Hooper v. City of Montgomery

• Decision Date: 16 March 2007
• Docket Number: Civ. Act. No. 2:06cv612-ID.
• Citation: 482 F.Supp.2d 1330
• Parties: Rhett S. HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

482 F.Supp.2d 1330

Rhett S. HOOPER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Act. No. 2:06cv612-ID.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

March 16, 2007.

John Scott Hooper, The Hooper Law Firm, PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Kimberly Owen Fehl, City of Montgomery Legal Division, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, Senior District Judge.

Before the court is a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 4), filed by Defendants City of Montgomery, John Wilson ("Wilson") and M.S. Lamb ("Lamb"). Plaintiff Rhett S. Hooper ("Hooper") filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 7), to which Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. No. 8.) After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted as to some claims, but denied as to others. The court also on its own initiative shall require Hooper to replead some of his claims.

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for all claims arising under federal law. The court also has original jurisdiction over claims based upon violations of civil rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990). Moreover, all factual allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).

Generally, "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Braden v. Piggly Wiggly, 4 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1360 (M.D.Ala. 1998). In 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions, however, where government officials sued in their individual capacities may be entitled to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has "tightened" the pleading requirements. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.2001) (recognizing that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a complaint must be pleaded with "heightened specificity ... in civil rights actions against public officials who may be entitled to qualified immunity"). In Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, the Eleventh Circuit held that in cases where qualified immunity is implicated, "some factual detail is necessary, especially if [the court is] to be able to see that the allegedly violated right was clearly established when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred." 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.1992). Accordingly, in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity, courts must be "guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement." GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1367.

Finally, "the analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto." Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, Hooper has submitted his own affidavit in opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court, however, may not consider it unless the court converts the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, which the court declines to do. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Hence, in ruling on the present motion, the court has not relied upon Hooper's affidavit.

III. BACKGROUND

As alleged in the complaint, the facts are as follows. On July 13, 2004, late in the evening around 10:00 p.m., Hooper was driving north on Interstate 85 near Shorter, Alabama, when another vehicle "r[a]n [him] off the road." (Compl. ¶ 10.) Hooper called the police "for help in stopping the driver." (Id.) At that time, Hooper did not know the identity of the driver. (Id. ¶ 11.) A police officer with the Shorter, Alabama Police Department responded to Hooper's call and pulled over the suspect vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 12. 23.) The driver of the vehicle was identified as John Wilson, who at the time was Chief of Police of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 23.) The officer who initiated the traffic stop observed Wilson "weaving and driving recklessly on a public road, in a private vehicle," and indicated that Wilson was "under the influence of alcohol." (Id. ¶ 12.)

Hooper and Wilson were not strangers prior to the foregoing incident. Hooper, a former Montgomery police officer, worked under the command of Wilson until approximately 2001. Their professional relationship, however, did not end affably. As alleged by Hooper, in 1999, Wilson, in conjunction with Hooper's direct supervisor (Lamb), intentionally fabricated a complaint against Hooper, accusing him of "racial harassment." (Id. ¶ 15.) After a hearing, Wilson recommended to the mayor that Hooper be terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 19-20.) Although on appeal the recommendation of dismissal was reduced to a forty-five day suspension, the "false information accusing Hooper of [ racial harassment" was made a part of Hooper's personnel file. (Id. ¶ 15.) Thereafter, Hooper remained employed with the Montgomery Police Department; however, after two years, Hooper was "force[d]" to resign due to the "hostile working environment" to which he was subjected. (Id. ¶ 20.) Moreover, because of the "fabricated" information in his personnel file, Hooper avers that he "is not eligible for rehire for employment" with the Montgomery Police Department and that, on unspecified dates, he has been denied other employment opportunities. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.)

The foregoing facts pertaining to the placement of stigmatizing information in Hooper's personnel file give context to what occurred after the traffic stop of Wilson on July 13, 2004. Hooper avers that, on or about July 15, 2004, Wilson disclosed Hooper's personnel file, containing the above-described "false and fraudulent" information, to "unauthorized parties, without consent or permission of [Hooper]." (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.) Namely, Hooper contends that Wilson released his personnel file to WSFA 12, a local television station in Montgomery, Alabama, and that "the same was broadcast to the public at large from said television broadcasting company for numerous days and placed ... on the WSFA internet site." (Id. ¶ 14.)

Consequently, Hooper filed the instant complaint on July 12, 2006, against the City of Montgomery and Wilson and Lamb in their individual and official capacities. The complaint contains five counts. In Count I, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hooper alleges a deprivation of his civil rights, which he generically describes in the caption of this count as violations of his "Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights." (Id. at 4.)

Paragraphs 17 through 23 of Count I describe the events, which the court recited above. In the two concluding paragraphs of Count I, Hooper alleges a multitude of violations by Wilson and Lamb, but does not connect the violations to any particular constitutional amendment. Hooper avers as follows:

Defendant Wilson has committed a violation of Police Department rules of conduct by conducting a hearing over Hooper in bad faith; by making untrue public statements about Hooper; by proceeding [sic] over a hearing knowingly containing false accusations; by proceeding [sic] over a hearing past the time allowed for the claims of the alleged victim's [sic] to be brought against Hooper; by disclosing confidential city information to unauthorized persons; by willfully disregarding City policies or procedures to the detriment of Plaintiff Hooper.

Defendant Lamb has committed a violation of Police Department rules of conduct by making a false and untrue claim against Plaintiff Hooper with intent to cause injury to Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff's civil rights.

(Id, ¶¶ 24-25.) As relief on Count I, Hooper demands unspecified declaratory relief, compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00, punitive damages "as a jury deems reasonable," and costs. (Id. at 1, 6.) In Counts II, III, IV and V, Hooper asserts state law claims grounded in negligence and requests $100,000.00 in compensatory damages and "costs." (Id. ¶¶ 26-41.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants move the court to dismiss each of the five counts of the complaint. As grounds for the dismissal of Count I, Defendants raise the defense of statute of limitations, assert that Wilson and Lamb are protected by qualified immunity and contend that the City of Montgomery is not liable on a theory of respondeat superior. As to the state law claims in Counts II, III, IV and V, Defendants argue that these claims also are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Wilson and Lamb are entitled to discretionary function immunity. Hooper has not responded to Defendants' arguments concerning the dismissal of the state law claims in Counts III, IV and V, and, consequently, the court finds that Hooper has abandoned these claims. Cf. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir.1995) ("[t]here is no...