Marshall v. West, Civ. Act. No. 2:06cv701-ID.

• Decision Date: 24 May 2007
• Docket Number: Civ. Act. No. 2:06cv701-ID.
• Citation: 507 F.Supp.2d 1285
• Parties: Richard MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. Chris WEST, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

507 F.Supp.2d 1285

Richard MARSHALL, Plaintiff, v. Chris WEST, et al., Defendants.

Civ. Act. No. 2:06cv701-ID.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

May 24, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jay Lewis, Law Offices of Jay Lewis, LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

Daryl L. Masters, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Richard Marshall ("Plaintiff') brings this civil rights lawsuit against Defendants Chris West and Lashun Hutson, who are sued in their individual capacities for alleged unconstitutional acts occurring within the line and scope of their authority as Alabama deputy sheriffs.¹ Plaintiff brings constitutional claims against Defendants under the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an illegal traffic stop, excessive force, unlawful search, false arrest and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff also asserts state-law claims of assault and battery and conversion.

This action presently is before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 5.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion (Doc. No, 8), to which Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. No. 9.) Defendants contend that they are entitled to dismissal on all the constitutional claims for failure of Plaintiff to plead his claims in sufficient detail to overcome Defendants' defense of qualified immunity, or, alternatively, because Plaintiff has failed to plead any specific conduct by Defendants which violated his clearly-established rights. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that Defendants' motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (civil rights jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations of both.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint because the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion questions the legal sufficiency of a complaint; therefore, in assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in the complaint are true. See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir.1990). Moreover, all factual allegations are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989).

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally sets the benchmark for determining whether a complaint's allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, however, where government officials sued in their individual capacities may be entitled to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit has "tightened" the pleading requirements. GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.1998); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that, in the Eleventh Circuit, a complaint must be pleaded with "heightened specificity ... in civil rights actions against public officials who may be entitled to qualified immunity"). Accordingly, in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a § 1983 claim against a defendant in his or her individual capacity, courts must be "guided both by the regular 12(b)(6) standard and by the heightened pleading requirement." GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1367.

Moreover, in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) assertion of qualified immunity, "[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). As explained in Marsh v. Butler, "The Supreme Court has urged [courts] to apply the affirmative defense of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage in litigation because the defense is immunity from suit and not from damages only." 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), implicitly modified on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed2d 666 (2002). This circuit, therefore, has recognized that, "[w]hile the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be ... raised and considered on a motion to dismiss." St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2002).

IV. FACTS

The facts in the complaint, which are taken as true for present purposes, are as follows.² On June 28, 2005, Plaintiff was driving a 1971 Chevrolet Nova in which his cousin was a passenger. (Compl.¶ 8.) Plaintiff "was peacefully and lawfully" driving his car on a public road in Lowndes County, Alabama, when he observed a Lincoln Town Car "approaching from the opposite direction at a high rate of speed." (Compl. ¶¶ 8-9.) The Lincoln "braked sharply" upon nearing Plaintiffs car, "turned around and began to follow Plaintiff." (Id. ¶ 10.) The Lincoln, which continued to travel at a high rate of speed, quickly caught up with and "pulled alongside" Plaintiffs vehicle. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff observed in the Lincoln two African-American males both of whom were "wearing black tee shirts." (Id. ¶ 13.) At that time, neither the passenger nor the driver "identified himself as a law enforcement officer." (Id. ¶ 15.) The passenger "produced a semiautomatic pistol, waved it at Plaintiff, and gestured for him to pull over." (Id.)

Plaintiff, however, did not know either individual in the Lincoln Town Car (id. ¶ 13), and he declined "to pull over at the behest of an unknown, pistol-toting male."³ (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff, therefore, continued driving, and the Lincoln "fell behind him, following him." (Id. ¶ 17.)

When Plaintiff turned west onto Highway 21, the Lincoln "suddenly sped up and again pulled alongside" Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 18) West, whose identity was still unknown to Plaintiff, again "waved his weapon at Plaintiff and gestured for him to pull over." (Id. ¶ 19.) Because this stretch of highway "was mostly deserted," Plaintiff decided "to keep driving until he could get to a populated area[.]" (Id. ¶ 20.) At that point, the Lincoln "fell back again, then sped up" and "ram[med] Plaintiffs vehicle in the rear." (Id. ¶ 21) The driver of the Lincoln, who was Hutson, continued to ram the vehicle "between three and five times." (Id.) Unsuccessful in stopping Plaintiffs car, Hutson executed a "precision immobilization technique," also known as a "pursuit intervention technique" ("PIT").⁴ (Id. ¶ 22.)

The PIT maneuver was successful, causing Plaintiffs car to "spin out of control" and land in a ditch alongside the highway. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 24.) As a result of hitting his head on the steering wheel, Plaintiff was "dazed and slightly injured." (Id. ¶ 25.) Defendants then "leapt from their vehicle pointing guns at Plaintiff and his cousin, shouting for them to get down on the g[r]ound." (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff "offered no resistance," but West nonetheless "discharged his weapon in Plaintiffs general direction, apparently as a warning," and presumably because Plaintiff did not act as "quickly" as West desired. (Id.) The gunshot "frightened and alarmed Plaintiff[,] and he froze in place, still offering no resistance." (Id. ¶ 27.) West then "threw" Plaintiff "to the ground, handcuffed him, and stood him back up against his vehicle." (Id. ¶ 28.)

West proceeded to "frisk[]" Plaintiff, rifling through his pants pockets and ripping his pants in the process. (Id. ¶ 29.) West also examined the contents of Plaintiff's wallet and retrieved from the wallet, among other items, approximately $500.00 in cash. Unknown to Plaintiff at the time, West returned only $100.00 to Plaintiffs wallet. (Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 35.) West and Hutson then conducted a warrantless search of Plaintiffs car. (Id. ¶ 31-32.) Plaintiff does not expressly allege whether any incriminating items were found in the search, but he does state that, ultimately, he was charged with "possession of controlled substances and carrying a pistol without a license." (Id. ¶ 36.)

After being transported to the Lowndes County jail, Plaintiff was "book[ed]." (Id. ¶&182; 33-35.) Plaintiff was then held for two days "without being charged" or informed of the basis for his detention. (Id. 1134.)

Plaintiff remained incarcerated from June 28, 2005, until August 5, 2005, when he was released on a $10,000 bond. (Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff alleges that he was in jail for this five-week period because the sheriff of Lowndes County refused to approve his aunt's efforts to "put up a property bond to secure his release." (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff also alleges that he was "compelled to pay $1,200 as a premium in order to secure his bond." (Id. ¶ 38.) In January 2006, Plaintiff appeared in court to answer the charges, and the charges were dismissed. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Seeking redress under federal and state laws, on August 8, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant three-count complaint against West and Hutson, alleging violations of his First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the U.S. Constitution, as enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 44, 48, and p. 8(a).) West and Hutson are sued in their individual capacities only. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.)

In Count I of the complaint, which alleges...