which has been condemned as an attempt to degrade the intelligence, virtue and manhood of the American laborer. State v. Goodwell, 33 W.Va., 179. In Branville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 76, it is said: "Labor is the prime foundation of all wealth." In Lesp v. St. Louis, 58 Ark., 407, it is said: "The right to acquire and possess property necessarily includes the right to contract. Of all the rights of persons it is the most essential to human happiness." Law v. Rees, 41 Neb., 127; State v. Goodwell, 33 W.Va., 179; Low v. Rees, 41 Neb., 670; Ritcher v. People, 155 Ill. 98; Gulf Railroad, etc., v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150; Yock Woo v. Hopkins, 118 Ib., 356; Sutton. v. State, 96 Tenn., 710; Frorer v. People, 161 Ill. 171; Godcharles v. Wyman, 112 P. 431; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ib., 280. The verdict was wrong, because no damages whatever were proved.

J. B. Chrisman, for appellee.

The statute, code 1892, § 1068, condemns the appellant to damages on his own testimony, It was intended to meet the very subterfuge under which he hoped to escape. It allows damages to the employer when they result from [a] wilful interference, [b] enticing away, [c] knowingly employing or [d] inducing a laborer to break his contract. The appellant evidently proceeded on the idea that if the laborer renounced his contract and left the premises of the employer, he was at liberty to employ him. But see Armistead v Chatters, 71 Miss. 509. "I won't go on Dorroh's place to move you off, " he says, "but if I find your effects in the big road Wednesday morning, I...