Hooper v. Albany Intern. Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2001
• Docket Number: CIV. A. No. 01-A-267-N.
• Citation: 149 F.Supp.2d 1315
• Parties: Robert S. HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY INTERNATIONAL CORP. d/b/a Appleton Wire and First Fortis Life Insurance Company, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

149 F.Supp.2d 1315

Robert S. HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. ALBANY INTERNATIONAL CORP. d/b/a Appleton Wire and First Fortis Life Insurance Company, Defendants.

CIV. A. No. 01-A-267-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

July 25, 2001.

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Alvin T. Prestwood, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Chris Mitchell, Charles A. Powell, IV, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ALBRITTON, Chief Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause is before the court on a Motion to Remand (doc. # 4) filed by the Plaintiff, Robert S. Hooper, on April 2, 2001. The Plaintiff originally filed this action on January 31, 2001, in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. Albany International Corp. d/b/a Appleton Wire ("Albany") filed a Notice of Removal on March 5, 2001. First Fortis Life Insurance Company ("First Fortis") filed a Consent to Removal on April 10, 2001.

For reasons to be discussed, the Motion to Remand is due to be DENIED.

II. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff alleges that while he was employed with Albany, he purchased a longterm and short-term disability insurance policy through Albany's Disability Benefits Program. Plaintiff claims that Albany sponsored and First Fortis administered the disability plan. According to Plaintiff, he became disabled on or about August 24, 1998. Plaintiff contends that sometime thereafter he made a claim for benefits under the plan, and that Albany and First Fortis (collectively "Defendants") failed to pay Plaintiff long-term disability benefits due under the plan.

Plaintiff's Complaint brings several state law claims against the Defendants arising from the denial of long-term disability insurance benefits. These claims are for breach of contract (Count I), fraudulent inducement (Count II), promissory fraud (Count III), negligent hiring and supervision (Count IV), and bad faith (Count V).

This case was removed to federal court only on the grounds of federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Albany's Notice of Removal, to which First Fortis has consented, contends that Plaintiff's claims are completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), so that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Albany filed its Notice of Removal on March 5, 2001, twenty-six days after it was served with legal process. First Fortis filed its Consent to Removal on April 10, 2001, one day after it received the summons and complaint in this case.

III. REMAND STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm. of Fla., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 131 (1984). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673. Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises four arguments in favor of remand. First, Plaintiff contends that Albany's Notice of Removal is defective because it was not joined by First Fortis. Second, Plaintiff argues that the "well-pleaded complaint rule" precludes removal in this case because no federal question is raised on the face of Plaintiff's Complaint. Third, in the event that Plaintiff's state law claims are completely preempted under ERISA, Plaintiff argues that 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), the so-called "saving clause," would nevertheless require remand of the present dispute to state court. Finally, Plaintiff maintains that the Montgomery County Circuit Court has concurrent jurisdiction over this dispute and, therefore, pursuant to Alabama case law, the Plaintiff should have his choice of forum. The court will take these arguments up in turn.

A. Joinder of First Fortis in Notice of Removal

Plaintiff's argument relating to defective removal can be summarily rejected. It is true as a general rule that all defendants must join in a removal petition in order to effect removal. Newman v. Spectrum Stores, Inc., 109 F.Supp.2d 1342, 1345 (M.D.Ala.2000).! If the record indicated that First Fortis had not joined in Albany's petition for removal, the issue of remand on that basis would require discussion. However, First Fortis has filed a Consent to Removal with the court.¹ Because the Plaintiff raises no other issues regarding procedural infirmities in this case, the court will move on to his next argument supporting remand.²

B. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule

Removal of a case to federal court is only proper if the case originally could have been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In this case, the Defendants claim that removal is proper because this court has federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff responds by noting that no federal question is presented on the face of his properly pleaded Complaint.

Federal question jurisdiction requires that the action arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In deciding whether a federal question exists, the court must apply the well-pleaded complaint rule whereby the court looks to the face of the complaint, rather than to any defenses asserted by the defendant. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Consequently, the general rule is that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of preemption. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425.

There is, however, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule which the Defendants claim applies in the present case to give this court federal question jurisdiction. This exception is known as the "complete preemption" doctrine. Id. The doctrine of complete preemption is distinguished from a simple defense of preemption in that simple preemption is a question of whether a defense is available under federal law, while complete preemption is a jurisdictional question which focuses on Congress' intent to make the cause of action a federal cause of action and removable despite the fact that the plaintiff's complaint identifies only state claims. Whitman v. Raley's Inc., 886 F.2d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.1989). Therefore, where the removal petition demonstrates that the plaintiff's claims, although couched in the language of state law claims, are federal claims in substance, the preemptive force of federal law provides the basis for removal jurisdiction. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968).

The Supreme Court has determined that the uniform regulatory scheme established by ERISA is one area in which Congress intended to provide for complete preemption. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). Congress' intent is evidenced in the statutory provision of ERISA which provides that ERISA shall supersede state laws insofar as they may relate to any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Therefore, if state law claims "relate to" an ERISA plan within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), the claims are converted to federal claims for the purposes of removal jurisdiction. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 60, 107 S.Ct. 1542.

In conducting its complete preemption analysis, the court is guided by the Eleventh Circuit's framework of analysis in Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir.1999). In Butero, the court explained that the requirements of complete preemption are that there must be a relevant ERISA plan, the plaintiff must have standing to sue under the plan, the defendant must be an ERISA entity, and the complaint must seek compensatory relief akin to that available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Id. at 1212.

There is no question here that all four elements of complete preemption are satisfied. Indeed, Plaintiff has not contested them. First, there is a relevant ERISA plan, The Albany International Disability Benefits Program, Short-Term Disability Benefit Plan, Long-Term Disability Benefit Plan. Exh. 1 (attached to Albany's Motion to Dismiss). See Love v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 120 F.Supp.2d 997, 1002 (M.D.Ala.2000) identifying the requirements of an ERISA employee welfare benefit plant to be: "(1) a plan, fund, or program (2) established or maintained (3) by an employer (4) for the purpose of providing disability benefits (5) to participants or their beneficiaries." (citing Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir.1982)). Second, as a potential beneficiary under the plan, Plaintiff has standing to sue. Exh. 1 (attached to Albany's Motion to Dismiss). Third, given the allegations included in Plaintiff's Complaint and the existence of an ERISA plan, Defendants are rightly considered ERISA entities for purposes of complete preemption analysis. Finally, the damages sought by Plaintiff are akin to those available under ERISA. See Butero, 174 F.3d at 1213; 29 U.S.C. § 1132.

The Supreme Court has stated that the words "relate to" in ERISA's preemption provision should be broadly construed in that a particular state law "relates to" an ERISA plan if the state law claim has a "connection with or reference to" an employee benefit plan. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). Such a determination must be made with a common sense view of the matter. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). Even a state law...