Hooper v. Hooper
| Decision Date | 02 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 7607,7607 |
| Citation | 403 S.W.2d 215 |
| Parties | L. G. HOOPER, Appellant, v. Barbara HOOPER, Appellee. . Amarillo |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Cox & Hurt, Plainview, for appellant.
Huff & Bowers, Lubbock, for appellee.
Barbara Hooper, plaintiff below, obtained a divorce from L. G. Hooper in a nonjury trial. The decree awarded custody of the minor son to the plaintiff; ordered a division of the community property; and ordered the defendant to pay $100.00 per month for the support of one minor child. The sole question presented by the defendant below on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which the property was divided.
Mrs. Hooper filed a suit on July 8, 1963, but the case was not heard on its merits until September 15, 1965. In the meantime Mr. Hooper was under an injunction not to dispose of any of the property; not to go about or molest his wife or the children; and was required to pay $250.00 per month for the temporary support of the wife and children. It is admitted these monthly payments were paid during this period. The parties had been married some 26 years and it is conceded all property involved was community property. Except for debts owing on a 1962 Chevrolet pickup truck and a 1956 Chrysler, all property was free and clear of indebtedness. Although there was some difference in the estimated values placed on some of the property by the parties, there is no substantial controversy over the property valuations. Prior to the trial the court appointed an independent appraiser. His report is not in evidence, but references to his appraisal were made by various witnesses and it seems to compare favorably with the Inventory and Appraisement filed by appellant upon the order of the trial court. The appraised value of the property is not in real issue.
The parties acquired the following community property along with its approximate value:
(1) A house and lot of the value of $11,500.00;
(2) Household furniture and fixtures valued at $1200.00;
(3) 26 Appaloosa horses valued at $4,000.00;
(4) One-half interest in a sporting goods and western wear store which includes its stock and fixtures, of the value of $16,000.00;
(5) One 1958 Chevrolet automobile of the value of $700.00;
(6) A 1956 Chrysler automobile of the value of $500.00, upon which there was a debt owed of $500.00;
(7) A 1962 Chevrolet pickup truck of the value of $1200.00, upon which there was a debt owed of $750.00;
(8) 2 horse stalls and pens, valued at $300.00;
(9) A tandem horse trailer, valued at $200.00;
(10) A life insurance policy, on the life of appellant in the face amount of $1,000.00, with a cash surrender value of approximately $650.00; and
(11) 2 bank accounts, the exact amount of each not shown, but they were relatively small.
The court awarded appellant the horses, the stalls and pens, the horse trailer, and the 1958 Chevrolet automobile; and awarded appellee the remainder of the property. The property awarded to Mrs . Hooper was valued at approximately $30,500.00 while the property awarded to the husband was valued at approximately $4,500.00. This does not include the $250.00 per month paid Mrs. Hooper by appellant for some 26 months for the support of herself and the children between the filing of the suit and the trial of the case. The parties' middle son was 17 years of age at the time suit was filed, but was over 18 at the time of the trial.
We know of no class of cases in which the general rules of law are more settled. The cases are legion which declare the general rule that the trial court has wide discretion in disposing of community property of parties to a divorce action. Tex.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, Section 207, page 545 and cases cited. However, this wide discretion is not unlimited and should be exercised with due regard for the rights of the parties. Wilson v. Wilson (Tex.Civ.App .) 225 S.W.2d 236. One of the early leading cases, Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21, held the district court was empowered to 'order a division of the estate of the parties to the divorce suit in such a way as to the court seemed just and right, having due regard to the rights of each party and of the children'....
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Capellen v. Capellen
...case, he cites such cases as Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Hooper v. Hooper, 403 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1966, writ dism'd). The fact situations in those cases are quite different from this case. Here, the "inequality" in the division......
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